Dr. Ramesh Sepehrrad, Author, Scholar Practitioner, and Cybersecurity Executive
&
Dr. Kazem Kazerounian, Professor and Scholar of Iranian Politics
| Note: FISN research reports and papers may be used freely with proper referencing and credit to the authors and the Free Iran Scholars Network. |
Introduction: The Regime’s Narrative and Rejection of Imposed Realities
Against the backdrop of Iran’s current crisis—which has now assumed global dimensions—the future of Iran and the prospects for change have become topics of urgent debate. In response to the regime’s relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons, its destructive regional meddling, sponsorship of terrorism, and, most importantly, it atrocious human rights record, the policy dilemma for years was framed as a binary choice: appeasement to induce behavioral change, or war. For over four decades, the prevailing policy was engagement with the regime, fueled by the futile hope of discovering “moderates” within its ranks and encouraging a shift in its conduct. Today, this approach stands thoroughly discredited, with few still defending such a course. Conversely, the recent conflict has demonstrated that external military intervention cannot resolve the threats posed by this regime either.
Twenty-one years ago, at the height of the appeasement-versus-war debate, Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), warned that appeasement would inevitably lead to war and offered a Third Option: rejecting both appeasement and war in favor of change by the Iranian people and their organized resistance.
The recent twelve-day war has once again vindicated the Third Option at a moment when the prospect of change is more tangible than ever. Immediately after the recent ceasefire, Mrs. Rajavi underscored:
“The ceasefire and end of the war are a step forward for the Third Option: neither war, nor appeasement. Let the people of Iran themselves, in their existential struggle, overthrow Khamenei and the dictatorship of Velayat-e Faqih. The people of Iran, through a century of struggle and by paying the heaviest price with successive uprisings, have rejected both monarchic and clerical dictatorship.”
The ruling regime and its Western lobbying circles are, accordingly, engaged in a coordinated campaign to promote two false narratives:
- The “invincibility” of the Islamic Republic, claiming that the opposition cannot bring about its downfall and that, if change does occur, it will inevitably result in chaos and anarchy—as evidenced, they claim, by the twelve-day war, which they present as proof of the regime’s internal stability.
- The specter often invoked is that regime change in Iran would unleash the kind of chaos and collapse witnessed in Iraq, Libya, or Syria—fracturing the country, sparking civil war, and triggering waves of refugees.
The practical outcome of these narratives is the assertion that there is no real alternative to the regime. Thus, realism and realpolitik, they claim, dictates that the West should continue appeasement and engagement with Tehran, not with the organized opposition. Accordingly, the “Third Option”—regime change by the people and the organized resistance—is portrayed as mere rhetoric, devoid of practical substance. Yet a close examination of Iran and the region reveals an entirely different reality.
A. Iran’s Unique Position: Historical, National, and Social Distinctions
In contrast to most countries in the region—which emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, shaped by the direct intervention of colonial powers (especially Britain and France) and the drawing of artificial borders—Iran possesses a deeply rooted, independent identity stretching back thousands of years to ancient times. Iran is neither the product of the “colonial ruler’s pencil” nor the result of imperial disintegration; rather, it has consistently preserved its cohesive identity and national structure throughout history’s many upheavals. Even in its most difficult moments, Iran has never become a formal colony.
Even in modern history, neither foreign invasions nor sweeping upheavals have managed to undermine Iran’s national unity. Neither the Mongol onslaught nor the Arab invasions, neither the Allied occupation during World War II, nor the direct political and military interventions by Russia and Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—none succeeded in fragmenting or dismantling Iran’s national structure.
Unlike certain countries in the region whose social and religious structures breed sectarian crisis, Iran’s ethnic and religious diversity has always been integrated into a resilient national fabric. While the “fragmented and contradictory composition” of neighboring states has sown the seeds of division and crisis, often activated by Iranian regime interference or other foreign interventions, Iran’s own cohesion has endured.
Moreover, unlike some countries in the region whose social and religious structures are marked by internal fault lines and prone to sectarian crises, Iran’s ethnic and religious diversity has historically been woven into a fabric of national and historical solidarity. Whereas the “fragmented and conflicting makeup” of other nations has sown the seeds of division and sectarian strife—leaving them vulnerable to destructive external meddling, such as that inflicted by the Iranian regime and other foreign actors in places like Iraq and Libya—Iran’s diversity has remained a source of cohesion. Indeed, it is the Velayat-e Faqih regime itself—by exporting fundamentalism, creating and supporting proxies, and fomenting ethnic and religious discord—that has played the role of “arsonist,” driving instability, violence, and crisis across the region. With the regime’s overthrow, a major source of turmoil would be removed, creating the real foundation for peace and enduring coexistence in the region.
Iran’s various ethnic groups, including Kurds and Azeris, have preserved their national identity and have always considered themselves inseparable from the Iranian nation—a reality fundamentally different from their counterparts in neighboring countries. In Iran, ethnic and national solidarity are central: Iranian Kurds, unlike those in Iraq or Turkey, have not gravitated toward separatism. Azeris have not only been an integral part of the nation but have governed Iran for 300 out of the last 400 years, and even the current regime’s supreme leader is Azeri. Notably, two of the three founders of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) in 1965 were Azeri.
Religiously as well, while 80 to 90 percent of Iranians are Shiite, aside from the history of oppressive regimes, religious minorities—Sunnis, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Baha’is—have, for the most part, coexisted peacefully alongside the majority. Iran has never witnessed internal war or disintegration, nor has any part of the country ever broken away due to ethnic or religious conflict. The separation of territories such as the Caucasus or parts of present-day Afghanistan from Iran was the result of foreign invasion, not ethnic or sectarian strife. This deep-seated historical, social, and cultural context renders any Libyan, Syrian, or Iraqi scenario for Iran baseless—fabrications devised solely in the regime’s own propaganda chambers and western think tanks.
B. The Collapse of the Regime’s Legitimacy and Capabilities
In the current situation, the regime’s political and religious legitimacy has all but eroded. Even its traditional pillars of support—such as segments of the clergy and the merchant class—now face a profound crisis of legitimacy. The gulf between the people and the state is wider and more visible than ever before.
Economically, the regime is at a complete impasse. Runaway inflation, soaring unemployment, endemic corruption, and international sanctions have shattered the regime’s economic foundations and plunged ordinary Iranians into a deepening crisis. These conditions have fueled the expansion of public protests.
Within its own power structure and security apparatus, the regime faces a rapid erosion of loyalty and growing fissures among its ranks. Its repressive forces are suffering from exhaustion, while external pressures and repeated regional setbacks have left the regime more vulnerable than ever. Taken together, these factors are propelling the system toward a point of no return and an uncontrollable downfall.
On the regional front, the regime has sustained irreparable strategic setbacks. The weakening and loss of its main proxy force, Hezbollah in Lebanon, military blows against the Houthis in Yemen, mounting pressure on Tehran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq, and, most importantly, the fall of Bashar al-Assad—who served as the backbone of the regime’s regional strategy—have all combined to dismantle what the regime once touted as its “strategic depth” and political shield. All these developments have pushed the regime ever closer to a point of no return and an irreversible collapse.
C. The Social Factor: The Objective Preconditions for Revolution
Since late 2017, Iran has witnessed several major nationwide uprisings, signaling a broad desire for regime change. The 2017–2018 protests, in which the people chanted “Reformists, Principlists, the game is now over!” reflected the collapse of illusions about change from within.
The November 2019 uprising marked the arrival of Iran’s lower classes onto the streets, shattering the myth of the regime’s support among the poor. Following a bloody crackdown that killed 1,500 protesters, rebellious youth retaliated, torching more than 900 government and security centers according to official figures.
The 2022 uprising—spanning several months across the country—was the eruption of forty years of repression, with women at its forefront.
Iran’s youth are the driving engine of this movement: a generation mostly born after the 1979 revolution, which, despite decades of regime propaganda and cultural indoctrination, has no emotional or ideological ties to the regime and sees its own future in fundamental change.
In recent years, social movements focused on economic grievances have flourished. In the Iranian year 1403 alone (March 21, 2024–March 21, 2025), at least 3,092 protest actions were recorded by at least 17 occupational groups—teachers, students, farmers, truck drivers, bakers, retirees, nurses, bazaar merchants and others—across Iran. These numbers underscore the vast extent of social discontent and society’s readiness for transformative change.
The widespread participation of women and youth at the forefront of protests, as witnessed in 2022, further attests to society’s preparedness for change and revolution. On one hand, the regime has exhausted all its strategic reserves and cannot solve any of society’s problems; on the other, the public has reached a breaking point and is no longer willing to tolerate the status quo. However, these explosive conditions in and of themselves alone do not guarantee regime change: only the presence of an organized, dedicated, and self-sacrificing vanguard force can turn this potential into actual revolution.
D. The Role of the Organized Force: The MEK, NCRI, and the Resistance Units
What truly distinguishes Iran’s current situation from that of other countries is the presence of a deeply rooted, organized, and broad resistance movement. The MEK (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran), with its vast network inside Iran, six decades of struggle, and heavy sacrifices, along with the NCRI, the longest-standing coalition in Iranian history (44 years), play a central and irreplaceable role in any prospect of change.
Often, references to the MEK and NCRI focus solely on the activities of the Resistance Units inside Iran, offering only a partial picture. The reality, however, is quite different. The MEK and NCRI possess a wide array of capabilities across various fields, granting them both the capacity to overthrow the regime and to establish a democratic alternative. Some of these strengths are outlined below:
- Cultural and Ideological Capacity: As the antithesis to fundamentalism, the MEK promotes a tolerant and democratic Islam and has placed women in leadership. The presence of a charismatic Muslim woman at the movement’s helm confers immense social potential, offering a unique answer to the cultural dilemma of a predominantly Muslim society. At the same time, the Iranian people have suffered for 46 years under the regime’s manipulation of religion, yet they seek to preserve their religious identity while attaining freedom in all aspects of life.
- Network of Dedicated Cadres: A network of experienced and dedicated cadres who advance this movement with remarkable cohesion—making the Iranian Resistance the only force that simultaneously maintains the initiative both inside the country and on the international stage. Cadres and supporters are prepared to pay any price, including their lives and property, for Iran’s freedom.
- Political Capacity: The NCRI distinguishes itself through its clear and actionable political vision for a democratic future. At the heart of its program is Maryam Rajavi’s Ten-point Plan, which offers a practical blueprint for a secular, pluralistic republic founded on universal suffrage, gender equality, freedom of expression and assembly, and the separation of religion and state. The NCRI’s roadmap further guarantees the rights of all ethnic and religious minorities, the abolition of the death penalty, an independent judiciary, and a foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence. Rooted in decades of struggle and organizational experience, this comprehensive framework not only addresses the immediate demands of Iran’s diverse society, but also provides a credible foundation for stability, justice, and democratic governance in the post-theocracy era.
- Ashraf-3: One of the MEK’s greatest assets is Ashraf-3, located in Albania, home to nearly 3,000 of its members—a concentrated community with extensive experience in every aspect of the struggle against the regime. Over the years, this group has overcome numerous obstacles, accumulating invaluable expertise. Ashraf-3, with its thousand former political prisoners and a thousand pioneering women, now serves as a powerful source of inspiration for Iran’s youth and women and stands as a guarantor of a peaceful transfer of power to the Iranian people in the country’s future.
- Resistance Units and MEK Structures Inside Iran: In 2024, the Resistance Units—the fighting arm of the MEK—carried out 3,077 operations targeting IRGC bases and other repressive centers of the regime. Beyond this, over 39,000 acts of courageous and symbolic defiance unfolded across Iran: burning regime emblems, displaying and projecting images of resistance leaders on pedestrian bridges and high-rise buildings, and inscribing slogans and graffiti in public spaces. These actions not only signal the expanding audacity and reach of the resistance but have also left the regime psychologically depleted and security-wise exhausted.
Embedded deep within the fabric of Iranian society, the Resistance Units—drawing on their intelligence, social networks, and organizational prowess—are uniquely positioned to spark, organize, and lead uprisings. They also play a vital role in safeguarding protests and steering them with strategic precision.
Despite arrests, harsh repression, and death sentences handed down to their members, the Resistance Units have managed to preserve the integrity of their structure and even expand their ranks. Not only have they continually grown horizontally, spreading across the country, but they have also achieved vertical growth—deepening their organization and, through close coordination, enabling ever larger and more impactful actions.
While the Resistance Units are at the spearhead of the movement inside the country, the broader MEK social network—including families of martyrs, prisoners, and people from all walks of life—plays a major role in social protests.
Another key asset is the MEK’s intelligence network, which has enabled access to the regime’s most closely guarded secrets. The uncovering of nuclear, terrorist, and other sensitive information over the past two decades is the direct result of this sophisticated network.
E. The International Standing of the Resistance
Internationally, the Iranian Resistance—and Maryam Rajavi’s Ten-Point Plan—has garnered unprecedented support. Over 4,000 lawmakers across the Atlantic, including majorities in the U.S. House of Representatives and in 34 parliaments worldwide, 137 former world leaders, and 80 Nobel laureates have formally endorsed the Ten-point Plan and the Third Option, calling for the recognition of the Resistance Units’ right to confront the IRGC and the regime’s repressive organs. The Ten-point Plan, centered on separation of religion and state, freedom of speech, gender equality, free elections, abolition of the death penalty, minority rights, and a non-nuclear Iran, has become the foundation for international solidarity.
F. The Recent War and the Viability of the Third Option
The recent war between Israel and the Iranian regime has once again demonstrated that, although the regime suffered serious blows, bombardment cannot bring about its downfall. The only real solution remains the Third Option: change by the people and the organized resistance.
The irrefutable reality—borne out by 46 years of experience—is that the Iranian people demand change, and that peace, stability, and tranquility in the region require change in Iran. Both appeasement and war have proven incapable of reforming or replacing the regime. Only the organized resistance, relying on the people, provides a credible, practical, and legitimate path to change. This path does not require military intervention, nor external money or arms; it depends solely on the Iranian people and a resistance whose authenticity, capacity, and legitimacy have been proven over the past 46 years.
This recent conflict has only further exposed the utter bankruptcy of the Shah’s son and the monarchists, who naively pinned their hopes for regime change on foreign intervention, fantasizing that the turmoil would precipitate the regime’s downfall and open the gates for their triumphant return to Iran. Now, profoundly disillusioned, they find their hollow claims and manufactured “alternatives” utterly irrelevant amid the unfolding realities. They possess neither a social base, nor a credible program, nor any organizational structure or genuine leadership. In truth, public opinion and society at large have turned their gaze toward the organized resistance and its leadership as the only viable path forward.
It is no accident that every senior official of the regime—including Khamenei himself—now speaks with palpable fear and growing alarm about the expanding influence of the MEK, the transformative role of Ashraf, and the actions of the Resistance Units. Time and again, they emphasize that these forces constitute an existential threat to the very survival of the regime. For this reason, the regime has concentrated the full force of its intelligence, surveillance, and repressive apparatus at home—and its conspiracies and terrorist plots abroad—squarely against the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the MEK, and the Resistance Units.
Conclusion
Contrary to regime propaganda and the manufactured narratives of its lobbies, the Third Option—overthrow of the regime by the people and the organized resistance—is not only practical, but necessary and legitimate. It is the sole path to national integrity, freedom, democracy, and the restoration of peace and security in Iran and the broader region. The rising tide of protest, the demonstrated capacity of the Resistance Units, extraordinary international support, and the unity of the Resistance’s leadership and program are the greatest national assets of the Iranian people and their hope for the future.