By Professor Matthew Tasooji, Ph.D., Scholar of Economics, Management, and Iranian Political Affairs
Introduction
Recent anti-regime mobilizations among the Iranian diaspora have coincided with reports of extensive state repression inside the country. Although casualty figures and detention numbers remain contested due to restricted information access and the absence of transparent official reporting, the protests have generated significant transnational activism and diplomatic attention.
Beyond immediate human rights concerns, these developments illuminate a deeper structural phenomenon, namely the interaction between authoritarian resilience, diaspora politics, and digital-era information warfare. The contested prominence of exiled political figures such as Reza Pahlavi raises questions about strategic amplification by both domestic and external actors. Why might adversarial states, or even a regime and its regional rivals, appear to converge in amplifying the same opposition personality?
This essay analyzes these dynamics through three theoretical lenses: (1) authoritarian survival theory, (2) balance-of-power and proxy competition frameworks, and (3) information warfare and digital manipulation models.
I. Authoritarian Resilience and Fragmentation Strategy
Elite Survival and Managed Opposition
Authoritarian regimes frequently rely not only on repression but also on institutionalized strategies of opposition management (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010). One such strategy is fragmentation.
Fragmentation increases coordination costs among challengers and reduces the probability of unified collective action (Svolik, 2012). Regimes may pursue fragmentation by:
- Encouraging rival opposition factions
- Elevating polarizing figures
- Promoting controlled alternatives
- Exploiting ideological divides
This logic aligns with theories of authoritarian power-sharing and elite manipulation, in which survival depends on preventing coordinated elite or mass defection (Magaloni, 2008; Schedler, 2013). From this perspective, amplifying a controversial opposition figure may function as a rational survival strategy. The purpose is not to install that figure, but to prevent coalition consolidation.
Information Control as Regime Infrastructure
Modern authoritarian systems increasingly incorporate digital manipulation into governance. Research from institutions such as Citizen Lab, along with scholarship on computational propaganda, has documented how states deploy coordinated inauthentic behavior, bot networks, and narrative flooding (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019; Deibert, 2013).
Rather than merely censoring dissent, regimes now shape the informational ecosystem itself. As Guriev and Treisman (2019) argue, contemporary authoritarianism often operates through informational autocracy, relying on persuasion and narrative management alongside coercion.
In such environments, visibility does not necessarily equate to organic legitimacy. It may reflect hybrid combinations of authentic support and strategic amplification.
II. External Rivalries and Strategic Instrumentalization
Regional Balance-of-Power Logic
Regional rivals of Iran, including Saudi Arabia and Israel, operate within a competitive balance-of-power system. Classical and neorealist theory suggests that states counter perceived threats through internal and external balancing mechanisms (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987).
In addition to military and economic tools, contemporary balancing increasingly incorporates narrative and political influence strategies (Mazarr et al., 2016). Supporting or amplifying opposition narratives may serve as a low-cost, indirect method of exerting pressure.
Such engagement aligns with proxy competition models, in which states seek influence without assuming direct control (Byman, 2018). Amplification of an opposition personality does not necessarily imply sponsorship or coordination. It may reflect instrumental alignment of interests.
III. Convergent Incentives and Strategic Ambiguity
Parallel Incentives Without Coordination
The apparent paradox, in which adversaries amplify the same individual, can be addressed through convergent incentive theory. International relations scholarship recognizes that parallel incentives can produce similar behavior even in the absence of formal cooperation (Jervis, 1978).
A regime may calculate that a polarizing opposition figure fragments dissent. External rivals may simultaneously calculate that the same figure represents a strategically useful alternative. These motivations can coexist without coordination.
The Weak-Leader Hypothesis
A related dynamic appears in research on transitional politics. External powers sometimes prefer opposition actors who lack consolidated domestic authority (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Leaders dependent on external support may be perceived as more pliable in future bargaining contexts.
Whether such calculations are accurate or normatively defensible is secondary here. The key point is their strategic rationality within realist frameworks.
IV. Diaspora Politics and Transnational Mobilization
Diasporas play a distinctive role in homeland conflicts. Research shows that diaspora communities often influence host-country policy debates and contribute financially and politically to homeland movements (Shain, 2007; Adamson, 2013).
Digital media intensifies this dynamic. Unlike earlier periods, such as the 1988 prison executions in Iran, today’s communication technologies allow rapid transnational mobilization and narrative dissemination.
However, digital environments also enable manipulation. Computational propaganda exploits the same affordances that empower grassroots activism (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019). The result is a hybrid information sphere in which authenticity and artificial amplification coexist.
V. Epistemic Crisis in the Post-Information Order
Hybrid conflict literature suggests that ambiguity itself has become a strategic asset (Mazarr et al., 2016). When authentic activism, foreign influence, regime propaganda, and commercial media incentives operate simultaneously, attribution becomes difficult.
This epistemic uncertainty erodes trust, not only in political actors but also in informational signals themselves. As Guriev and Treisman (2019) argue, informational autocracies rely on precisely this ambiguity to maintain plausible legitimacy.
The Iranian case thus reflects a broader transformation in global politics. Power is exercised not only through coercion and material leverage, but also through narrative engineering and strategic opacity.
Conclusion
The apparent convergence of regime and rival-state incentives around the amplification of specific opposition figures should not be interpreted as evidence of coordination without rigorous empirical proof. Rather, it reflects structural logics identified in:
- Authoritarian resilience theory
- Balance-of-power and proxy competition models
- Information warfare and computational propaganda research
In the post-information era, fragmentation, amplification, and ambiguity function as core instruments of geopolitical strategy. Understanding contemporary Iranian opposition politics requires structural analysis grounded in international relations theory rather than personality-centered speculation.
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