Kazem Kazerounian, Ph.D., Professor
Hossein Saiedian, Ph.D., Professor
We are dedicated to fostering informed, rigorous dialogue on the future of Iran. We hope that institutions like the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), known for their pursuit of intellectual rigor and balanced discourse, will continue to uphold these principles. When CFR recently hosted Reza Pahlavi for a public conversation, we felt compelled to voice our concerns.
We believe that offering a platform to a figure whose claims to leadership are highly contested and whose public record lacks both democratic legitimacy and operational substance undermines principled human rights discourse.
In a letter sent to the CFR’s leadership, we expressed our view that elevating such a figure sends a confusing message to those inside Iran risking everything for justice, accountability, and democratic change. Our correspondence received no response.
In the interest of a truly balanced and nuanced public discussion, we are now publishing the critical analysis we submitted to the CFR. This article offers a fact-based, thoroughly documented counter-narrative to the image presented at the CFR event and elsewhere.
On October 3, 2025, Reza Pahlavi took part in a public conversation with Steven A. Cook, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
What unfolded was less a substantive engagement than a carefully staged performance, characterized by self-congratulatory rhetoric, imprecise generalities, and evasive responses to direct questions. Pahlavi presented an idealized narrative—one in which he enjoys broad-based support and serves as a unifying figure for Iran’s future. Yet, notably absent was any concrete strategy for effecting change within Iran, beyond reiterating the vague imperative of recruiting elements from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Equally missing was any acknowledgment of the absence of a coherent political structure, a clearly articulated platform, or demonstrable public support—particularly among the diaspora, where endorsement of opposition figures entails minimal personal risk.
Several critical questions were left unasked:
- What is his actual governing platform, and does it imply a concentration of power akin to the absolute authority wielded by Khamenei?
- What are the details of his claimed bilateral contacts with Revolutionary Guard commanders?
- What is his stance on the torture and executions during his father’s reign, and how does he address his alleged cooperation with, and ties to, Parviz Sabeti, the notorious deputy of SAVAK (the Shah’s secret police), who is currently facing a $225 million lawsuit in a U.S. federal court for his alleged role in the torture and murder of political dissidents during the 1970s?
These questions strike at the heart of credibility, accountability, and transparency—yet none were meaningfully addressed.
1. Does Reza Pahlavi have real support on the ground?
Despite persistent claims of mass support, Pahlavi and his campaign have repeatedly failed to mobilize even modest crowds. A rally in Washington, D.C. in April 2025—promoted for weeks as the largest Iranian gathering in the United States—drew no more than 300 attendees. A similar event in Munich, advertised as a global convergence, barely matched that number, though organizers inflated the figure to 500. Has the international campaign demonstrated real traction?
The much-touted campaign to stage rallies in 100 cities worldwide has been similarly unsuccessful. Many cities witnessed no turnout at all, while others attracted only a handful of individuals—sometimes as few as four or five. Far from generating meaningful publicity or political momentum, these efforts appear to have been orchestrated primarily to fabricate the illusion of widespread support. The disparity between promotional claims and actual participation underscores a broader pattern: Pahlavi’s reliance on spectacle over substance, and on symbolic gestures rather than genuine grassroots mobilization. In reality, the actions have amounted to hype without substance, revealing a striking disconnect between rhetorical claims and actual mobilization on the ground.
Digital Illusions
When challenged by the moderator with the evident disconnect between claimed support and actual mobilization, Pahlavi deflected by citing his social media following as evidence of popular backing. However, recent investigative reports, including one by Haaretz, have revealed that a significant portion of this online presence is artificially manufactured. The investigation uncovered a sophisticated network of AI-generated fake accounts—many created and operated as part of a foreign influence campaign funded and coordinated from abroad. These accounts, posing as ordinary Iranian citizens, were designed to simulate grassroots enthusiasm and amplify pro-Pahlavi messaging across platforms such as X and Instagram. The operation, which intensified during periods of regional conflict, was aimed not at genuine engagement but at constructing a digital façade of legitimacy and support.
The Missing Bridge
One of the most glaring and consequential omissions in Pahlavi’s discourse is the absence of a concrete plan or operational strategy for dismantling the current regime. While he routinely resorts to rhetorically appealing clichés about a secular, democratic future, he offers no substantive roadmap for how such a transition might be achieved. The question of how to reach that future—how to confront and overcome the entrenched power structures of the Islamic Republic—is left unanswered. Instead of articulating a viable mechanism for regime change, he remains focused on abstract visions of what comes after. Without a credible strategy for crossing the threshold from authoritarianism to democracy, any discussion of the future remains speculative at best. The bridge to a post-theocracy Iran must first be built and crossed before one can meaningfully engage with what lies on the other side.
Reality Check
The claims of widespread support and meaningful political momentum evaporate when confronted with quantifiable evidence, revealing a profound disconnect between the persona and the political reality:
- Failure of Mobilization: The consistently low turnout at high-profile, months-long organized rallies, such as those in Washington, D.C., and Munich, which drew figures far below the threshold of political significance (fewer than 300 individuals), demonstrates a clear lack of grassroots traction, even among the Iranian diaspora. The failed ambition of the 100-city campaign underscores this organizational vacuum.
- Fabricated Digital Mandate: Contrary to the claim that social media following proves popular backing, investigative journalism has exposed that a substantial portion of Pahlavi’s online presence is artificially manufactured. The existence of a sophisticated, foreign-funded network of AI-generated fake accounts, documented by independent sources, demonstrates a calculated effort to construct a false digital façade of legitimacy rather than cultivate genuine popular support.
- Operational Void: A viable political movement must offer a credible means of achieving its goals. Mr. Pahlavi’s focus on abstract, post-regime visions and his complete omission of an operational strategy or concrete plan for dismantling the current power structure leaves the fundamental question of how unanswered. This vacuum highlights a critical failure to transition from rhetorical critique to actionable political leadership.
2. Claims of Leadership and Popular Mandate
Reza Pahlavi asserts that a majority of Iranians have asked him to assume a leadership role in the campaign for regime change. He also claims that if a poll were conducted in Iran, he would be the most popular and trusted figure. Furthermore, he states that he believes in free elections and a popular mandate.
Reality Check
- Lack of Tangible Evidence: Pahlavi’s claim that a majority of Iranians have chosen him as their leader is made without presenting any verifiable data. Given the regime’s restrictions, conducting free and fair surveys in Iran is impossible, making his assertion of widespread popularity unsubstantiated. This could be interpreted as self-aggrandizement or an attempt to legitimize his role.
- Ignoring Opposition Diversity: While Pahlavi emphasizes unity among opposition forces, he seems to position himself potentially as a central leader. This stance is in sharp conflict with the perspectives of other groups, such as republicans or ethnic minorities, who do not recognize his leadership.
- Contradiction in Symbolic Role: Although Pahlavi publicly claims not to seek power, his persistent emphasis on leadership and his refusal to categorically reject the possibility of a monarchical revival raise legitimate concerns about underlying intentions. Notably, in 1980, he declared himself king—a proclamation he has never formally rescinded. This enduring self-designation, coupled with his strategic ambiguity, suggests a calculated effort to position himself as the default successor in the event of regime collapse. His apparent reliance on cultivating ties with the IRGC and courting foreign support further reinforces the impression that he seeks to inherit power through mechanisms reminiscent of his dynastic legacy, rather than through transparent, democratic processes.
- Authoritarian Blueprint: The blueprint released shortly after the Munich Conference belies Pahlavi’s claims of democratic transition. While he publicly advocates for a secular and democratic future, the document centralizes executive, legislative, judicial, military, and security powers in the hands of a single individual—himself. It further stipulates that he must remain in power for a minimum of 36 months, with the possibility of extension.
This concentration of authority not only contradicts the principles of democratic governance but also raises serious doubts about the sincerity of his stated vision. The absence of institutional checks and balances, independent oversight, or mechanisms for public accountability suggests a model of governance that is more autocratic than transitional. In effect, the blueprint appears less as a roadmap to democracy and more as a framework for personal rule under the guise of a transition to democracy.2. Remarks on the 1979 Revolution
3. Recasting 1979: Elitist Narrative of Revolution
Reza Pahlavi attributed the 1979 revolution not to a genuine popular uprising, but to the actions of elite groups—primarily Marxists and Islamists—who, he argued, manipulated public discontent to advance their own ideological agendas. He maintained that the masses were not the driving force behind the revolution, but rather its victims, misled by promises that were never fulfilled. According to Pahlavi, many in Iran’s younger generation now view the revolution as a grave mistake. They believe that the revolutionaries steered the country into its current crisis and, in hindsight, regret the overthrow of his father, seeing the monarchy as a lost opportunity for modernization and national dignity.
Reality Check
- Historical Distortion: The assertion that the 1979 revolution was solely the result of elite actions contradicts well-documented history. The revolution was a massive, nationwide uprising involving diverse social groups—workers, students, clerics, and merchants. Mass protests, widespread strikes (notably by oil workers), and public mobilization were central to the revolution, not just elite maneuvering. This narrative undermines the popular will that led to the fall of the Pahlavi regime. The revolution was far from monolithic; it brought together Muslims, Marxists, and nationalists—groups with often conflicting ideologies. Yet despite their differences, they were united by a single, resounding chant that echoed across Iran: ‘Down with the Shah.'”
- Undermining Public Agency: By attributing the revolution to ideological elites, Pahlavi effectively dismisses the broad-based public participation. This could be seen as an attempt to absolve his father’s regime of responsibility and to delegitimize the revolution’s grassroots nature—potentially alienating many Iranians who view it as a popular uprising against autocracy.
- Overgeneralization of Youth Sentiment: Claiming that Generation Z universally blames the revolutionaries for Iran’s current predicament is an unverifiable generalization. While young Iranians express disillusionment about the current situation in Iran, most still regard the revolution as a justified response to the Shah’s tyranny. This complexity is reflected in the 2022 protest slogans, especially among university students and diaspora demonstrators, who chanted: “Down with the oppressor, whether the Shah or the Leader [Ali Khamenei],” a powerful and universal rebuke to both past and present authoritarianism. These chants directly challenge Pahlavi’s narrative and underscore a broader rejection of autocracy in all its forms.
4. Controversial Views on the Regime and the Opposition
Reza Pahlavi has described the 2025 Munich Conference, formally titled the National Cooperation Convention to Save Iran, as the most diverse opposition gathering in 46 years, claiming it brought together over 500 attendees from across Iran’s political, ethnic, and social spectrum. He emphasized the presence of monarchists, republicans, tribal leaders, former political prisoners, and activists as evidence of a united front against the Islamic Republic.
In parallel, he claimed that his newly launched website “Iran Ra Pas Migirim” (“We Take Back Iran”), had received 1.5 million visits within 24 hours of its launch. This figure was later inflated to 4.5 million, though no independent analytics or verifiable data from the website itself have been provided to substantiate these numbers.
Reality Check
- Ambiguous Evidence of Opposition Success: The claim of success regarding the Munich Conference and website traffic lacks verifiable details, such as participant lists or independent analytics. These inflated claims and lack of transparency have led many observers to question the authenticity and effectiveness of Pahlavi’s initiatives describing them as promotional exaggeration. While Pahlavi framed the Munich gathering as a historic moment of unity, others view it as more symbolic than strategic, lacking the operational depth and grassroots infrastructure necessary to catalyze real change inside Iran.
In fact, the overwhelming majority of the Iranian opposition, even traditional monarchists, reject Pahlavi. Notably, the Munich event reportedly hosted only 200–250 attendees, many of whom lacked political significance, and even traditional monarchists boycotted it.
Reza Pahlavi has claimed that one million individuals have endorsed the Munich Charter, a declaration associated with his political platform. However, this assertion lacks independent verification. No publicly accessible documentation or third-party data substantiates the claim beyond Pahlavi’s own statements.
Similarly, Pahlavi presented his latest initiative, the website “We Take Back Iran” as a major mobilization effort. He claimed that the site garnered over 1.5 million viewers, which was later inflated to 4.5 million views—a figure that appears highly exaggerated and unverifiable. No analytics or traffic data from the website itself have been provided to support this number.
Moreover, inflating viewership statistics through paid services is a well-known and easily executed tactic in digital media, raising further doubts about the credibility of the claim. A basic examination of the site reveals that users can repeatedly register their names, undermining the integrity of any participation metrics. This lack of safeguards calls into question the legitimacy of the platform’s reported engagement.
It is also important to note that the slogan “Iran Ra Pas Migirim” was not coined by Pahlavi. It first gained prominence during the 2009 uprising, becoming a rallying cry among protesters demanding democratic reform. Millions, especially the youth, were changing, “We fill fight, we will die, and we will take back Iran.” Pahlavi’s appropriation of this slogan, like several others, has been criticized as a form of rhetorical appropriation and political branding, rather than original leadership.
5. Views on the Diaspora and Domestic Uprising
Pahlavi refers to the diaspora as ‘Iran’s embassy to the world,’ urging them to lobby and support activists inside Iran. He claims that 60,000 individuals from inside Iran—primarily the IRGC, the Basij, the Ministry of intelligence, State Security Forces and bureaucratic personnel—have contacted him via QR code to express willingness to defect or collaborate.
Reality Check
- Exaggeration of Domestic Engagement: The claim that 60,000 individuals from within Iran have reached out seeking to defect from the regime—particularly under such a tightly controlled and repressive system—lacks independent corroboration. In the absence of verifiable evidence, such assertions risk trivializing the complex and perilous path toward change in Iran. More critically, they may inadvertently serve the regime’s interests by undermining the credibility and authenticity of genuine grassroots efforts for reform and resistance.
6. Lack of Operational Detail in Transition Plans
Pahlavi outlines a five-point plan involving maximum pressure, support, regime defection, and national reconstruction. Regarding the first 100 days post-regime collapse, he mentions plans for transition and constitutional drafting.
Reality Check
- Concealing the lack of plan to overthrow the regime: a roadmap for transition and more as a rhetorical device to obscure the absence of a concrete strategy, operational structure, and credible force on the ground capable of effecting change in Iran. More troubling is the plan’s reliance on the very institutions—namely the IRGC and the Basij—that have been instrumental in sustaining the regime’s repressive grip on power. Such an approach risks perpetuating the status quo rather than dismantling it.
While Iran’s younger generation—particularly those who have been at the forefront of protests since the 2018 uprisings—actively seek ways to confront and resist the IRGC and Basij, Reza Pahlavi continues to advocate for a Gandhi-inspired model of nonviolence and has even called on IRGC commanders to reach out to him. This stance stands in stark contrast to the prevailing sentiment within Iranian society, especially among youth, who view these forces not as potential allies but as central pillars of oppression.
Conclusion
Reza Pahlavi’s appearance at the Council on Foreign Relations offered more spectacle than substance. His narrative, steeped in nostalgia and projection, lacks the organizational depth, political clarity, and grassroots legitimacy required for meaningful leadership of a movement for change with a network on the ground in Iran. At a time when Iran’s future demands courage, organizational capability, and a determined intent to confront the regime and end clerical rule, what emerged instead was a carefully curated illusion. Even more critically, it lacked any indication of the willingness to take real risks or to sacrifice blood and treasure on the ground—elements that are indispensable to any serious struggle for liberation.