Professor Hossein Saiedian, The University of Kansas
Professor Kazem Kazerounian, The University of Connecticut
Abstract. This article examines the use of political polling in authoritarian regimes, focusing on Iran and the recent surveys of the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran (GAMAAN). While GAMAAN presents its work as “scientific” and “representative,” its online snowball sampling fails to meet the standards of statistical rigor or ethical neutrality. Under repression and surveillance, genuine political preferences cannot be measured. What emerges is not public opinion but the architecture of fear.
This is the second critique of GAMAAN. Our earlier response to its 2022 survey exposed the impossibility of unbiased polling under dictatorship. The 2025 report repeats the same flaws while elevating controversial figures such as Reza Pahlavi, whose contested record is mirrored in the bias of its producers.
Drawing on historical examples and documented repression in Iran, the article argues that such surveys are scientifically invalid and morally indefensible. They distort reality, erase dissent, and risk legitimizing tyranny. In authoritarian contexts, legitimacy cannot be polled. It is measured only by resistance.
1 Introduction
In authoritarian regimes, where fear and surveillance dominate, the idea of “scientific” political polling is deceptive. Polling requires freedom of expression, safety of respondents, and transparency of process. None of these conditions exist in a dictatorship. Surveys there do not measure opinion. They reflect fear.
This article responds to the second survey released by the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran (GAMAAN). Like its 2022 predecessor, the 2025 report portrays controversial figures, especially Reza Pahlavi, as widely supported. These claims are not only methodologically flawed; they are ethically dangerous.
Calling such polling “scientific” lends false legitimacy to actors tied to repression. It trivializes the suffering of dissidents and normalizes authoritarianism. Conducting and publicizing these surveys without acknowledging their limits turns flawed data into propaganda.
This article exposes the illusion of scientific legitimacy, highlights the danger of false narratives, and calls out the responsibility of those who produce them. In repressive contexts, polling is not a tool of insight. It is a weapon of distortion.
2 Background and Context
The Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran (GAMAAN) presents itself as an institute conducting “scientific” surveys of Iranian society. Its mission is to measure political and cultural attitudes, and its online polls are promoted as representative of millions.
In March 2022, GAMAAN released Iranians’ Attitudes Toward Political Systems. It claimed to capture the views of more than sixteen thousand respondents inside Iran. The report suggested significant support for monarchy and portrayed Reza Pahlavi as the most popular political figure. It even ranked Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah above Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh [1].
We responded with a detailed critique. We showed that under dictatorship, polling cannot reveal genuine preferences. Questions were biased, the sampling unscientific, and the environment repressive. Our conclusion was clear: the survey was political, not scientific [2].
In August 2025, GAMAAN released another report, Analytical Report on Iranians’ Political Preferences in 2024. Based on seventy-seven thousand online respondents, it narrowed to a weighted sample of about twenty thousand. Once again, it highlighted Reza Pahlavi as the leading figure, despite his decline since 2022. The flaws remained, and so did the message [3].
A key change since 2022 has been the record of Ammar Maleki, GAMAAN’s director. In many writings and interviews, he has praised Reza Pahlavi and his family, even while claiming republican leanings. This contradiction undermines any claim of neutrality. It is reflected in the surveys and exposes the political intent behind them.
3 The Illusion of Scientific Legitimacy
Scientific polling requires three conditions: freedom of expression, safety of respondents, and transparency of process. In authoritarian states, these are absent. In Iran, they are actively suppressed.
Expressing political views can bring arrest, torture, or execution. Surveillance is constant. Even anonymous participation in a survey feels dangerous. Internet activity is monitored, opposition content filtered, and online dissent prosecuted. Many avoid participation altogether. Those who do respond often self-censor.
Calling such polls “scientific” gives false credibility to data shaped by fear and exclusion. The illusion is not harmless. It can justify repression, rehabilitate discredited figures, and mislead international opinion.
History shows this pattern. From Syria under Assad to Russia to Nazi Germany, polling and referenda were used to manufacture consent. Numbers were engineered through coercion and propaganda. Iran fits squarely in this tradition.
The GAMAAN surveys are no exception. They do not meet the standards of scientific inquiry. They are not neutral measurements. They are political tools designed to create legitimacy under dictatorship.
4 Theoretical and Methodological Impossibility
4.1 Political Surveys Under Dictatorship: A Contradiction in Terms
Scientific surveys require freedom. Respondents must feel safe to state their real preferences. In dictatorships, this condition does not exist. The Islamic Republic is not only authoritarian. It is violent. Political expression brings punishment.
Other dictatorships show the same pattern. In Syria, polls were described as “without credibility” and “a mockery” [4][5]. In Russia, surveys were called “a political weapon.” Respondents hid their views to avoid risk [6][7][8]. Such polls do not measure opinion. They reproduce fear.
History offers stark examples. In 1938, Hitler staged a “referendum” in Austria to legitimize annexation. The ballot was rigged for a single answer: YES. The official tally claimed 99.7 percent approval. At the same time, Nazi “mood reports” collected by informants were presented as evidence of support. In truth, both the ballot and the reports manufactured consent, not opinion [9][10].
In 2022, Russia staged “referendums” in occupied Ukraine. Results claimed 87 to 99 percent support for annexation. The UN, EU, and OSCE dismissed them as fraudulent [11][12].
The pattern is clear. Authoritarian surveys and referenda are engineered to create legitimacy. Iran is no exception. For four decades repression, executions, and surveillance have defined life. No serious researcher can claim genuine preferences can be measured in this context. Only after dictatorship ends and democracy emerges can political surveys be valid. Until then, legitimacy rests only in resistance.
4.2 Online and Snowball Sampling: Built-in Biases
GAMAAN relies on online distribution and “snowball” sampling. Respondents are recruited through social media, then asked to share the link. The sample grows like a chain of acquaintances.
This is not probability sampling. It is self-selection. Those active online or connected to certain circles dominate the sample. The poor, the disconnected, and the fearful are excluded from the start.
Statistically, this is non-random sampling and carries multiple biases. Such samples tend to over-represent people with strong social networks and under-represent those who avoid exposure. The failures are visible even in free societies. Examples are many. In U.S. studies of drug use, snowball sampling captured only the narrow circles of initial participants, leaving entire groups unrepresented. In the 2016 election, many online opt-in polls predicted a Clinton victory because responses came mostly from liberal networks, while the actual outcome was Trump’s win. These cases show how snowball and online opt-in methods distort results, a problem documented extensively in the literature [13–17].
GAMAAN tries to “weight” the data. But weighting cannot fix a non-random input. Biased data in yields biased data out. The claim that these surveys represent Iran’s literate adult population is not defensible.
4.3 Other Scientific Flaws
Snowball sampling is not the only problem in the GAMAAN surveys. Several other methodological flaws undermine their credibility.
Coverage Error. The surveys are distributed only online. This excludes many Iranians without reliable internet, especially in rural areas, among the elderly, and the poor. Internet shutdowns during protests also block access. The result is a sample skewed toward urban, young, and more affluent participants.
Nonresponse Bias. Even among those who see the survey link, many do not respond. Those who are fearful, politically disengaged, or skeptical are less likely to participate. Those who are motivated or connected to the distributing networks are more likely to answer. This inflates some views while silencing others.
Measurement Bias. The wording of questions can lead participants to select answers that match the surveyor’s agenda. For example, framing regime change as “violent and bloody” versus “peaceful and democratic” makes the second option appear more desirable, even if respondents doubt its feasibility. Such loaded questions distort outcomes.
Transparency and Replicability. GAMAAN does not publish raw data or the full recruitment process. In scientific practice, transparency is essential for replication and independent verification. Without it, the credibility of the results is limited.
Bogus Respondents and Bots. No measure is described to prevent manipulation of the results by repeat respondents, fake accounts, or automated bots. In online polling, this is a well-documented problem that can heavily distort outcomes.
Misuse of Weighting. GAMAAN applies statistical weighting to adjust the non-random sample. Weighting assumes that the initial sample is at least somewhat random. When the inputs are already biased, the adjusted outputs remain biased. Weighting in this case creates only an appearance of scientific rigor.
Overgeneralization. Despite all these problems, GAMAAN claims that its results can be generalized to the literate adult population of Iran. With multiple layers of bias, this claim is indefensible. It is an overreach that misleads the public and policymakers.
Together these flaws show that even without political repression, the GAMAAN surveys are not scientifically reliable. Under a dictatorship like Iran, the problems are multiplied.
4.4 Fear and Silence in Iran
Fear is the decisive factor. In Iran, the absence of scientific conditions is not just technical. It is psychological and political. The regime’s surveillance apparatus, censorship, and history of punishing dissent create an environment where expressing genuine political views is dangerous. Even anonymous participation in a survey can feel risky. Citizens know that supporting banned groups or opposing the regime, even in private, can lead to arrest, harassment, or worse. This fear shapes who responds, how they respond, and whether they respond at all. The result is a dataset filtered through repression, not reflection. It excludes the most courageous voices, those advocating for radical change, and amplifies the safest, most regime-tolerated narratives. In this light, the illusion of scientific legitimacy is not merely a methodological flaw. It is a reflection of systemic silencing. What appears as data is, in fact, a map of fear.
The case of Hamid Nouri, the regime official tried in Sweden, is a revealing example. He admitted in court that even mentioning the name of the MEK carried a heavy price if he returned to Iran. If a regime insider fears to utter a name in a foreign court, what can be expected of ordinary citizens inside Iran?
The evidence is clear. Iranians have been arrested for posting critical comments on social media. Students have been expelled from universities for online activism. Teachers and workers have lost their jobs for expressing sympathy with protest movements. Families inside Iran are threatened when relatives abroad speak against the regime. These practices are well documented by human rights organizations and international media.
Even browsing the internet can carry risks. The regime filters opposition websites, foreign news outlets, and most independent sources of information. Some Iranians use VPNs and other tools to bypass these restrictions. Doing so is illegal and monitored by the Cyber Police. There have been mass arrests of people accused of using “anti-filter” tools to visit forbidden sites. During protests, when internet access is restricted or shut down, anyone caught with circumvention devices or accused of accessing opposition media is vulnerable to prosecution. In such an environment, even clicking on a survey link feels dangerous. To participate, people must bypass filters, risk exposure, and trust that their responses will not be traced. For many, this is unthinkable.
This is why entire segments of society vanish from surveys. The most committed opponents of the regime remain invisible, while those with regime ties, monarchist nostalgia, or little political stake surface more easily. The numbers do not reveal the will of the people. They reveal only the contours of repression.
5 Contradictions in the 1404 Report
5.1 Democracy vs. Authoritarianism
The 1404 report claims that 89 percent of Iranians support democracy [3]. At the same time, it states that 43 percent are open to “authoritarian rule by a strong leader” [3]. These results cannot both be true. A society cannot demand democracy while nearly half embrace authoritarianism.
This is not a minor flaw. It is an engineered outcome. By blurring the line between democracy and authoritarianism, the survey creates confusion. It prepares the ground to present monarchy, or another strongman, as a “democratic” option. What looks like data is a political message.
5.2 Shifting Support for Monarchy
The 1401 report gave Reza Pahlavi 39 percent support, portraying him as the main alternative to the regime [1]. The 1404 report reduced this to 31 percent [3]. Yet GAMAAN still presents him as the leading opposition figure.
The same report admits that support for monarchy is concentrated in a few provinces such as Gilan and Alborz, and weak in places like Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan [3]. This is not a national consensus. It is a narrow, uneven preference.
By the time the report appeared, Reza Pahlavi’s credibility was already damaged. He had openly hoped for a foreign military strike to restore his throne. He also worked closely with elements of the IRGC. These positions alienated many Iranians. Yet the survey still framed him as the most viable option.
This is not neutral research. It is propaganda. It reduces political choice to a false binary: clerical dictatorship or monarchy.
Even if we assume the numbers are accurate, the 1404 report concedes that no figure or force has majority support [3]. Monarchists, republicans, reformists, and activists each represent only a fraction. The landscape is fragmented and diverse.
That should have been the main conclusion. Yet the survey highlights Reza Pahlavi as if he were the central choice. His support is modest, declining, and far from the majority.
The contradiction is obvious. The report admits diversity but promotes one figure as inevitable. This is not neutral reporting. It is a selective emphasis.
Fragmentation is not weakness. It reflects vitality and many voices. By reducing this to a false binary of dictatorship versus monarchy, the survey contradicts its own numbers.
5.4 Contradictions in Presentation
Even if we suspend disbelief and treat the numbers as accurate, which is highly doubtful, the way the results are presented exposes more contradictions.
Fragmentation versus Unity. The survey breaks republicans and civil activists into many small subgroups, making them look weak and scattered. At the same time, monarchy is concentrated into a single figure, creating the impression of unity. One side is artificially divided while the other is artificially consolidated.
Question Framing. The report itself shows that the wording of questions produces contradictions. Respondents can endorse democracy at the same time as they endorse authoritarian rule. This does not clarify preferences. It muddies them. The design itself ensures contradictions that serve a political message.
Inflated Numbers. Earlier GAMAAN surveys even published totals that exceeded 100 percent. This is mathematically impossible. Such results cannot be dismissed as oversight. They reveal manipulation to produce a desired outcome.
Illusion of Balance. The report presents neat charts and tidy categories to suggest balance and neutrality. But the weighting, fragmentation, and framing already bias the results. What appears objective is in fact staged to create a specific impression.
These contradictions show that the report is not simply flawed. It is engineered. It creates a false image of coherence and balance while concealing the biases built into its design.
6 Political Motives Behind Polling in Iran
Beyond methodological flaws, the GAMAAN surveys must be understood as political instruments. In a country where genuine public opinion cannot be freely expressed, the act of polling itself becomes a form of messaging. These surveys do not simply reflect distorted data, they actively shape narratives. By elevating specific figures like Reza Pahlavi, downplaying resistance movements, and presenting false binaries between monarchy and theocracy, the surveys serve a strategic purpose: to manufacture legitimacy for preferred actors and marginalize alternatives. This section examines the political agenda embedded in the design, interpretation, and promotion of these polls, revealing how they function not as neutral research but as tools of influence.
6.1 The Bias of the Director: Ammar Maleki’s Admiration for the Pahlavis
Any claim of neutrality in the GAMAAN surveys collapses when we examine the public record of its director, Ammar Maleki. Though he presents himself as a supporter of a republican form of government, his consistent and enthusiastic praise for the Pahlavi family reveals a deep personal bias. Over several years, Maleki has publicly framed Reza Pahlavi as democratic, historic, and uniquely capable of uniting the opposition. He has described Pahlavi’s statements as “historic,” his leadership as “checkmate” for critics, and his popularity as surpassing that of monarchy itself [18-28]. He has even extended admiration to Noor Pahlavi, praising her advocacy for women’s rights.
This alignment is deliberate. Maleki’s repeated endorsements align seamlessly with the engineered results of the GAMAAN surveys, which consistently elevate Reza Pahlavi above all other figures. The numbers are designed to suggest that most Iranians want democracy, but that their preferred democratic figure is one with authoritarian lineage. This framing creates space for monarchy to be rebranded as a “democratic authoritarian” solution. The contradiction is unmistakable: a man who extols the Pahlavis now produces surveys that legitimize them. Neutrality cannot survive such evidence.
6.2 The “Shah vs. Sheikh” False Binary
One of the most insidious outcomes of the GAMAAN surveys is the construction of a false binary: that Iranians must choose between the current clerical regime (“the Sheikh”) and a return to monarchy (“the Shah”). This framing erases the rich diversity of opposition voices, including secular republicans, progressive activists, and organized resistance movements. It reduces a complex political landscape to a simplistic and misleading choice.
This binary functions in two ways. It rehabilitates the Pahlavis by casting them as the sole viable alternative, and it diminishes other democratic forces by excluding them from consideration. Iranian society contains diverse visions for the future, yet the survey’s design reduces that diversity to a simplistic dichotomy. By presenting monarchy as unified and organized while portraying other currents as fragmented, the report imposes a distorted framework on the political landscape.
6. 3 Whitewashing the Pahlavis
The surveys also contribute to a broader revisionist effort to whitewash the crimes of the Pahlavi dictatorship. By portraying Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah as more popular than Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, a symbol of democratic nationalism, the surveys invert historical memory. They obscure the legacy of torture, censorship, and political repression under the monarchy, replacing it with sanitized nostalgia.
This revisionism is not just academic; It has political consequences. It prepares the ground for the reintroduction of authoritarian figures under the guise of democratic reform. It encourages younger generations, unfamiliar with the realities of the Pahlavi era, to view monarchy as a lost golden age. The surveys thus serve not only to measure opinion but to reshape it.
6.4 Neutralizing the Resistance
Perhaps most troubling is the systematic erasure of organized resistance movements from the survey results. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and its leading organization, the MEK, are either excluded or marginalized. This is not a reflection of their actual support. It is a reflection of fear. In Iran, expressing support for banned groups can lead to persecution.
Yet outside Iran, where support for the NCRI and the MEK is not met with violent repression, we have witnessed massive, passionate demonstrations, especially among women and the educated class, in support of the Resistance. These events offer a real measure of the resistance’s broad and loyal social base, unmatched by any other opposition force. For example, so far in 2025, tens of thousands of Iranians have gathered in various capitals to support the Iranian Resistance. Notably, hundreds of internationally recognized figures also attend and speak alongside Mrs. Maryam Rajavi. Many of the individuals claimed to be popular alternatives to the regime have never managed to mobilize even a fraction of such turnout, even with full freedom of movement and speech abroad. This stark contrast reveals the depth of the MEK’s popular support and the deliberate nature of its exclusion from surveys like GAMAAN’s.
7 The Real Measure of Legitimacy
In Iran, legitimacy cannot be measured by polling. It must be measured by resistance. When freedom of speech is criminalized, when dissent is punished with imprisonment or execution, and when even anonymous participation in a survey carries risk, the true voice of the people is not found in data, it is found in defiance.
This principle applies not only to Iran, but to all societies under dictatorship or occupation. Public support is inseparable from the degree of struggle and sacrifice a political figure or movement demonstrates in opposing tyranny. Only after the fall of a dictatorship and the establishment of a democratic system can popularity be assessed through free elections and credible polling. Until then, resistance is the truest measure.
We see this clearly in Ukraine, where President Zelensky’s national and international standing far exceeds his 2019 election numbers. His legitimacy stems not from polling, but from his unwavering resistance to Russian aggression. Similarly, in post-war Europe, major German political parties still derive their moral authority from their opposition to Hitler’s fascism. In France, General de Gaulle’s leadership of the Resistance against Nazi occupation became the foundation of his legitimacy long before any vote was cast.
In Iran, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), with its leading organization the MEK, has articulated a clear vision for democratic transition. Its six-month plan for a provisional government, followed by free elections, stands in stark contrast to the authoritarian alternatives promoted in flawed surveys. This commitment to pluralism, secularism, and human rights is not theoretical, it is backed by decades of sacrifice, exile, and resistance.
The goal of these so-called surveys is to promote a false narrative: that the Iranian people face only two choices, return to the monarchy or endure the current theocracy. This binary is not only misleading; it is politically motivated. It seeks to divert young Iranians from revolutionary change and push them toward nostalgic illusions of the pre-revolutionary era. These efforts rely on cherry-picked images of elite neighborhoods, sanitized memories of the 1970s, and a deliberate erasure of the brutal realities of the Shah’s dictatorship.
But revolutions do not happen in a vacuum. They arise from real conditions, economic inequality, political repression, and social injustice. The 1979 revolution was not a mistake; it was a response to decades of authoritarian rule, torture, censorship, and the denial of basic freedoms. If the Shah had enjoyed genuine popular support, he would not have been overthrown so decisively, nor would he have fled the country in disgrace.
Until dictatorship is dismantled and free elections are possible, no survey can claim to measure popularity. In such conditions, resistance is not just a political act, it is the moral compass. And by that standard, the NCRI and MEK stand alone.
8 Concluding Remarks: Legitimizing Tyranny Is a Moral Betrayal
Legitimizing individuals complicit in repression, torture, and crimes against humanity is not a mere misstep—it is a grave betrayal of truth and justice. Through manipulated polls, sanitized media narratives, or calculated political moves, elevating such figures distorts reality and wounds the oppressed. In Iran, we confront living architects of brutality: regime officials who have orchestrated executions, tortured students, and crushed civil society, alongside remnants of the Pahlavi dictatorship, whose systematic torture and political imprisonment are well-documented by Amnesty International and other human rights groups.
To claim these figures enjoy popular support—through polls conducted amid fear, censorship, and surveillance—is not just statistically false. It is politically dangerous and morally indefensible. Such efforts do not reflect public sentiment; they fabricate it. They do not inform; they deceive. They do not heal; they tear open unhealed wounds.
History warns us. When France learned that President François Mitterrand had ties to Marshal Pétain, the Vichy collaborator under Nazi occupation, the revelation sparked outrage. A single meeting—not torture chambers or mass executions—shook a democratic society’s conscience. If a free nation demands such accountability, how much more must we reject the normalization of those with blood on their hands, not as historical relics but as active contenders for power?
Silence in the face of this betrayal abandons the victims. Elevating these figures mocks human dignity and justice. Moral clarity is not a luxury—it is the bedrock of any society aspiring to freedom. We must stand firm, expose deception, and honor the truth with unwavering resolve.
References
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