By: Professor Matthew Tasooji
The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to exist as a constitutional and institutional system. Its formal structure remains intact, its government functions, and its state institutions continue to operate. Beneath this appearance of continuity, however, many of the foundations that once sustained the regime have weakened substantially. The concentration of political authority, the cohesion of the ruling elite, the country’s economic strength, the government’s public legitimacy, the effectiveness of state institutions, and its ability to manage crises have all steadily deteriorated. Taken together, the political, economic, social, and security developments of recent years suggest that while the Islamic Republic has preserved its institutional form, it has experienced a profound erosion in the substance of its power.
One of the clearest indicators of this erosion is the leadership question. For decades, the Islamic Republic relied on a highly centralized political system in which ultimate authority rested with the Supreme Leader. Today, however, the regime faces increasing difficulty in maintaining that same degree of authority and cohesion. Mojtaba Khamenei, long discussed as a possible successor, has yet to establish the political legitimacy or independent authority necessary to command Iran’s diverse centers of power. Unlike the revolutionary generation that founded the Islamic Republic, he lacks both the historical credentials and the nationwide political constituency needed to unite competing factions. Consequently, internal rivalries have become more visible, and consensus within the ruling establishment has become increasingly difficult.
Alongside the leadership challenge, the economy has become the regime’s greatest vulnerability. Decades of sanctions, structural inefficiencies, corruption, capital flight, and declining investment have left Iran increasingly unable to meet the expectations of its citizens. Persistent inflation, repeated depreciation of the national currency, high unemployment—particularly among educated young people—and declining purchasing power have placed enormous pressure on millions of Iranian families. The government no longer possesses the economic capacity it once had to reduce social tensions through financial assistance and state benefits.
The economic crisis has consequently evolved into a political one. Repeated demonstrations by workers, retirees, teachers, nurses, farmers, and other sectors of society demonstrate that public dissatisfaction now extends well beyond living standards. Economic grievances have become inseparable from demands for transparency, accountability, and more effective governance. For many Iranians, economic hardship is no longer viewed as an isolated policy failure but as a consequence of corruption, mismanagement, and broader structural problems within the political system.
Political divisions within the ruling establishment have also intensified. Competition among various factions has evolved beyond routine electoral rivalry into deeper disagreements over economic policy, foreign relations, and responses to domestic unrest. Rather than presenting a unified strategy to confront mounting crises, competing political groups increasingly seek to preserve their own institutional influence and economic interests. This fragmentation has weakened decision-making and reduced the government’s ability to respond effectively to both domestic and international challenges.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), long regarded as the principal pillar of the Islamic Republic, also operates in a more difficult environment than in previous decades. Although it remains the country’s most powerful military, security, and economic institution, it faces mounting financial constraints, regional uncertainties, and growing domestic criticism. Simultaneously maintaining extensive internal security operations while supporting regional allies has imposed increasing organizational and financial burdens.
Public perceptions of the IRGC have also shifted. For many Iranians, particularly younger generations, the organization has become increasingly associated with political repression, economic privilege, and restrictions on civil liberties rather than solely with national defense. Although this does not eliminate the IRGC’s institutional power, it weakens one of the regime’s traditional sources of political legitimacy.
Iran’s domestic security environment has likewise become more complex. Alongside recurring nationwide protests, reports indicate continued armed activity by Kurdish and Baluchi groups against government security forces in several border regions. At the same time, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) has announced an expansion of the activities of its Resistance Units inside Iran. Regardless of differing assessments regarding these organizations’ influence, the government now confronts a broader and more diverse range of security challenges than in previous decades.
Perhaps the most significant characteristic of Iran’s protest movement is that it is no longer confined to any single social class or political demand. Economic protests, demands for civil liberties, women’s rights, ethnic minority concerns, anti-corruption campaigns, and broader political grievances have increasingly converged into a nationwide expression of dissatisfaction with the existing political order. This convergence has steadily eroded one of the regime’s most valuable assets: its claim to political legitimacy.
Meanwhile, Iran’s opposition has made meaningful gains both inside and outside the country. Advances in communication technology, social media, satellite broadcasting, and transnational networks have strengthened coordination among activists, labor organizations, student groups, women’s rights advocates, and the Iranian diaspora. The government no longer enjoys the near monopoly over information and public discourse that it possessed in previous decades, shifting part of the political balance toward society itself.
None of these developments necessarily suggest that the immediate collapse of the Islamic, yet what Iran is experiencing today is more than a series of temporary difficulties. It is the gradual erosion of the fundamental pillars upon which the Islamic Republic was built. Economic decline has weakened political authority; political fragmentation has reduced effective governance; social dissatisfaction has undermined legitimacy; and growing security pressures have increased the costs of maintaining the existing order.
For these reasons, the Islamic Republic remains largely unchanged in its constitutional form but fundamentally different in the substance of its power. Its institutions continue to function, but many of the conditions that once made them resilient have steadily disappeared. The regime has preserved its outward structure while losing much of the cohesion, legitimacy, and governing capacity that sustained it for more than four decades. In that sense, Iran is already experiencing a form of regime change—not through the replacement of its constitutional order, but through the profound transformation of the political realities that underpin it. Given these developments, the conditions may now be ripe for the international community to recognize the Iranian people’s right to regime change and to provide greater political and diplomatic support to the Iranian opposition as it seeks to establish a democratic system of government in Iran.