An FISN Research Report by Dr. Khalil Khani, Professor Emeritus, Tehran University
August 21, 2025
Iran, a nation historically admired for its ingenious water management systems—most famously the ancient qanat, subterranean aqueducts that sustained civilisations for thousands of years[1]—is today facing one of the gravest environmental and social emergencies in its modern history. As of August 2025, the country is contending with unprecedented water shortages, dangerously depleted reservoirs, and sweeping rationing measures, particularly in major urban centers such as Tehran[2].
Although environmental pressures, including a prolonged five-year drought[3] and record-breaking heatwaves[4], have intensified the strain, the depth and severity of the crisis are the direct consequence of decades of policy failure, endemic corruption, and deliberate misallocation of resources under the regime[5]. These are not incidental failings; they are structural features of a regime whose priorities have consistently favored the political survival of the clerical establishment, the enrichment of a narrow elite—above all the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—and the pursuit of costly regional adventurism over the basic welfare of its own citizens.
President Masoud Pezeshkian, who took office in July 2024, has been forced to acknowledge publicly[6] the gravity of the crisis, warning that without urgent action, Iran could face an irreversible catastrophe. Yet even this rare admission has been accompanied by the regime’s habitual evasion of responsibility. Experts estimate that while climate change accounts for perhaps 20–30 per cent of the current water shortage[7], the overwhelming remainder stems from man-made mismanagement[8]—mismanagement so entrenched that many Iranians now regard it as inseparable from the nature of the regime itself.
Historical Context and Decadence in the Era of Religious Dictatorship
Iran’s semi-arid geography has always demanded careful water stewardship. Average annual rainfall is only about 250 millimetres[9], roughly one-third of the global average, and ancient Persian engineers responded with systems like the qanat, designed to tap aquifers without exhausting them[10], combined with communal governance that balanced competing needs. For centuries, these practices ensured a degree of resilience despite the country’s natural limitations.
After the rise of the religious dictatorship, this equilibrium was shattered. A surge in population—from 37 million in 1979 to more than 90 million today[11], was driven by pro-natalist policies under Khomeini.
At the same time, the regime encouraged unsustainable groundwater extraction, producing an annual deficit exceeding 30 billion cubic metres[12]. Aquifers have been permanently damaged, and in some areas land subsidence now exceeds 25 centimeters per year[13]. Experts such as former Agriculture Minister Issa Kalantari began warning of “water bankruptcy[14]” as early as the 2000s. Yet successive governments, beholden to the same political and military power structures, ignored or suppressed such warnings.
Climate change has made an already precarious situation worse. Temperatures are rising[15], precipitation patterns are becoming erratic, and droughts have become both longer and more severe[16]. Nevertheless, as climatologist Nasser Karami notes, the crisis “transcends drought” and is fundamentally rooted in “government mismanagement, militarized agriculture, and deliberate manipulation” for political ends.
The Crisis in 2024–2025
The water year beginning on 22 September 2024 yielded only 23.56 billion cubic metres of rainfall[17], well below the historical norm. By mid-2025, precipitation deficits stood at 45%, with Tehran[2] province receiving a mere 7 inches over the year[18]. In July and August 2025, temperatures above 50°C[19] were recorded in Ahvaz and Omidiyeh, with some areas experiencing a heat index of 65°C—among the highest globally.
Dam inflows are down nearly 30% compared with recent averages, leaving reservoirs at perilous lows. Tehran[2]’s four main dams—Amir Kabir, Lar, Taleghan, and Latyan—are at or below 20% capacity, with some as low as 6%[20], the worst in nearly six decades. In over 50 cities, residents receive water for only a few hours per day; in parts of rural Sistan and Baluchestan, Khuzestan, and Kurdistan, wells have run completely dry.
This water scarcity coincides with a nationwide energy crisis, forming a “triple crisis” of water, electricity, and fuel. Hydroelectric power output has collapsed, gas shortages have forced plants to burn heavy fuel oil, and blackouts—already costing the economy billions—are forecast to worsen.
Regime Mismanagement and the “Water Mafia”
At the heart of the crisis lies the Iranian regime’s governance model: centralised, opaque, and dominated by the IRGC. The Supreme Water Council routinely approves projects that serve regime interests rather than public need. The IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters[22] has entrenched itself as the linchpin of a vast “water mafia”—a network of military-linked firms and loyal bureaucrats profiting from dam building, river diversion, and other environmentally destructive schemes.
These projects are typically imposed without environmental impact assessments[23] and have devastated ecosystems, drying rivers and wetlands and depriving downstream communities—often ethnic minorities—of their lifelines. Corruption is endemic: billions allocated to water infrastructure are siphoned off through inflated contracts, with IRGC companies reaping the rewards. The legalisation of over 30,000 illegal wells[25] in 2010, many controlled by regime insiders, accelerated groundwater depletion.
Water allocation reflects the same political bias. Favoured industries[26]—steel, petrochemicals, and mining—dominate access, even in the most water-stressed provinces. Meanwhile, up to 30% of Tehran[2]’s piped water is lost to leaks that the regime refuses to repair. Funds that could address these losses are instead diverted to nuclear projects[28], ballistic missile programmes, and the financing of proxy militias abroad. After the 2024 conflict with Israel, resources were once again funnelled into foreign reconstruction and military build-up, leaving the country’s own infrastructure to decay.
Public Impact and Growing Anger
The social consequences are severe. Wealthier residents in Tehran[2] can afford rooftop storage tanks and tanker deliveries, but poorer households cannot. Reports of polluted tanker water are common. In Bushehr, where extreme heat and humidity are routine, limited water supply and daily blackouts have turned life into a fight for survival.
In the countryside, desperation is visible. Salt storms[29] from the shrinking Lake Urmia[24] damage crops and cause respiratory illness. These hardships have already triggered protests in Isfahan, Khuzestan[31], and elsewhere—protests that increasingly target the regime itself rather than local officials.
Economically, the crisis is crippling. Agriculture is contracting sharply, forcing shifts in cropping patterns[30] and an expensive increase in food imports. Industrial output suffers from power shortages, further fuelling inflation and unemployment. Politically, the link between water shortages and regime corruption is now openly discussed in markets, workplaces, and on social media. Many Iranians no longer see these problems as isolated technical failures, but as the inevitable result of clerical rule. The belief that nothing will change while the mullahs remain in power is spreading, and with it, the sense that only their removal can open the way to solutions.
Risk of Uprising
The water crisis has become more than an environmental emergency; it is a political flashpoint. Past protests over water in Khuzestan (2021) and Isfahan (2021 and 2025) have morphed into nationwide demonstrations calling for systemic change. The regime’s violent suppression of such protests has only deepened public anger.
With each new shortage, each instance of blatant mismanagement, the conviction grows that these are not fixable under the current system. As living conditions deteriorate, the crisis could become the catalyst for a broader uprising. Experts warn of a tipping point at which environmental collapse, economic hardship, and political repression converge to trigger sustained nationwide revolt. This is a regime that has long feared the mobilizing potential of bread-and-butter grievances—and water is as fundamental as it gets.
Inadequate and Cynical Responses
The regime’s measures—water rationing, reduced pressure, penalties for “heavy consumers”, and occasional infrastructure announcements—are palliative at best. Desalination and wastewater recycling projects exist mostly on paper or in partial operation. Even if sanctions relief were to allow greater access to foreign technology, the same political and institutional priorities would obstruct meaningful progress.
Calls for independent water authorities, transparent data, and community involvement are met with propaganda, deflection, or outright repression. The regime’s propaganda machine continues to blame “inherited imbalances” or foreign enemies, rather than confronting its own catastrophic governance.
Conclusion
Iran’s 2024–2025 water crisis starkly demonstrates how a natural vulnerability can be weaponised by corruption and incompetence into a threat to national survival. While drought and climate change are significant factors, the decisive cause is a regime that has plundered the nation’s resources, empowered a militarised “water mafia”, and neglected its duty to protect the most basic needs of its people.
The crisis is not just a matter of hydrology; it is a matter of political legitimacy. As the shortages bite deeper and more Iranians conclude that relief is impossible under clerical rule, the likelihood of a popular uprising increases. Without fundamental political change—beginning with the dismantling of the IRGC’s stranglehold on resources and the replacement of opaque, centralised governance with accountable, sustainable management—the cycle of crisis will continue.
Iran’s history shows it has the ingenuity to manage its scarce water. What it lacks under the current regime is the will to put that ingenuity to work for the people, rather than against them.
—
Footnotes
[1] UNESCO, Qanats of Iran (World Heritage Centre).
[2] IRNA / Tasnim / Associated Press, July–Aug 2025 water rationing reports.
[3] Iran Meteorological Organization (IRIMO), Drought Monitoring Reports 2020–2025.
[4] WMO Climate Monitoring, July–Aug 2025 heatwave data.
[5] Chatham House, Iran’s Environmental Crisis and Political Stability, 2023.
[6] ISNA, “Pezeshkian acknowledges water crisis,” July 2025.
[7] World Bank, Water Security in the Middle East, 2022.
[8] Kalantari, I., interviews, Shargh Newspaper, 2020–2023.
[9] FAO AQUASTAT, Country Profile: Iran.
[10] UNESCO, ibid.
[11] Statistical Centre of Iran, Population Census data, 1976–2021.
[12] IRIMO / Ministry of Energy groundwater deficit figures.
[13] Geological Survey of Iran, Land Subsidence Reports 2018–2024.
[14] Kalantari, I., op. cit.
[15] WMO regional climate analysis.
[16] UNDP Iran, Drought Impact Assessment, 2023.
[17] Ministry of Energy hydrology data, Sept 2025.
[18] IRIMO precipitation data.
[19] WMO, Global Extreme Heat Database.
[20] Ministry of Energy dam capacity reports.
[21] Local water authority statements, July 2025.
[22] Transparency International Iran, 2024 report.
[23] DOE (Iran Department of Environment) internal memos leaked 2023.
[24] UNEP, Lake Urmia Restoration Programme Report, 2022.
[25] IRNA news archive, 2010.
[26] Iran Chamber of Commerce industrial water allocation data.
[27] Tehran Water and Wastewater Company report, 2024.
[28] Reuters, “Iran diverts funds to foreign proxies,” March 2025.
[29] Iranian Journal of Environmental Health, 2022.
[30] FAO food import statistics.
[31] Amnesty International, “Iran: Protest Crackdowns,” 2021–2025.
[32] Chatham House, ibid.
[33] World Resources Institute policy recommendations.
Dr. Khalil Khani is an Environmental Specialist and a Human Rights activist. He holds a Ph.D. in Ecology, Botany, and Environmental Studies from Germany and has taught at the University of Tehran and the Hesse State University in Germany. He is also a Doctor of Medical Psychology from the United States.