Published in Hartford Courant April 1, 2026
Kazem Kazerounian, Professor, UConn
More than a month into open confrontation between Iran, the United States, Israel, and now parts of the Arab Gulf, the illusion of a quick and decisive conflict has collapsed. What remains is a grinding war with no clear endpoint and no coherent strategy.
Inside Iran, the damage is severe. The upper ranks of the dictatorial regime’s leadership have been decimated. First- and second-tier commanders have been eliminated in rapid succession. Yet the system has not collapsed. The machinery of repression and command continues to function.
Military infrastructure has taken heavy hits. Defense industries have been degraded. Civilian infrastructure has also suffered. Thousands of civilians are believed to have been killed, though exact figures remain unclear. The economy has nearly come to a halt. Inflation has surged. Poverty and hunger are spreading rapidly.
The most telling development is internal. Despite bombardment and economic collapse, the regime’s machinery of repression is fully active. Arrests, surveillance, intimidation, and executions have intensified. The state is wounded but not weak where it matters. Contrary to expectations in Washington and Jerusalem, the war has not sparked a popular uprising. It has suppressed it. Fear, chaos, and heightened security have closed the space for mass mobilization.
This is not surprising. The same governance failures behind environmental and economic crises have produced a system built to absorb pressure and shift the burden onto its people.
Politically, Tehran is not seeking a symmetrical war. It is expanding the conflict outward. The goal is clear. Stretch the battlefield across the region. Turn this into a long, attritional confrontation. Increase pressure on global energy markets. Exploit divisions within the United States and Israel. Force a premature end to hostilities on terms favorable to survival.
Washington, meanwhile, appears to be searching for an off-ramp without a map. There is no visible strategic doctrine guiding the next phase. The idea of a quick military solution has faded, but no serious political alternative has taken its place.
Efforts to identify a leadership alternative inside Iran have faltered. Reza Pahlavi, son of deposed Shah, heavily promoted in some media circles, lacks organization and meaningful presence inside the country. The gap between image and reality is now undeniable. A recent New Yorker report noted that figures in Trump’s inner circle have privately referred to him as the “loser prince.” Politico, citing senior administration officials, reported blunt responses when his name was raised. “No way.”
Other ideas have fared no better. The notion of relying on Kurdish forces as a national alternative was briefly entertained, then abandoned. Kurdish groups rejected the premise, and U.S. planners recognized the obvious. A regional force cannot be transformed into a nationwide governing structure in a country as complex as Iran.
This leaves a dangerous vacuum. So where does this go?
The central reality is unavoidable. A regime like this will not fall through air power alone. No matter how extensive the bombing, without a sustained ground presence, the core structure will survive. Israel does not have that capacity. The United States does not have the political will to launch an intervention on a scale far larger than Iraq.
A coup from within the Revolutionary Guard Corps is often mentioned. It is also highly unlikely. The IRGC is not just a military force. It is an economic empire and an ideological institution tied to the regime’s survival. Its leadership extends far beyond top commanders into a broad, entrenched network controlling vast sectors of the economy. Its senior ranks are beneficiaries of the system, not agents of change.
Leaving the regime wounded but intact is not a neutral outcome. It is a strategic mistake. A weakened Iranian Islamic Dictatorship is often more aggressive, more unpredictable, and more reliant on repression.
At the same time, flirting with fragmented opposition figures who lack organization inside Iran is not a serious policy. It is political theater that obscures reality.
There is only one path that aligns legitimacy with capability. A structured alternative with a real presence inside the country. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) represents such an option. It brings decades of resistance, an established network, and a defined political platform. Its Ten-Point Plan calls for a secular democratic republic, a non-nuclear Iran, gender equality, separation of religion and state, a free-market economy, peaceful coexistence with the world, and recognition of the rights of Iran’s diverse nationalities within a unified country.
Its international backing is substantial. It includes bipartisan support in the United States, thousands of European parliamentarians, endorsements from more than one hundred Nobel laureates, and support from thousands of American and Iranian-American academics. It does not ask for foreign funding or foreign troops. For five decades, its message has been consistent. No war. No appeasement. Democratic change by the people of Iran.
This is not about preference. It is about viability.
Wars end through decisive force or credible political transition. Neither exists today. Continuing this path risks the worst outcome: a prolonged regional war, a devastated population, and a regime that survives more dangerous than before. Strategy cannot be improvised in war. It must be defined now.