Reza Pahlavi’s Platform — A Roadmap to Neo-fascist Rule

By Dr. Majid Rafizadeh, Harvard-educated political scientist and Advisory Boarrd Member of Harvard International Review, a International Relations Council publication.

August 2025

Note: FISN research reports and papers may be used freely with proper referencing and credit to the authors and the Free Iran Scholars Network.

On August 1, 2025, Reza Pahlavi posted on X announcing that, under his supervision, experts had drafted his plan for Iran’s future. In the same post, he included a link to the program published on the website of NUFDI, his propaganda outlet.

The shortest possible description of this program is that it is a comprehensive roadmap for establishing a dictatorship infused with neo-fascism in Iran. Below are some of its key provisions:

Key Points of the Program — “Post–Regime Overthrow”

1. “Following the overthrow of the Islamic Republic in a national revolution by the Iranian people and the joining of the armed forces and law enforcement with the people, a “Transition System”[1] will manage the country during the interim period. This Transition System will operate under the leadership of the Leader of the National Uprising [Reza Pahlavi] and will consist of three bodies: the “National Uprising Body,” the “Transitional Government,” and the “Transitional Judiciary.””

2. “Appointment and dismissal of the heads of all three bodies will be done upon the proposal of the National Uprising Body (requiring an absolute majority vote of its members) and with the approval of the Leader of the National Uprising.”

“A – National Uprising Body”

1. “Will serve as the legislative authority during the transitional period.”

2. “Its members, “representing the diversity and plurality of the unified Iranian nation,” will be appointed by the Leader of the National Uprising [Reza Pahlavi]. Any change in the total number of members or the removal of a member requires an absolute majority vote in the body plus the Leader’s [Reza Pahlavi] approval.”

3. “Once the Mahestan is elected, the legislative role of the National Uprising Body will end, but it will continue in an advisory role to the Leader until the dissolution of the Transitional Government, which will also dissolve the National Uprising Body.”

Our emphasis: Even in its legislative phase, this body remains an “advisory” organ to the Leader. The use of the term Mahestan is notable — it refers to an ancient aristocratic council in Iran, purely advisory and restricted to the elite.

“B – Transitional Government”

1. “Will act as the executive branch during the transitional period.”

2. “Ministers will be appointed by the head of the government [himself appointed by Reza Pahlavi] after approval by the National Uprising Body (all appointed by Reza Pahlavi).”

3. “The structure of the Transitional Government (e.g., number of ministries and agencies) will be determined in consultation with the National Uprising Body and with the Leader’s approval.”

“C – Transitional Court”

1. “Will serve as the judiciary during the transitional period.”

2. “Its head, “a distinguished and reputable jurist (preferably a judge),” will be appointed and dismissed according to the process described in Clause 4 of this document.” [ Meaning proposed by the National Uprising Body, all its members appointed by Reza Pahlavi and approved by Reza Pahlavi himself.

“Duration of the Transitional Period”

1. “The proposed process requires at least 18 months and up to 36 months, subject to extension in the event of unforeseen circumstances (e.g., natural disasters or war).”

2. “Any extension beyond six months requires approval by all three bodies (National Uprising Body, Transitional Government, Transitional Judiciary) [all appointed by Reza Pahlavi] and the Leader’s [Reza Pahlavi] approval.”

“Preservation of Core Functions”

1. “The transitional government with the aim of stabilizing the country will try to  maintain vital functions without interruption. The plan outlines the strategies for the first six months to maintain social stability in both the public and private sectors.”.

2. One “key measure” for “maintaining law and order to prevent social unrest” is martial law in 20 critical and high-risk cities.”

3. “Under “protection of sensitive sites,” it calls for “a unified group to recover public assets, reporting directly to the head of the transitional authority [Reza Pahlavi]. This special unit must have executive, legal, and operational powers to act decisively without bureaucratic delays.”

Conclusions

1. The proposed structure is highly authoritarian: extreme centralization of power in one leader; no elections; no separation of powers; no transparency or accountability.
2. Under this plan, a government led by Reza Pahlavi would hold power for at least three years, with Pahlavi exercising absolute autocratic control: personally appointing the heads of the executive, legislature, judiciary, and intelligence — answerable to no one.
3. The “Transition System” mirrors the clerical regime in structure and, in some respects, surpasses it in authoritarianism by eliminating public participation entirely.
4. In the illusion of co-opting regime enforcers, even transitional justice is made contingent on a referendum — giving perpetrators of crimes against humanity the possibility of “forgiveness.” Truth commissions and transitional courts, if formed, would operate under the same centralized control — becoming tools for consolidating dictatorship rather than ensuring justice.
5. The plan preserves the regime’s repressive organs, including the Ministry of Intelligence, and integrates IRGC personnel into other security bodies.
6. The pledge to “retain forces with vetting” becomes alarming when paired with an explicit framework for Special Police and anti-riot units, tasked with “crowd control” and “anti-riot operations,” the very vocabulary of the current regime’s street repression. In a genuine transition to democracy, the first priority must be protecting the right to protest, not entrenching anti-protest police structures.
7. On foreign policy and regime change, the plan offers no realistic strategy rooted in domestic organization. It starts from the assumption that the “regime’s fall” has already occurred. The political foundation rests not on an organized social force inside Iran but on two pillars: a hereditary figurehead and foreign backing, a policy that undermines the people’s uprising and hands the clerical regime a gift.
8. There is no concrete program for Iran’s ethnic nationalities (e.g., Kurds); instead, there is a focus on combating the imagined threat of “separatism and ethnic-sectarian threats in border areas,” to be handled by the army.
9. The plan grants Reza Pahlavi limitless authority without any mechanism for responsibility or oversight, powers comparable only to absolute monarchy or the Supreme Leader under velayat-e faqih. The “transition” it envisions is one from above, aided by foreign governments, not a grassroots democratic movement. The hereditary leader is the nexus of all appointments, the overseer of transitional justice, and the commander of coercive forces. There is no guarantee of meaningful parliamentary oversight, no safeguard for the right to protest, no press freedom guarantees, and no ban on anti-riot units being deployed against political demonstrations.
10. This is not a program for democracy; it is a program for establishing absolute dictatorship, dressed in democratic trappings. If implemented, its difference from dictatorship and neo-fascism would be in form, not substance. Democracy begins with an organized people, not an all-powerful leader.

In short:

• No actionable plan for regime change
• Absolute power for three years (or more)
• Preservation of regime’s repressive forces under new names and uniforms
• A new security agency reporting directly to the leader
• The clerical regime’s laws remain in place until further notice

Meaning: A new dictatorship — not freedom, not popular sovereignty.

Note1: The term “Transition System” is an umbrella for three institutions that will run Iran during the transitional period under the leadership of Prince Reza Pahlavi. These three bodies are: the National Uprising Body (legislative), the Transitional Government (executive), and the Transitional Court (judiciary).

Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated political scientist and alumnus. He holds a Ph.D. in Government and International Affairs, a Master’s degree in Global Politics, a Master’s degree Journalism, and a Master’s degree Linguistics. He also earned a Bachelor’s degree in Translation with a focus on English, Arabic, and Persian. Dr. Rafizadeh is fluent in Arabic, English, and Persian. He serves on the advisory board of the Harvard International Review, a publication of the Harvard International Relations Council at Harvard University. He can be reached at dr.rafizadeh@post.harvard.edu.