Why Reza Pahlavi’s “Emergency Phase” Plan Reproduces Authoritarian Rule
By: Professor Kazem Kazerounian, Jan 2026
Foreword: This article examines Reza Pahlavi’s 2024 “Emergency Phase” transition plan and argues that, despite its democratic rhetoric, it outlines a governance model that structurally reproduces authoritarian rule. The plan concentrates legislative, executive, and judicial power under a single unelected leader, relies on extended emergency authority with no hard endpoint, and postpones popular sovereignty, political pluralism, and civil liberties to an undefined future. It frames stability through centralized control rather than consent, treats ethnic diversity as a security problem rather than a political reality, and omits binding safeguards for judicial independence, minority rights, and democratic accountability. Taken together, these features reveal a transition architecture that governs first and legitimizes later, creating a pathway in which emergency rule risks becoming permanent and democratic outcomes remain contingent rather than guaranteed.
Introduction
The document known as the Emergency Phase plan was released in 2024 as part of Reza Pahlavi’s proposed roadmap for Iran’s political transition following the collapse of the Islamic Republic. It is presented as an operational manual for the first 100 to 180 days after regime change and is described as the most decisive period of the transition, during which the foundations of the new political order are to be established (overview, p. 5). From the outset, the plan explicitly subordinates the legislative, executive, and judicial functions to a single authority, thereby violating the most basic principle of separation of powers that underpins any democratic system. Rather than treating these three pillars as independent checks on one another, the document collapses them into a unified vertical chain of command under one leader.
The plan further allows this emergency period to be extended well beyond its initial timeframe. The broader transitional phase is defined as lasting between 18 and 36 months, with mechanisms that permit repeated extensions approved internally by unelected transitional bodies and confirmed by the Leader of the National Uprising (Section 3, para. 17, p. 13). Although framed as exceptional and temporary, this structure creates a clear pathway by which emergency governance can be renewed, normalized, and potentially extended indefinitely. In practical terms, the most concentrated and least accountable form of power can persist for years, with no hard institutional barrier preventing its continuation.
The plan is closely associated with Reza Pahlavi’s inner political and advisory circle, many of whom have been publicly presented as key interlocutors, coordinators, or informal architects of the project. A significant portion of this inner circle consists of individuals who, until relatively recently, operated within or alongside the power ecosystem of the Islamic Republic, including state institutions, regime-affiliated economic networks, and security-adjacent circles linked to the IRGC. These affiliations are not incidental. They help explain why the governing logic of the document relies so heavily on centralized authority, security primacy, and elite management rather than popular participation and bottom-up legitimacy (introductory pages and acknowledgments, p. 2).
Political transitions do not fail only because of bad intentions. They fail when their architects reproduce, often unconsciously, the logic of the systems they claim to replace. Reza Pahlavi’s Emergency Phase plan is a striking example of this danger.
While presented as a pragmatic roadmap toward democracy, the document in fact outlines a centralized, leader-dominated, security-first system in which democratic governance is postponed, conditional, and structurally subordinated. What emerges is not a democratic transition temporarily constrained by crisis, but a command-based order justified through emergency, with no built-in safeguards against authoritarian consolidation.
This is not a neutral technical plan. It is a political design. And its design points unmistakably toward personal rule.
Personal Authority as the Foundation of the System
Reza Pahlavi’s plan does not begin with popular sovereignty, collective leadership, or a provisional social contract. It begins with himself.
The entire transitional system is explicitly defined as operating under his leadership:
“The Transitional System shall operate under the leadership of the Leader of the National Uprising” (Section 3, para. 3, p. 6).
This authority is not limited to the initial emergency phase. It extends across the entire transitional period, including any extensions of that period. At no point prior to the adoption of a permanent constitution is the leader’s position subject to election, confirmation, or public review.
In democratic transitions, emergency authority is normally time-bound and institutionally constrained. Here, leadership authority is continuous, personalized, and insulated from popular challenge.
Control Over Time as a Form of Power
The emergency phase is formally defined as lasting between 100 and 180 days. However, this timeframe is explicitly nonbinding.
The document states that the broader transitional period may last between 18 and 36 months (Section 3, para. 17, p. 13). Extensions beyond the initial emergency phase can be approved internally by the transitional institutions themselves, with confirmation by the Leader of the National Uprising. Extensions of up to six months require no public input. Extensions beyond twelve months may involve a referendum, but only after prolonged rule by unelected emergency authorities who control the political environment in which such a vote would take place.
This structure creates a pathway by which emergency rule can be continuously renewed. What is presented as temporary becomes self-perpetuating. Control over time becomes control over politics. In this design, there is no absolute endpoint at which emergency authority must give way to democratic governance.
Total Control Over All Branches of Power
Reza Pahlavi’s plan formally establishes three institutions that resemble the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. In practice, all three are subordinated to a single authority.
“The appointment and removal of the heads of all three institutions shall be carried out with the approval of the Leader of the National Uprising” (Section 3, para. 4, p. 7).
This arrangement applies throughout the emergency phase and any extensions thereof. No branch can outlast, override, or independently challenge the leader who controls its leadership.
This is not a transitional necessity. It is structural domination.
An Appointed Legislature Without Representation
The body designated as the legislative authority during the transition, the National Uprising Institution, is not elected and does not represent constituencies.
“Members of the National Uprising Institution shall be appointed by the Leader of the National Uprising” (Section 3.A, para. 6, p. 7).
Even changes to its size or membership require the leader’s approval. After its formal legislative role ends, the body continues to function in an advisory capacity directly attached to the leader until the transition concludes (Section 3.A, para. 8, p. 8).
A non-elected body appointed by one individual thus remains embedded at the center of governance for the entire transitional timeline.
Governance in Secrecy During the Formation of Power
Before regime collapse, the plan authorizes the formation of governing bodies whose members are deliberately concealed from the public.
“Due to security considerations, the identities of these individuals shall not be disclosed until regime collapse” (Section 3, para. 2, p. 7).
This secrecy applies during the period when strategies are formed, alliances built, and power relationships fixed. By the time transparency begins, the emergency order may already be normalized and extended.
This is a classic mechanism of elite capture during political transitions.
Emergency Rule as the Default Mode of Governance
Throughout the emergency phase and its potential extensions, governance is framed as rule by directive rather than rule by law.
Authorities are empowered to suspend institutions, replace officials, control communications, impose curfews, and override normal procedures. These powers are not confined to a narrow crisis window.
The document authorizes:
“Immediate suspension, vetting, and replacement of senior managers” without embedding judicial safeguards as a prerequisite (security and emergency governance provisions, pp. 73–85).
Legal guarantees are repeatedly deferred to later stages, reinforcing a system in which power precedes accountability.
Fusion of Intelligence and Justice
The plan authorizes intelligence-led coordination of arrests and judicial processes during the emergency and transitional phases.
“Command authority over transitional intelligence courts, coordinating targeted arrests” (Phase 2B/A, p. 85).
This fusion persists throughout the extended transition and is not tied to a fixed expiration date. Judicial independence is postponed until a future moment that the same authorities control.
Suspension of Media Independence
The emergency phase mandates the seizure and suspension of national broadcasting institutions.
“Peaceful seizure of key institutions including national broadcasting and suspension of official operations” (Phase 1, p. 73).
The document provides no fixed timeline for restoring independent media governance. As with other emergency powers, restoration is conditional on the conclusion of the transition rather than guaranteed at a defined point.
Erasure of Ethnic Diversity and the Road to Civil Conflict
One of the most consequential silences in the plan concerns Iran’s ethnic and national diversity. Across the entire document, there is no recognition of ethnic communities as political subjects, no acknowledgment of their historical grievances, and no reference to any right of self-determination, local self-rule, or meaningful participation in shaping the post-regime order.
Kurds, Arabs, Baluch, Azeris, Turkmen, and other communities that together constitute a substantial portion of Iran’s population do not appear as rights-bearing groups anywhere in the plan. When regions associated with strong ethnic identities are mentioned, they are framed almost exclusively through the language of security, border control, and threat prevention. Diversity is treated not as a democratic reality to be accommodated, but as a problem to be contained.
The document repeatedly elevates territorial integrity and national unity as absolute principles, without pairing them with political inclusion or power-sharing. Any form of regional mobilization that challenges centralized authority is implicitly categorized as a security risk. In this framework, demands for local governance, cultural recognition, or political autonomy are not political questions to be negotiated, but deviations to be suppressed.
This approach reproduces the same centralist logic that has fueled decades of rebellion, repression, and bloodshed. A transition that once again denies political voice to large segments of the population while empowering security institutions to enforce unity from above is not a path to stability. It is a recipe for civil war.
History offers a clear warning. In multiethnic societies emerging from authoritarian rule, peace depends on early recognition, inclusion, and negotiated arrangements. When a transition begins by imposing a rigid, centralized order and postponing all questions of identity and local agency to an undefined future, it invites resistance. When that resistance is met with force rather than politics, the outcome is not unity but violence.
A transition that ignores diversity does not preserve the country. It destabilizes it.
What Is Missing and Why the Absence Matters
Beyond what the plan explicitly establishes, its most revealing features are what it omits. These absences are not neutral gaps to be filled later. They are structural silences that shape the transition in advance.
The plan never states that sovereignty belongs to the people as an immediate and operative principle. Authority is assumed through leadership designation and emergency necessity. Elections are postponed. Consent is deferred. The people appear as subjects to be managed, not authors of power.
There is no protection for political pluralism during the transition. Opposition to the transitional authority itself is not recognized as legitimate. Parties and movements are future actors, not present stakeholders. This allows dissent to be treated as a threat to stability rather than an essential democratic force.
Civil liberties are not guaranteed during the emergency phase. Freedom of expression, assembly, protest, and independent organizing are subordinated to order. Surveillance and restrictions are specified. Rights are not.
Judicial independence is postponed. Courts are not insulated from executive or security influence. Without an independent judiciary from day one, there is no effective remedy against abuse of power.
Social and economic justice are treated as technical matters rather than democratic imperatives. Workers, marginalized communities, and victims of repression are offered stability, not voice.
There is no firm commitment to absolute limits on state coercion. Fundamental rights are not framed as inviolable. Punishment and repression remain subject to emergency discretion.
Finally, the plan lacks a clear moral rejection of authoritarian methods themselves. It promises democratic outcomes but accepts authoritarian means. History shows that when methods are not constrained by principles, outcomes rarely escape those methods.
Taken together, these omissions form a pattern. The plan is detailed where control is concerned and vague where rights are at stake. It specifies how power is exercised, not how it is limited. It manages society but does not trust it.
Conclusion: When Emergency Has No End
Reza Pahlavi’s plan promises democracy, but only after an emergency phase that can last months, years, and with a built-in pathway to permanence through renewable extensions controlled by the same unelected authorities.
Sovereignty flows downward, not upward. Power consolidates before participation begins. Emergency becomes routine. Rights are deferred. Oversight arrives late, if at all.
This is not a democratic transition delayed by crisis. It is a blueprint for dictatorship justified by crisis.
History is unambiguous. When emergency rule controls both power and time, democracy does not arrive by promise alone.
The danger is not what this plan says about democracy.
The danger is how easily its emergency can become permanent.