Author: Professor Matthew Tasooji
President Donald Trump recently framed the challenge posed by Iran in stark terms: either reach an agreement that permits Iran to rebuild and pursue a better future or take decisive action to prevent the Islamic Republic from continuing to threaten its neighbors and the wider world. In his September 2026 address to the United Nations, Trump explicitly asked whether he should make a deal with Iran or “annihilate the Islamic Republic” quickly. [1]
That statement has predictably generated fierce political debate in the United States. But before choosing sides based on partisan loyalty, Americans—and policymakers in the West—should step back and examine the facts. There is a legitimate argument that war with Iran would be enormously costly. There is also a legitimate argument that diplomacy is preferable to military confrontation whenever diplomacy can produce a durable solution. But there is a third option that deserves far more serious consideration: supporting the Iranian people in their struggle for a democratic, secular, non-nuclear alternative to the Islamic Republic.
The problem did not begin with today’s crisis
The Islamic Republic has pursued an expansive regional strategy since the 1979 revolution. Tehran has invested heavily in building and supporting a network of armed organizations across the Middle East. The Congressional Research Service has documented Iranian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis in Yemen, and several Iraqi armed groups, including Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. The nature and degree of Iranian support varies from organization to organization, and these groups retain different levels of independence from Tehran. Nevertheless, Iranian support for them is a well-established element of the Islamic Republic’s regional strategy. [2]
The U.S. State Department has likewise described the IRGC-Quds Force as a central mechanism through which Iran provides guidance, training, funding and weapons to regional partners and proxy organizations, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas and Iran-aligned militias in Iraq and Syria. [3] This strategy provides Tehran with significant regional influence without requiring it to rely exclusively on conventional military power. The result has been a form of warfare that often allows Tehran to project power while maintaining some distance from the consequences.
Hezbollah became one of Iran’s most important regional partners. The Houthis have attacked commercial shipping and international maritime routes. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have attacked U.S. personnel and interests. Hamas has received Iranian support for decades. Together, these organizations form what is commonly described as Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” [2] This is not a theory invented by one political party. It is a documented component of Iranian foreign policy.
Hormuz and the politics of escalation
The Strait of Hormuz is another reason the world cannot treat the confrontation with Iran as a distant regional dispute. The strait is one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimated that approximately 20 million barrels per day of petroleum liquids passed through Hormuz in 2024—roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. Approximately one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade also passed through the strait. [4]
Any prolonged disruption could therefore have consequences far beyond Iran, Israel, or the Persian Gulf. Energy prices, shipping costs, inflation and economic growth could all be affected. That is precisely why Tehran has historically possessed leverage through the threat of disruption. But there is an important distinction between recognizing the seriousness of this threat and celebrating it. Those who portray attacks on American bases, attacks on commercial shipping, or threats to energy flows as evidence of Iranian “success” should ask a simple question:
Successful for whom?
Iranian missiles and drones may impose costs on the United States and its allies. Disrupting shipping may create economic pain. But ultimately, ordinary people—in Iran, the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the United States—pay the price. Celebrating instability because it hurts an American president is not a foreign-policy strategy.
The nuclear question cannot be dismissed
The most consequential part of the Iranian challenge is the nuclear issue. Iran has spent decades developing an advanced nuclear infrastructure while insisting that its program is peaceful. At the same time, the International Atomic Energy Agency has raised serious safeguards questions concerning Iran’s nuclear activities. In 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations. [5]
The economic cost has also been extraordinary. Iran Open Data estimated in 2025 that Iran’s nuclear strategy had generated between roughly $900 billion and $3.1 trillion in lost economic opportunities, depending on the economic-growth scenario used. This figure should be understood as an estimate rather than a settled accounting fact. [6]
Even the lower end of such an estimate represents an extraordinary opportunity cost for a country with a population of more than 90 million and substantial natural and human resources. The fundamental question, therefore, is not simply how much Iran has spent on nuclear development. It is what the Iranian people have sacrificed for a strategy that has brought sanctions, isolation, confrontation and enormous opportunity costs.
Were the warnings ignored?
Critics of Western policy have argued for decades that the international community underestimated the ideological and geopolitical ambitions of the Islamic Republic. One example is Mohammad Mohaddessin’s 1993 book, Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat. Published by Seven Locks Press in Washington, D.C., the book presented an early warning from the Iranian opposition concerning the international implications of the Islamic Republic’s ideology and its policy of exporting revolutionary fundamentalism. [7]
So, the broad question is: Did Western governments place economic interests and short-term stability ahead of confronting the long-term consequences of Iran’s regional strategy?
There were understandable reasons for diplomacy. Iran is a major country with a large population, significant energy resources and a strategically important geographic position. Diplomacy can prevent wars, save lives and create opportunities that military action cannot. But diplomacy works only when both sides are prepared to make meaningful concessions. Repeatedly offering concessions without establishing credible consequences for violations can become appeasement rather than diplomacy.
The Iranian people are not the Iranian regime
This distinction is essential. The Islamic Republic and the Iranian people are not the same thing. Millions of Iranians have repeatedly demonstrated opposition to the political system, corruption, repression and economic mismanagement. The protests of recent years have demonstrated that the desire for political change is not confined to a small group of exiles. The regime has responded to dissent with imprisonment, executions and violence.
The United Nations reported in August 2025 that Iranian authorities had executed at least 841 people between January 1 and August 28 of that year, including 110 executions in July alone. The UN specifically expressed concern that the death penalty was being used as a tool of state intimidation and noted that individuals associated with the MEK and participants in the 2022 protests were among those facing execution. [8] The history of political repression goes back much further.
The mass executions of political prisoners in 1988 remain one of the darkest episodes in the history of the Islamic Republic. Thousands of prisoners were killed, with MEK members and supporters among the principal targets. The precise number of victims is said to be oin tens of thousands and is extensively documented by human-rights organizations and United Nations sources. [9] This history matters because the international community should not confuse the Iranian regime’s survival with the Iranian people’s welfare.
There is an alternative to both war and surrender
This brings us to the most important question: What comes after the Islamic Republic? Military intervention by itself cannot answer that question. A war with Iran could kill enormous numbers of people, destroy infrastructure, destabilize neighboring countries and potentially strengthen the very hardliners it is intended to weaken.
War should therefore not be treated as an easy solution. But the alternative cannot be endless accommodation either. The answer should be to empower the Iranian people to determine their own future. There are organized Iranian opposition movements that have spent decades advocating political change. The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) have presented themselves as part of a democratic alternative to the Islamic Republic and have long opposed Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the regime’s regional policies.
Regime change should come from the Iranian people
The goal should not be the destruction of Iran. It should be the transformation of Iran. A democratic Iran could become a stabilizing force in the Middle East rather than a source of instability. It could redirect its enormous human and economic resources toward its own people rather than toward militias, missile programs and regional conflicts. It could maintain peaceful relations with its neighbors. It could abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons. It could release political prisoners. It could allow Iranians to choose their own government. And it could finally end the cycle in which the Iranian people are held hostage to the ambitions of their rulers. That transformation should be led by Iranians themselves.
The United States and its allies cannot manufacture Iranian democracy from outside. But they can make a profound difference by refusing to legitimize repression, exposing human-rights abuses, imposing meaningful consequences on those responsible for them, protecting the Iranian people’s access to information and communication, and recognizing the legitimacy of the Iranian people’s aspiration for democratic government.
The choice is not Trump or Iran
One of the most troubling aspects of the current debate is the tendency to reduce the issue to partisan politics. Some Americans oppose virtually anything President Trump supports. Others support virtually anything he proposes. Neither approach is adequate for a question as consequential as Iran. The Iranian regime should not be defended simply because it is opposed to Trump. Nor should war be embraced simply because Trump threatens it.The proper question is much bigger:
What policy gives the Iranian people the best chance to achieve freedom while protecting the United States and the international community from another devastating war?
The answer should be neither unconditional appeasement nor reckless military escalation. It should be maximum pressure on the regime combined with maximum moral and political support for the Iranian people.The international community should recognize that the Iranian people have the right to determine their own political future. It should support those Iranians seeking a democratic and non-nuclear Iran and hold the regime accountable for terrorism, repression and regional destabilization.Peace in the Middle East will not come from permanently managing the Islamic Republic’s aggression. Nor will it come from destroying Iran. It will come when the Iranian people themselves are free to build a government that represents them. The ultimate objective should therefore be clear: not war with Iran, but freedom for Iran.
Selected Resources and References
1. Donald J. Trump, United Nations General Assembly address, September 22, 2026.
The transcript contains Trump’s statement presenting the choice between a deal with Iran and “annihilat[ing] the Islamic Republic.” Full transcript — Roll Call/Factbase
2. Congressional Research Service, “Iran-Supported Groups in the Middle East and U.S. Policy.”
A particularly useful nonpartisan source documenting Iran’s relationships with Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and Iraqi armed groups. Congressional Research Service report
3. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism.
The State Department describes the IRGC-Quds Force’s role in providing funding, training, weapons and guidance to regional armed groups. U.S. Department of State — Country Reports on Terrorism
4. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Strait of Hormuz analysis.
Useful source for statistics concerning oil and LNG flows through Hormuz and the potential consequences of disruption. U.S. Energy Information Administration
5. International Atomic Energy Agency.
The IAEA is the primary international institution for verification of Iran’s nuclear obligations and safeguards compliance. Its reports provide the strongest primary-source material for the nuclear section.
6. Iran Open Data, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Multi-Trillion-Dollar Strategic Misfire,” June 17, 2025.
This is the source for the $900 billion–$3.1 trillion estimate. Because the number is an economic model rather than an independently audited figure, the article appropriately describes it as an estimate. Iran Open Data analysis
7. Mohammad Mohaddessin, Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat (Seven Locks Press, 1993).
The book is particularly relevant to your argument that the Iranian opposition warned about the international implications of the Islamic Republic decades ago. WorldCat bibliographic record
8. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Iran executions, August 2025.
The UN reported at least 841 executions through August 28, 2025, and specifically raised concerns about executions connected to alleged MEK membership and the 2022 protests. United Nations Office at Geneva — Iran executions
9. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026: Iran.
Provides additional documentation of executions, repression, arbitrary arrests and the treatment of political opponents in Iran. Human Rights Watch — Iran 2026