Author: Professor Matthew Tasooji
The recent appearance of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in New York during the United Nations General Assembly offered an important opportunity to examine the political forces competing over Iran’s future. The demonstrations surrounding his visit also highlighted a fundamental question: which opposition forces have the organization, political infrastructure, and international presence necessary to challenge the Islamic Republic?
One of the most visible demonstrations in New York during Pezeshkian’s visit was organized by supporters of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and its principal member, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK). The demonstration focused on opposition to the Islamic Republic and called for democratic change.
The significance of the event goes beyond the number of people who participated. The rally demonstrated the ability of the NCRI/MEK network to organize and mobilize supporters on an international stage at a time when the Iranian government was attempting to present its own political message at the United Nations.
The absence of similarly significant demonstrations by other opposition currents during Pezeshkian’s New York visit, including groups supporting Reza Pahlavi and the restoration of the monarchy—is also noteworthy.
The Islamic Republic itself is confronting serious political, economic, military, and social pressures. The death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the subsequent selection of his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as his successor created a major transition within the ruling structure. Reuters reported that Mojtaba was selected in March 2026 after his father was killed in a U.S.-Israeli strike and that his appointment reinforced the influence of hardline elements within the Iranian establishment.
This transition matters because the Islamic Republic has historically depended on a highly centralized political system in which the Supreme Leader exercises enormous authority over Iran’s political and security institutions. A change at the top can therefore create new tensions among competing factions within the ruling establishment. Mojtaba Khamenei also faces the difficult task of consolidating authority during a period of war, economic pressure, and widespread domestic opposition.
Iran’s internal challenges are not limited to its leadership transition. The country has experienced severe economic difficulties, political repression, and repeated waves of public protest. The government’s response to the most recent nationwide uprising demonstrated just how far the authorities are willing to go to preserve their control.
The nationwide protests that began in late December 2025 were met with a massive crackdown. A September 2026 United Nations fact-finding mission found that Iranian security forces carried out killings on a massive scale across the country and documented serious violations including murder, arbitrary detention, torture, and other abuses.
By September, a United Nations fact-finding mission reported that Iranian authorities had carried out widespread unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearances during the crackdown. The Iranian government’s official figure cited by the mission was 3,038 deaths, while the UN said the actual toll was likely higher. The mission also reported that at least 221 children were killed and that approximately 25,000 people were injured, with more than half reportedly requiring surgery.
This level of repression is important when considering what could happen during future uprisings. The experience of January and February demonstrates that the government has been willing to use lethal force on a massive scale to prevent demonstrations from developing into a broader challenge to its authority. If another nationwide uprising occurs, protesters may confront an even more aggressive security response, particularly if the authorities believe the survival of the regime is at stake.
Future demonstrations could therefore become more violent. This would not necessarily be because protesters themselves are seeking greater violence, but because the government’s demonstrated willingness to use overwhelming force creates the conditions for increasingly dangerous confrontations. The bloodshed of January and February showed that the conflict between Iranian society and the Islamic Republic has entered an increasingly dangerous phase.
For years, the Iranian government has also benefited politically from a state of confrontation in which the country is neither fully at peace nor completely at war. In my view, this “no war, no peace” environment can serve the regime politically. External threats allow the government to portray dissent as a security issue and to justify greater repression in the name of national defense.
When the government faces economic hardship, political opposition, and public dissatisfaction, continued confrontation can provide another justification for restricting political activity. The existence of an external enemy can also allow the authorities to frame domestic opponents as collaborators with foreign powers rather than as citizens demanding political change.
This is why military strikes alone are unlikely to resolve Iran’s political crisis. Airstrikes can damage military infrastructure, weapons systems, command centers, and other strategic targets. They can weaken the regime’s capabilities, but destroying infrastructure is not the same as changing the political system that controls the country.
A government can survive military losses if its political and security institutions remain functioning. The Revolutionary Guard, intelligence services, police, courts, and other institutions of state power can continue operating even after significant military infrastructure has been damaged.
The United States also faces the enormous cost and complexity of any attempt to impose political change through a ground invasion. The experience of Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates the financial and human costs associated with prolonged military interventions. Brown University’s Costs of War project estimated that the post-9/11 wars cost the United States approximately $8 trillion, with about $2.3 trillion attributed to the Afghanistan/Pakistan war zone and approximately $2.1 trillion to the Iraq/Syria war zone in its 2021 assessment.
Iran would present an even more complicated challenge. It is a large country with a population of roughly 90 million, a substantial military and security establishment, difficult geography, and a deeply entrenched political system. A large-scale ground invasion would therefore carry extraordinary military, financial, humanitarian, and geopolitical consequences.
The United States is already experiencing the costs of military operations against Iran. A September 2026 Congressional Budget Office assessment estimated that U.S. Department of Defense operational, logistical, and sustainment costs associated with the current conflict had reached approximately $38 billion as of August 1, 2026, excluding several other categories of federal costs. CBO also estimated that the monthly cost could rise substantially if the intensity of fighting increased.
The more important question, therefore, is what happens inside Iran. External military pressure can alter the balance of power, but lasting political change ultimately depends on developments within Iranian society and institutions.
Iran has already experienced repeated waves of protests, and the events of 2025–2026 demonstrated both the willingness of large numbers of people to challenge the government and the willingness of the security forces to respond with lethal force. The combination of economic hardship, political repression, and public dissatisfaction creates the possibility of further unrest.
The leadership transition following Ali Khamenei’s death adds another dimension to this situation. Mojtaba Khamenei inherited the position of Supreme Leader during an extraordinarily turbulent period. Reuters reported that his appointment strengthened the position of hardline elements and the Revolutionary Guard at a time when Iran was already under severe domestic and external pressure.
The result is a political system facing pressure from multiple directions at the same time. The government must maintain control at home while dealing with military confrontation abroad, economic difficulties, international pressure, and an opposition movement calling for fundamental political change.
The situation is further complicated by the continuing confrontation between Iran and the United States. During Pezeshkian’s September 2026 visit to New York, Iran and the United States resumed indirect discussions through intermediaries. Reuters reported that the two sides remained far apart on how to end the conflict, even as diplomacy continued.
This illustrates the contradiction at the heart of the current crisis. Iran needs relief from enormous economic and military pressure, but significant elements of its political establishment continue to view confrontation and resistance as essential to preserving the Islamic Republic.
For the Islamic Republic, the danger is that external conflict and internal opposition could reinforce each other. Military pressure can increase economic hardship, while economic hardship can increase public dissatisfaction. Public dissatisfaction can produce demonstrations, and demonstrations can provoke even greater repression. The cycle can become increasingly difficult for the government to control.
This is why the future of Iran cannot be determined solely from the battlefield. Military action may weaken the regime, but it cannot by itself create a democratic political system. Political change ultimately requires an organized alternative and a population capable of determining the country’s future.
In my view, democratic forces seeking fundamental political change in Iran should therefore receive greater political attention and support. The objective should not be the occupation of Iran or the replacement of one authoritarian structure with another. It should be to create conditions in which Iranians themselves can determine their country’s political future.
The New York demonstration was significant in this context because it showed the organizational capacity of an Iranian opposition movement at a critical political moment, while the Iranian president was addressing the United Nations. The demonstration placed the issue of political change in Iran directly in front of an international audience and provided a visible expression of organized opposition to the Islamic Republic.
Iran’s future will ultimately depend on the interaction between external pressure and internal political developments. Airstrikes may weaken the Islamic Republic, but they cannot by themselves bring about its downfall or establish a democratic political system. Lasting change requires political organization, sustained pressure, and, most importantly, the ability of the Iranian people to determine what comes after the Islamic Republic.
The path toward a lasting resolution to Iran’s political crisis should therefore focus on supporting Iranians inside the country who seek a democratic alternative to the Islamic Republic. Such an alternative would be based on the principle that the Iranian people themselves should determine their political future, free from authoritarian rule and external imposition. It should also seek peaceful relations with Iran’s neighbors, an end to the cycle of regional confrontation, and the reintegration of Iran into the international community. Political change of this kind would address not only the internal political crisis but also the broader regional and international tensions that have contributed to Iran’s isolation. Ultimately, a peaceful, democratic, and internationally integrated Iran would depend on the ability of its people and organized democratic forces to build a political alternative capable of replacing repression and confrontation with representative government, peaceful relations, and constructive engagement with the world.