Dr. Hossein Saiedian, Professor Computer Science, The University of Kansas
Definition of Tiered Internet and Importance of the Issue
“Tiered Internet” in Iran refers to a system that stratifies internet access based on political and class-based criteria, such as proximity to power, social status, or institutional affiliation. Unlike the digital divide in many countries, which is primarily rooted in economic or geographical factors, in Iran, this phenomenon is predominantly political, creating a structural discrimination between regime affiliates and ordinary citizens. Government officials, their associates, and wealthy regime supporters enjoy high-speed, unfiltered internet and free access to global platforms like Twitter, YouTube, and WhatsApp, while the majority of the population faces sluggish speeds, extensive filtering, and exclusion from most global websites. This policy not only deepens social and economic inequalities but also violates citizens’ digital rights, including freedom of expression and access to information, severely undermining public trust in the fairness of access to technology. This article examines the dimensions of tiered internet, the regime’s objectives in implementing it, its consequences, comparisons with global experiences, and practical solutions for public resistance, supported by the international community.
Dimensions and Characteristics of Tiered Internet in Iran
Tiered internet in Iran is a discriminatory system that allocates access to free and high-speed internet based on proximity to power. This discrimination, beyond technical or managerial justifications, structurally distributes privileges in favor of regime elites, their associates, and wealthy supporters of the regime.
- Class-Based Access Structure: Regime officials, their families, governmental institutions such as the state broadcaster, and certain privileged academics or university figures enjoy high-speed, unfiltered internet. In contrast, ordinary citizens face severe speed restrictions and extensive filtering, making access to global platforms practically impossible. This profound inequality, indirectly referenced in reports, indicates a class divide that exceeds professional or technical needs.
- Concrete Examples: Initiatives like the “Goshaiesh” plan at Sharif University or temporary access granted to certain regime-aligned journalists, ostensibly designed to support professional needs, in practice provide informal and non-transparent access for regime elites and their associates, such as the use of YouTube and Twitter, exacerbating digital inequality.
- Connection to Broader Policies: The “National Information Network” project and decisions by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, aimed at creating a controllable domestic internet, have turned access into a class-based privilege obtainable only through “vetting” or proximity to power. These policies have transformed the internet from a public tool into a privilege for elite groups.
- Social Impacts: This discrimination has widened the digital divide, depriving disadvantaged groups, especially in underserved regions, of educational, economic, and cultural opportunities. For instance, a child in a deprived area with access only to filtered domestic content is denied equal opportunities compared to the children of officials with access to global resources. This situation has severely damaged public trust in the fairness of access to technology.
Objectives of the Regime in Implementing Tiered Internet
The Iranian regime uses tiered internet to achieve political, security, and class-based objectives:
- Political and Security Control: By segregating internet access, the regime controls the flow of information and prevents the spread of critical or dissenting content. Reports indicate that following the 1401 (2022) protests, widespread internet restrictions were imposed to disrupt protesters’ communications, while regime institutions and privileged individuals retained free internet access. This control enables the suppression of dissenting voices and limits social organization.
- Preservation of Class Privileges: Access to high-speed, unfiltered internet serves as a privilege for regime elites, their associates, and wealthy supporters, ensuring their loyalty. This privilege deepens the gap between rulers and the public, institutionalizing inequality.
- Superficial Justifications: The regime uses deceptive claims such as “enhancing security” or “supporting specific professions” to legitimize this discrimination. For example, initiatives like “Goshaiesh” at Sharif University or temporary access for certain journalists, ostensibly for professional support, in practice lead to systematic access segregation, undermining public trust.
Consequences of Tiered Internet in Iran
Tiered internet in Iran reinforces structural inequalities and violates citizens’ digital rights:
- Structural Inequalities: The exclusion of ordinary citizens, especially in underserved regions, from global resources limits educational and economic opportunities, deepening class divides. For example, small businesses reliant on global platforms like Instagram and WhatsApp have faced significant financial losses due to filtering.
- Violation of Digital Rights: Extensive filtering deprives the majority of their right to freedom of expression and access to information, silencing dissent. These restrictions hinder access to free educational and news resources, excluding the younger generation from global discourse.
- Social Instability: The blatant discrimination between regime affiliates and the public increases dissatisfaction and distrust, particularly among the tech-dependent youth. This distrust could lead to social unrest and reduced national cohesion.
Comparison with Global Experiences
Tiered internet in Iran differs significantly from global examples and is closely linked to the concept of the “digital divide,” which encompasses inequality in access to digital technologies, including quality, speed, and content freedom. Here are a few sample experiences:
- Persian Gulf Countries (UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia): Gulf Cooperation Council countries, particularly the UAE and Qatar, boast some of the world’s fastest internet speeds due to massive investments in digital infrastructure. According to the Speedtest Global Index in 2024, the UAE leads with an average fixed broadband download speed of 297.62 Mbps and mobile speed of 398.51 Mbps, while Qatar follows with 344.34 Mbps for mobile. These nations promote universal high-speed access through fiber optic expansion, Wi-Fi 6 technology, and fiber-to-the-room (FTTR), while supporting net neutrality policies that enhance public trust. In stark contrast, Iran’s tiered internet system restricts the majority to filtered, low-speed connections, deepening inequality and suppressing information freedom, standing in opposition to the region’s digital advancements.
- Europe (Finland, France, Germany): In these countries, the internet is recognized as a “basic public service,” and in Finland, a minimum internet speed is legally guaranteed for every citizen. These countries, with an emphasis on net neutrality and data protection laws, prevent digital discrimination. The key lesson from these models is the importance of legal transparency and commitment to universal access, which not only reduces the digital divide but also strengthens public trust in governmental institutions.
- India: India emphasizes net neutrality, deeming permanent access discrimination illegal. Although temporary restrictions (e.g., in Kashmir) have been imposed, permanent class-based policies are absent. India’s experience shows that maintaining net neutrality fosters public trust.
- China: China’s model, with its “Great Firewall,” isolates the internet from the global network, restricting ordinary users to domestic content. This surveillance system, executed with advanced infrastructure, enforces strict censorship and makes free access impossible. However, unlike Iran, discrimination in China is more about universal surveillance than allocating class-based privileges to specific groups. In Iran, tiered internet deliberately grants free and high-speed access to regime affiliates, their relatives, and wealthy supporters, while depriving the majority of these rights. This distinction highlights a deeply political and discriminatory nature in Iran, going beyond mere technical control to become a tool for preserving power and elite privileges.
Key Lessons for Iran
The Iranian regime’s tiered internet policies, which favor its affiliates and supporters, deserve strong condemnation. Global experiences highlight the urgent need for international pressure and global action against this discrimination:
- Condemnation of Non-Transparent Policies: Europe’s experience shows that legal transparency is essential for equal access. The Iranian regime, by implementing informal policies without legal approval, deliberately violates citizens’ digital rights. International organizations like the United Nations and Reporters Without Borders must condemn these actions and demand their cessation.
- Combating Digital Inequality: Restrictive policies, like those in China, exacerbate the digital divide, but in Iran, this divide is deliberate and class-based. The international community, including institutions advocating for information freedom, must support the Iranian people in demanding equitable internet access.
- Rebuilding Public Trust: India’s experience demonstrates that net neutrality fosters citizen trust. In Iran, the regime’s discriminatory policies have destroyed public trust. Global organizations must expose this injustice and pressure the regime for accountability.
- Preventing Catastrophic Consequences: Tiered internet in Iran not only institutionalizes inequality but also leads to political instability and cultural stagnation. International organizations must support internal resistance and exert global pressure to force the regime to halt this oppressive policy.
Role and Responsibility of the Younger Generation in Resistance
Iran’s younger generation, as pioneers of the digital age, alongside international community support, play a pivotal role in resisting tiered internet:
Public Awareness: Through social media, in-person discussions, and independent media like “Simay-e Azadi” or “Iran Azadi,” youth must expose the consequences of this policy and raise public awareness. This awareness, supported by international organizations, can lead to collective demands.
Civil Advocacy with Global Support: Since Iran’s political structure, controlled by the IRGC, provides no space for internal legal advocacy, resistance must follow independent and transnational channels. The youth can challenge discriminatory policies by forming online and offline campaigns for digital justice and collaborating with human rights organizations like Access Now and Reporters Without Borders. International organizations must amplify these efforts and demand equitable access.
Support for Digital Businesses: Young people active in digital commerce can compile reports on the impact of filtering on small businesses, collaborating with independent media like “Simay-e Azadi” to highlight the depth of harm caused by these policies. International organizations can use these reports to draw global attention.
International Pressure: Documenting instances of digital rights violations and presenting them to global institutions like the United Nations or Reporters Without Borders, with their support, can increase international pressure on the regime. This form of resistance, rooted in the global right to equal access to information, amplifies the people’s voice beyond domestic borders.
Practical Solutions for Bypassing Censorship
To counter tiered internet, the following practical solutions are proposed:
- Public Education: A key measure is educating people on tools to bypass censorship and enhance communication security. Youth and the educated generation can teach the use of secure VPNs, encryption protocols, and anti-censorship software like Psiphon through simple Persian-language guides, offline workshops, or virtual group training. Sharing technical knowledge and experiences builds collective strength.
- Decentralized Networks (IPFS, Matrix): Using censorship-resistant protocols like IPFS and Matrix Synapse for secure content sharing and communication without reliance on centralized servers.
- Mesh Networks: Applications like Briar and FireChat for establishing local communication during internet outages, especially in crisis situations.
- Satellite Technologies: Pursuing technologies like Starlink’s Direct-to-Cell for direct, unfiltered internet access. This may be a promising technology and is further discussed below.
Feasibility Assessment of Starlink in Iran
Starlink, developed by SpaceX, is a satellite-based internet service that provides high-speed, low-latency connectivity by linking users directly to a constellation of low Earth orbit satellites. Unlike traditional internet services that rely on ground infrastructure, Starlink enables access in remote or censored regions — making it a powerful tool for bypassing government-imposed restrictions.
In Iran, where internet censorship and surveillance are widespread, Starlink presents a compelling alternative. However, its adoption faces both technical and political hurdles.
Advantages of Starlink. The following are three of the most promising benefits of Starlink for Iranian users
- Bypassing Filtering: Starlink’s direct satellite connections circumvent Iran’s National Information Network and filtering systems. As of early 2025, over 100,000 Iranians were reportedly using Starlink, especially following the 1401 (2022) protests.
- Support in Crises: During internet blackouts — such as those in June 2025 following Israeli attacks — Starlink remained operational, allowing users to maintain contact with the outside world.
- Group Sharing: To offset costs, local communities have adopted shared-use models, pooling resources to purchase and operate Starlink terminals collectively
Challenges of Starlink. But there are also challenges in using Starlink, both economically and logistically. For example, Starlink use in Iran is constrained by several factors.
- High Costs: Equipment prices ($700 to $2,000) and monthly subscriptions ($110) compared to the average Iranian income of $200 limit use to wealthier classes.
- Smuggling and Logistics: Devices are often imported via black markets, especially through Iraq, which increases both cost and risk
- Limited Local Integration: While Starlink provides global access, users still depend on Iran’s domestic internet for services like banking, government portals, andlocal apps, which remain inaccessible via satellite.
- Strict Regulations: Starlink use is illegal, punishable by equipment confiscation, fines, and up to two years in prison.
Starlink’s Direct-to-Cell technology, enabling direct phone-to-satellite connections, could reduce costs and risks. However, this technology is still in early stages and requires cooperation with telecommunications operators.
Conclusion and Call to Action Tiered internet in Iran is a tool for the regime’s digital oppression against the people. While regime affiliates, their relatives, and wealthy supporters enjoy free and high-speed internet, the majority are shackled by filtering and speed restrictions. This discrimination not only widens the digital divide but also violates the right to freedom of expression and access to information. Iran’s younger generation, with support from international organizations like the United Nations and Reporters Without Borders, must resist this oppression through awareness-raising, civil organization, and the use of anti-censorship tools like decentralized networks and Starlink. Collaboration with independent media like “Simay-e Azadi” and information freedom advocates can amplify the people’s voice globally. The internet is a citizen’s right, not a regime privilege. The international community must condemn these oppressive policies and support Iran’s resistance, pressuring the regime for accountability. Through global solidarity, education, and practical action, this oppression can be challenged, paving the way for digital justice and a fairer society.
Related Sources on Digital Divide and Apartheid Internet in Iran
For those interested in further exploring the topic of tiered internet and internet censorship in Iran, the following list of recent articles and reports examines various aspects of this issue:
- Freedom House (October 15, 2024) in the report “Iran: Freedom on the Net 2024” addresses Iran’s restricted internet environment, highlighting government censorship, surveillance, and the use of AI technologies for monitoring, as well as examining the rising costs of internet access and the ban on unlicensed VPNs.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/iran/freedom-net/2024 - Iran International (July 19, 2025) in “Morad Veisi: The Consequence of Tiered Internet Is Increased Corruption” explains how tiered internet exacerbates corruption and injustice by creating privileged access lists through favoritism or bribery.
https://t.co/HAR8rHRrcV - Iran International (July 22, 2025) in “Internet Shutdowns and Their Costs for the Islamic Republic” examines the economic costs of internet outages during Iran’s 12-day conflict with Israel, noting a 30 percent drop in the digital economy and significant financial losses.
https://t.co/HUNk2nLn5o - Iran International (July 22, 2025) in “Nima Akbarpour: The Islamic Republic’s Security-Driven Approach to the Internet” describes the regime’s security-centric approach to internet restrictions, particularly during crises like the war with Israel, and its devastating impact on online businesses.
https://t.co/aTVvDjqaRA - Iran International (July 23, 2025) in “Cutting SIM Card Access to Suppress Critics” discusses how Iranian security agencies cut SIM card access for dozens of citizens post-war to silence critics, forcing some to delete critical content or post pro-government material.
https://t.co/EW6AjND6kG - Iran International (July 21, 2025) in “Strong Criticism of the Tiered Internet Plan in Iran” addresses widespread backlash against a government directive granting preferential internet access to certain groups, seen as institutionalizing privilege and deepening censorship.
https://t.co/QC1sKT4qhU - The New York Times (September 29, 2022) in “Despite Iran’s Efforts to Block Internet, Technology Has Helped Fuel Outrage” discusses the failure of internet restrictions to suppress protests following Mahsa Amini’s death, examining Iranians’ use of VPNs to access global platforms.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/29/world/middleeast/iran-protests-internet-censorship.html - The New York Times (June 21, 2025) in “Iranians Find Pockets of Connection Amid Internet Blackout” addresses the near-total internet blackout in Iran during Israeli airstrikes in June 2025, noting partial restoration of weak connections and challenges with VPN use.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-internet-blackout.html - WIRED (June 18, 2025) in “Iran’s Internet Blackout Adds New Dangers for Civilians Amid Israeli Bombings” examines Iran’s internet restrictions during the conflict with Israel, highlighting their role in controlling narratives and limiting access to vital information.
https://www.wired.com/story/iran-internet-shutdown-israel/ - Reuters (September 14, 2023) in “Iran Steps Up Internet Crackdown One Year After Mahsa Amini Death” discusses intensified internet restrictions ahead of the anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death, noting internet shutdowns, digital curfews, and VPN criminalization to suppress dissent.
https://www.reuters.com/article/business/media-telecom/feature-iran-steps-up-internet-crackdown-one-year-after-mahsa-amini-death-idUSL8N3AJ203/ - The Wall Street Journal (July 3, 2025) in “Iran Suspends Cooperation With U.N. Atomic Agency After Airstrikes” primarily focuses on Iran’s nuclear program but indirectly references internet restrictions as part of the regime’s efforts to control information flow post-airstrikes.
https://tinyurl.com/yn7xvrbe - Wikipedia (June 25, 2025) in “Internet Censorship in Iran” provides an overview of internet censorship in Iran, including speed restrictions, VPN bans, and internet shutdowns during protests, with references to reports from 2006 to 2024.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_in_Iran