Note: FISN research reports and papers may be used freely with proper referencing and credit to the authors and the Free Iran Scholars Network.
Executive Summary
The activation of the United Nations “snapback” mechanism under Security Council Resolution 2231 represents a pivotal moment in the long struggle to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. For more than two decades, Western governments have pursued negotiation and concession, hoping that engagement would moderate Tehran’s behavior. The outcome is clear: Iran is closer than ever to nuclear weapons capability, emboldened in its repression at home and aggression abroad.
This briefing analyzes why appeasement failed, the significance of snapback, and why the only sustainable path forward requires firmness, clarity, and alignment with the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people. It also draws lessons from historical failures of appeasement in international relations – underscoring that appeasement is not diplomacy, and that true diplomacy requires accountability, enforcement, and leverage.
Background: Two Decades of Negotiation and Deception
Since the initial NCRI’s 2002 revelations of clandestine sites at Natanz and Arak, Tehran has pursued a dual strategy: temporary negotiation to buy time, and steady technical advancement to build nuclear capability.
– Geneva Agreement (2013): Froze some enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief.
– JCPOA (2015): Lifted sanctions under UNSCR 2231, with sunset clauses and loopholes.
– Post-JCPOA (2016–2020): Tehran expanded missile testing, regional proxy wars, and enrichment.
At every stage, Tehran treated diplomacy as tactical delay. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei openly described his “heroic flexibility” not as compromise, but as maneuver to outlast pressure.
Why Negotiations Failed
For Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), the bomb is an insurance policy for survival. No number of concessions could persuade them to abandon it permanently. More specifically, Khamenei never sought genuine compromise. His regime’s survival has always hinged on a deliberate, well-rehearsed strategy: stall negotiations, enrich uranium behind closed doors, and inch toward nuclear weapons under the illusion of diplomacy.
Internal Contradictions on Diplomacy
- Public rejection vs. private approval: Khamenei rejected direct talks with Washington in August 2025, yet his senior official Abdulhossein Khosropanah admitted he approved indirect talks after the 12-day war with Israel.
- Rouhani’s admission: Former president Hassan Rouhani argued that reducing tensions with the U.S. is “a duty.”
These high level contradictions expose a regime in survival mode – posturing ideologically while seeking lifelines abroad.
Appeasement Is Not Diplomacy
It is crucial to distinguish between appeasement and diplomacy:
- Diplomacy involves negotiation grounded in verifiable enforcement, reciprocity, and accountability.
- Appeasement involves unilateral concessions that embolden aggressors without addressing root causes.
In moments of international crisis, policymakers and commentators often invoke the need for “diplomacy.” The word itself carries a positive connotation, dialogue, negotiation, the pursuit of peace without war. Yet history warns us that not all talks are equal, and not all concessions are wise. To confuse diplomacy with appeasement is to court disaster, particularly when confronting regimes that thrive on deception and aggression. This distinction matters in the case of Iran. As Tehran pushes its nuclear weapons program, crushes dissent at home, and armed proxy militias across the Middle East, the temptation for Western governments has been to pursue engagement at any cost. But diplomacy without enforcement is not diplomacy at all. It is appeasement, and it has already emboldened the ayatollahs for decades. Diplomacy involves negotiation grounded in verifiable enforcement, reciprocity, and accountability. When the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in arms control talks during the Cold War, they did so on the basis of strict inspections, reciprocal reductions, and consequences for cheating. Diplomacy works when it protects long-term security while preserving principles.
Appeasement, by contrast, involves unilateral concessions that embolden aggressors without addressing root causes. The most infamous case remains the 1938 Munich Agreement, where Britain and France ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Hitler in the hope of peace. Far from satisfying Nazi ambitions, appeasement paved the way for World War II.
Therefore, lesson is clear: diplomacy requires strength and clarity, while appeasement projects weakness and invites escalation.
Tehran’s Playbook: Exploiting Appeasement
Few regimes have mastered the art of exploiting appeasement like Tehran. Since the early 2000s, Western governments have entered into multiple agreements with the Islamic Republic, Paris (2003), Geneva (2013), and most notably the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. In each case, Tehran pocketed the concessions, reaped economic relief, and used the breathing space to expand repression at home and terror abroad.
The JCPOA is a case study. While it temporarily capped enrichment, its sunset clauses allowed Iran to resume nuclear work after a few years. Sanctions relief injected billions into the regime, much of it diverted to the IRGC to bankroll wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. This is not diplomacy; it is appeasement dressed as diplomacy. And the result was predictable: a more confident, more aggressive regime.
The Cost of Appeasement at Home and Abroad
The victims of appeasement are not only the West’s long-term security, regional players, it is first and foremost the Iranian people. Every time Tehran’s regime is granted concessions without ac countability, it tightens the noose around its citizens. In recent months, the world has witnessed a horrific surge of executions, including political prisoners affiliated with the NCRI. By ignoring these crimes in the name of engagement, Western governments send Tehran a dangerous signal: repression carries no cost.
Regionally, appeasement has fueled instability. Tehran arms to Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, Lebanon, and the Gulf. It openly threatens shipping lanes and global energy supplies. Far from moderating, the regime interprets conciliatory gestures as weakness, and it escalates accordingly.
For Iran, the stakes could not be higher: regional stability, global security, and the future of 85 million people yearning for freedom.
Comparative Historic Lessons
History offers us several examples where appeasement will not yield peaceful outcomes.
| Case | Appeasement Outcome | Final Firm Response |
| Munich Agreement (1938) | Concessions to Hitler enabled Nazi expansion, leading to WWII. | Firm allied response only came after aggression escalated. |
| Cold War INF Treaty (1987) | Soviet deception in earlier talks stalled progress. | Firm deterrence + intrusive verification delivered verifiable arms control. |
| South Africa (1980s–90s) | Apartheid thrived when sanctions were partial and uneven. | Coordinated sanctions + domestic resistance ended apartheid and dismantled nukes. |
| North Korea (1990s–present) | Aid-for-promises deals failed; Pyongyang advanced covert weapons. | Verification and pressure remain necessary but absent. |
| Serbia/Kosovo (1990s) | EU appeasement failed to stop ethnic cleansing. | NATO action + sanctions forced Milosevic to retreat. |
| Iraq (1990s) | Early leniency allowed concealment of WMD programs. | UN inspections with enforcement exposed violations. |
| Libya (2003) | Earlier engagement failed to stop WMD pursuit. | Maximum pressure forced Gaddafi to dismantle WMD program. |
| Syria (2013) | Chemical disarmament deal without enforcement; Assad continued attacks. | Without strict verification, commitments were meaningless until the international community and internal dynamics led to the fall of Syrian dictatorship. |
| Iran JCPOA (2015) | Sanctions relief strengthened IRGC; proxy wars, internal repression, enrichment continued. | Snapback sanctions offer automatic enforcement. |
Snapback: Mechanism and Implications
UN Security Council Resolution 2231 provides for the automatic restoration of sanctions without requiring a new vote. Within 30 days of notification- such as the European Troika’s recent letter- all six prior Security Council resolutions suspended under the JCPOA will return in full force. This “snapback mechanism,” outlined in Paragraph 12 of Annex A of Resolution 2231, is both a legal and political tool.
Snapback is more than an economic penalty- it represents a delegitimization of Tehran on the international stage. The regime’s threats to abandon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or close the Strait of Hormuz should be read not as signs of power, but of vulnerability. Tehran crossed a red line with near–weapons-grade enrichment, triggering targeted strikes by Israel and the United States. Yet more significant than what happened was what did not: Russia and China- supposed strategic allies- did not come to Tehran’s defense. Their silence confirmed the regime’s isolation is far deeper than it admits.
FISN concludes: “Snapback is not simply about sanctions- it is about stripping Tehran of legitimacy.”
What Snapback Means in Practice
When snapback is activated, the following six resolutions are reinstated in their entirety:
- Resolution 1696 (2006) – The first binding resolution on Iran, demanding suspension of uranium enrichment.
- Resolution 1737 (2006) – Imposed initial sanctions: banned the transfer of sensitive nuclear and missile technology, froze assets of related individuals and entities.
- Resolution 1747 (2007) – Expanded sanctions: prohibited Iranian arms exports and froze additional assets.
- Resolution 1803 (2008) – Added travel restrictions, authorized inspections of Iranian shipments, and imposed tighter banking controls.
- Resolution 1835 (2008) – Contained no new sanctions, but reaffirmed Iran’s non-compliance and the Council’s determination to act.
- Resolution 1929 (2010) – The most comprehensive package: banned sales of heavy weapons to Iran, tightened financial and banking restrictions, barred investment in the energy sector, and mandated inspections of Iranian air and sea cargo.
Once the snapback mechanism is triggered (September 28, 2025), all six resolutions automatically return in full effect. Crucially, this does not require a new Security Council vote, unless the Council unanimously agrees otherwise within 30 days- a near impossibility given the alignment of Western powers.
Among these, Resolution 1929 is the most consequential, as it imposes sweeping restrictions on Iran’s military, financial, and energy sectors- the very lifelines of the regime’s survival.
Internal vs. External Fear
While the regime’s leadership projects defiance abroad, its actions reveal a different reality. Khamenei does not fear foreign airstrikes as much as he fears what is rising from within: the Iranian people, organized and determined to reclaim their future.
That is why, in the wake of the war and the snapback process, Tehran’s immediate response was not diplomatic engagement but a wave of political executions, targeting MEK members and dissidents. This is not the behavior of a regime acting from confidence. It is the behavior of a system cracking under pressure, lashing out at its most feared threat: internal rebellion backed by an organized pro-democracy alternative.
FISN believes: “What Tehran fears most is not bombs- it is its own people.”
Beyond Appeasement and Foreign War
Iran’s modern history presents two critical case studies- both marked by failure. Between 1921 and 1979, the country experienced a succession of externally engineered regime changes. In 1921, Reza Khan seized power through a British-backed coup, transitioning from military officer to monarch, displacing the Qajar dynasty, and founding the authoritarian Pahlavi state. His son, Mohammad Reza Shah, ascended the throne in 1941 after the British and Soviet occupation forced his father’s abdication during World War II. The younger Shah consolidated his rule following the 1953 CIA-backed coup that overthrew the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh.
For nearly six decades, the Pahlavi dynasty governed on the strength of external patronage rather than internal legitimacy. Ultimately, it collapsed under the weight of its authoritarianism and repression, demonstrating that foreign-imposed monarchies are incapable of delivering durable freedom or stability.
After 1979, the pendulum swung to the opposite extreme. The West shifted from externally imposed solutions to a strategy of appeasement, wagering that the newly established Islamic Republic could be moderated through dialogue, concessions, and nuclear agreements. Decades of engagement produced little beyond broken promises. The regime responded not with reform, but with escalating executions, systematic repression, regional terrorism, and an unrelenting drive toward nuclear capability.
In both instances, the outcome was consistent: the Iranian people bore the heaviest cost, while the international community miscalculated. Appeasement has, in effect, become the cornerstone of Western failure on Iran- emboldening the regime, legitimizing its violence, and entrenching its grip on power. Just as foreign-installed monarchs proved unsustainable, the notion that the clerical regime can be reformed from within is equally illusory.
Another recurring failure has been the West’s inability to fully apprehend the regime’s deliberate strategy of deception and its true Achilles’ heel. Even under the JCPOA framework, Tehran covertly expanded centrifuge capacity and fortified nuclear sites. When Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared in March 2025 that “there will be no talks and no war,” this was not a projection of strength but a calculated gamble. He wagered that Western governments lacked the political will to act, and that limited missile strikes- if they occurred- were an acceptable risk compared to the far greater danger he faces: a domestic uprising.
This gamble revealed the regime’s deepest vulnerability. Khamenei does not fear foreign airstrikes; he fears the Iranian Resistance. He fears the growing capacity of his own people, increasingly organized and determined to reclaim their future.
FISN’s assessment is clear: “appeasement has facilitated the regime’s survival; and limited military strikes have not brought structural change. What the regime truly fears, and what the international community must recognize, is the rise of a determined, organized resistance rooted in the Iranian people themselves. That is Tehran’s Achilles’ heel.”
Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the NCRI, has long articulated a Third Option:
- Not war, which risks regional conflagration.
- Not appeasement, which has consistently failed.
- But democratic change led by the Iranian people and their organized resistance, reinforced by international firmness and solidarity.
Policy Recommendations
- Full Snapback Implementation: The United States and its allies must ensure the comprehensive enforcement of restored UN sanctions under Security Council Resolution 2231. This includes the reactivation of all previous prohibitions on nuclear and missile activities, arms transfers, banking, and energy sector investments. Sanctions should be rigorously monitored and enforced to close loopholes, prevent backdoor financing, and cut off the regime’s access to hard currency. Without strict enforcement, snapback risks becoming symbolic rather than transformative.
- No Partial Side Deals: The mistakes of the JCPOA must not be repeated. Partial agreements or ad hoc side deals that provide Tehran with economic relief in exchange for temporary or easily reversible commitments only serve to embolden the regime. Any future negotiation must avoid concessions that undermine snapback’s credibility and instead insist on comprehensive compliance with all UN resolutions, including a complete halt to enrichment.
- IAEA Monitoring and Accountability: For snapback to be meaningful, Iran’s nuclear program must be subjected to robust verification and intrusive inspections. This requires universal adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol, unrestricted access to suspect sites, and full disclosure of past nuclear activities. Without independent verification, Tehran will continue its pattern of concealment and deception. Strict monitoring not only ensures compliance but also strengthens the credibility of the international community’s response by providing hard evidence of violations.
- Counter Tehran’s Narrative: Tehran thrives on propaganda that portrays sanctions as illegitimate, external pressure as “imperialist,” and its nuclear program as a symbol of sovereignty. Western governments, media, and civil society must challenge these narratives by exposing the regime’s contradictions- its secret enrichment activities, its fabricated “defensive” posture, and its diversion of resources from the Iranian people to foreign wars and terror proxies. A coordinated information campaign is essential to delegitimize Tehran’s claims both domestically and internationally.
- Support the Iranian People’s Right to Regime Change: The international community must explicitly recognize the right of the Iranian people to overthrow tyranny and establish a democratic, secular republic. This includes political recognition of the NCRI’s platform, amplifying the voices of dissidents, condemning executions and political repression, and ensuring accountability for human rights abuses through universal jurisdiction. Such recognition sends a powerful signal that the world stands with the people of Iran rather than their oppressors.
- Multilateral Unity and Resolve: Tehran’s survival strategy has long relied on exploiting divisions between the United States, Europe, and regional partners. To break this pattern, Western allies must act in concert, alongside Middle Eastern partners threatened by Iran’s destabilizing activities. A unified approach- anchored in transatlantic alignment and regional coordination- ensures that snapback is credible, pressure is sustained, and Tehran cannot maneuver diplomatically to weaken enforcement. Unity also prevents adversaries such as Russia and China from using divisions to dilute pressure on Tehran.
Conclusion
Iran’s nuclear challenge is political, not technical. It stems from a regime that survives on repression and deception. Negotiations without enforcement are appeasement – and appeasement has failed in Iran, North Korea, and history. Snapback is the first step toward realism, but only succeeds when tied to the Iranian people’s right to determine their future. The choice now is stark: repeat history’s mistakes or stand with the people of Iran. The only sustainable alternative is the Third Option championed by Maryam Rajavi: regime change led by the Iranian people and their organized resistance, supported by international firmness and solidarity.
Reference
- NCRI revelations on Natanz and Arak, 2002.
- Ali Khamenei, remarks on “heroic flexibility,” 2013.
- Abdulhossein Khosropanah, Secretary of Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, September 2025 (state media reports).
- Hassan Rouhani, remarks to advisors, September 2025 (domestic press).
- Ettela’at and Etemad newspapers, September 2025, acknowledging snapback’s severe consequences.