Behind the Crown: A Documented Critique of Reza Pahlavi’s Political Role

By: Dr. Kazem Kazerounian, Professor, University of Connecticut & Dr. Hossein Saiedian, Professor University of Kansas

A Free Iran Scholar’s Network Project – July 2025

Note: FISN research reports and papers may be used freely with proper referencing and credit to the authors and the Free Iran Scholars Network.

Reader’s Guide: This Executive Summary distills the findings of a 10,000-word investigative report prepared by the Free Iran Scholars Network. The full report, presents a four-decade analysis of Pahlavi’s record using original Persian and English sources.

Executive Summary

This report offers a meticulously documented analysis of Reza Pahlavi’s political trajectory over the past four decades. It argues that far from advancing democratic change in Iran, Pahlavi has repeatedly impeded meaningful resistance, whether by accident, incompetence, or design. Based on original Persian and English sources, including public interviews, leaked statements, diaspora testimonials, and regime-linked disclosures, the report reveals a consistent pattern: Reza Pahlavi has functioned less as a leader and more as a symbolic placeholder, who diverts energy away from authentic, grassroots democratic movements.

At the center of this critique is Pahlavi’s reliance on hereditary privilege—a claim to leadership based solely on being the son of the deposed Shah. Pahlavi has refused to reject monarchy, evaded moral responsibility for his father’s dictatorship, and failed to offer a clear roadmap for Iran’s future. Despite access to vast family wealth, international media platforms, and decades of opportunity, he has produced no lasting institution, no viable coalition, and no measurable outcome.

Biographical Inaction and Political Evasion

Born in 1960 and exiled in 1979, Reza Pahlavi declared himself Crown Prince in 1980. Since then, his career has been defined not by political sacrifice, but by luxury and inaction. He has never held a job, led a functional organization, or demonstrated personal risk in support of Iran’s freedom. Instead, he has adopted the vague rhetoric of “serving the people” while avoiding clarity on key questions: monarchy or republic, leadership or support, exile or return.

Pahlavi has repeatedly shifted positions, praising reformists during Iran’s Green Movement, claiming symbolic leadership during the Mahsa Amini uprising, then backpedaling. In one moment, he champions a republic; in another, he defends “elective monarchy”. At various points, he’s said he does not seek power—only to later declare he’s “ready to take over.” These inconsistencies have alienated democratic forces, fractured the opposition, and fostered confusion rather than confidence.

Lack of Domestic Legitimacy

Crucially, Reza Pahlavi lacks any meaningful support inside Iran. No major civil society group, student movement, labor union, or ethnic organization has endorsed him. Protest chants have explicitly rejected both the Shah and the Supreme Leader, demanding a secular republic. When asked why he remains distant from activists inside the country, Pahlavi deflects responsibility—suggesting that “leadership must come from within.” Yet he paradoxically asserts himself as Iran’s spokesperson in international forums, revealing a disconnect between words and actions.

Even informal surveys show only single-digit support among politically engaged Iranians. His refusal to engage directly with underground networks, refugees, or the most repressed communities inside Iran underscores his symbolic role: a figure of nostalgia, not of strategy.

A Legacy of Failed Initiatives

Over the past 30 years, Pahlavi has launched numerous political efforts—all of which have collapsed. These include:

Council of Iranian Solidarity (1990s) – collapsed due to poor structure.
Foundation for the Children of Iran (1991) – marred by financial opacity and minimal impact.
Iran National Council (2013) – faded amid structural weaknesses and lack of transparency.
Ofogh Iran International (2014) – short-lived media venture with unclear strategy.
Phoenix Project of Iran (2019) – think tank initiative that quickly lost momentum.
New Covenant (2020) – vague unification appeal with no clear follow-up.
Alliance for Democracy and Freedom in Iran (2022–2023) – collapsed due to unilateralism and internal disputes.
Georgetown Summit Front (2023) – disbanded after Pahlavi withdrew from collaboration and declared that his role is above all others.
Strike Fund for Iranian Workers (2022–2025) – No accountability for where the collected funds are.
“I Give Mandate” Campaign (2023) – unverifiable and later disavowed by its own initiator.
Iran Prosperity Project (2025) – A PR stunt that lacked legitimacy or engagement inside Iran.
National Collaboration Campaign (2025)– In June 2025, Pahlavi launched Hamkāri-ye Melli, a so-called “secure” registration platform for regime insiders. Although framed as a bold initiative to encourage IRGC and army defections, the campaign was swiftly condemned by dissidents and experts for its lack of encryption, identity safeguards, and oversight. Critics warned it could serve as a regime trap, posing serious counterintelligence risks and enabling infiltration of diaspora networks.
Multiple diaspora summits and media appearances – produced no institutional or political continuity.

Each of these efforts followed a predictable pattern: grand announcements, little infrastructure, no follow-through, and eventual quiet disappearance. Collectively, they demonstrate that Pahlavi is neither interested in, nor capable of long-term political organization.

A Renewed Push: Manufactured Comeback?

Despite years of detachment—and his own admission that he “won’t live in Iran even if crowned king”—Reza Pahlavi has recently re-entered the political arena. An analytical assessment suggests two main potential drivers behind this resurgence:

Regime Strategy: The regime’s manipulation of nostalgic sentiment is no longer a conjecture. In a leaked video, IRGC strategist Hassan Abbasi admitted that slogans like “Reza Shah, Rest in Peace” were manufactured by the regime to defuse protests. A February 2025 article in the regime-controlled Vatan Emrouz confirmed this strategy, describing monarchism as a “rootless movement” that ultimately benefits the Islamic Republic by diverting opposition energy into harmless channels. Reza Pahlavi’s refusal to call for regime overthrow for years, his avoidance of organized resistance fit, and his insistence that IRGC needs to be a main part of security forces in future Iran, fits precisely into this role as a symbolic opposition figure used to preserve the illusion of dissent while obstructing real change.
Financial Opportunity: In his 2025 speech at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), Pahlavi urged Western governments to divert frozen Iranian assets to trusted opposition actors (implicitly meaning himself). His call comes despite his failure to account for previous funds including the strike fund scandal. Observers fear that access to tens of billions in unfrozen assets will be misused or disappear without oversight, repeating the same pattern of unaccountable funding and symbolic posturing.

Disruption, Not Unity

Pahlavi’s faction, propped up by outlets like Iran International and surrounded by former SAVAK operatives or regime-affiliated figures, has cultivated a toxic culture of intimidation. His online supporters routinely harass journalists, women’s rights activists, and republicans who question his legitimacy. Rather than promoting unity, his movement silences dissent and divides the opposition.

Instead of engaging in pluralistic coalition-building, Pahlavi has positioned himself as the default leader through media saturation and symbolic branding. SAVAK’s flag is a regular feature of all the sparsely attended rallies of Reza Pahlavi supporters. Pahlavi’s failure to renounce SAVAK, criticize the IRGC unequivocally, or build bridges with grassroots republican groups mirrors authoritarian tendencies, not democratic values.

Conclusion: A Barrier to Iran’s Democratic Future

Reza Pahlavi is not the leader of Iran’s democratic movement. He is a relic of the past, whose hereditary claim and failed political experiments serve more to distract, divide, and delay than to unite or lead. His conduct, marked by evasion, opportunism, and passivity, stands in sharp contrast to the sacrifice and clarity demanded by Iran’s ongoing struggle for freedom.

At a moment when Iran needs genuine unity, strategy, and vision, Pahlavi offers ambiguity, spectacle, and nostalgia. Whether consciously or as a tool of others, his presence has weakened the opposition, demobilized momentum, and granted the regime space to survive.

The road to a free Iran must be led by democratic, secular, and accountable forces—not inherited names or foreign-backed figureheads. Reza Pahlavi’s moment has long passed. The future belongs to those buildings, not branding, resistance.

** ** **

Behind the Crown: A Documented Critique of Reza Pahlavi’s Political Role

(Full Report)

By: Dr. Kazem Kazerounian, Professor, University of Connecticut & Dr. Hossein Saiedian, Professor University of Kansas

1. Introduction: Hereditary Privilege vs. Record of Effective Leadership

Reza Pahlavi, heir to the deposed Pahlavi dynasty, is often portrayed in Western media and segments of the diaspora and diaspora circles as a beacon of hope for Iran’s liberation from theocratic rule. This image, carefully crafted through decades of media amplification and nostalgia for a bygone monarchy, crumbles under scrutiny. His forty-year record reveals no credible plan, movement, or genuine commitment to democratic action. Instead, Pahlavi’s prominence rests on unearned hereditary privilege, as he clings to the title of Crown Prince while offering only vague promises of “serving the will of the people.” Far from advancing Iran’s democratic struggle, his ambiguous rhetoric, failed initiatives, and troubling ties to authoritarian elements, such as his claimed outreach to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization have consistently undermined the opposition, and diverted energy from those risking their lives for freedom.

This carefully constructed myth of leadership stands in stark contrast to the political reality faced by Iranians. Pahlavi’s refusal to unequivocally reject monarchy, as demanded by democratic principles, and his failure to condemn his father’s dictatorship, marked by widespread torture, political executions, and corruption, reveal a profound moral and political disqualification. His reliance on foreign patronage, often through media outlets with questionable ties, and his alignment with figures linked to the Shah’s notorious SAVAK or even the current regime’s institutions, further erodes his credibility. SAVAK flag is a regular feature of all the sparsely attended rallies of Reza Pahlavi supporters. As Iranians chant “Down with the dictator, be it Shah or Supreme Leader” in the streets, Pahlavi remains detached, a bystander whose inherited status overshadows the sacrifices of activists who face imprisonment, torture, and death to dismantle tyranny.

This report examines the hereditary mirage of Reza Pahlavi’s leadership, and draws on four decades of evidence from independent English and Persian sources, including investigative journalism, scholarly analyses, diaspora testimonies, and his own contradictory statements. It argues that Pahlavi’s actions, whether through incompetence or design, have fragmented democratic forces, perpetuated illusions of regime collapse, and served the Islamic Republic by obstructing genuine resistance. As Iranians fight for a secular, democratic republic, Pahlavi’s presence as a self-styled leader diminishes their struggle, recycling the shadows of a discredited past instead of illuminating a path to freedom

2. The Crown Prince in Exile: A Biography of Inaction and Ambiguity

This section includes a summary overview of Reza Pahlavi’s background. The key areas in this summary are further discussed in more details in the follow up sections.

Reza Pahlavi was born on October 31, 1960, in Tehran, Iran. As the eldest son of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Farah Diba, he was officially declared Crown Prince in 1967 at the age of seven. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, he left Iran along with the rest of the royal family, first taking refuge in Morocco, then Egypt, and eventually settling in the United States.

Following his father’s death in 1980, Reza Pahlavi proclaimed himself the rightful heir to the Iranian throne. In numerous interviews during the 1980s, he positioned himself as a constitutional monarch-in-exile. For example, in a 1984 interview with the BBC Persian Service, he said:

“It is my duty to be ready to serve my country when the time comes. I will return to Iran not as a dictator but as a symbol of national unity.”

He enrolled in the U.S. Air Force Flight Academy at Reese Air Force Base in Texas but did not complete the program. Though he occasionally cited this training as part of his public service to his home country, he never entered military service.

Despite his 48-year presence in exile, Reza Pahlavi has never held a formal job or professional position, or active role in managing the vast wealth he inherited, relying instead on family funds and donations from nostalgic supporters to sustain a luxurious lifestyle In a 2017 interview with the Associated Press, he openly admitted that he had no “side occupation,” clarifying that his finances came from family wealth and donations by supporters. The Washington Post similarly reported that Pahlavi had been unemployed for years and sustained by contributions from friends and family. These statements underscore a central contradiction in his public image: although he claims a leadership role in Iran’s democratic future, he has never been professionally accountable, never earned a living through work, and never led an organization or institution in any meaningful capacity.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Reza Pahlavi made occasional appearances in Western media, where he criticized the Islamic Republic without ever articulating a concrete path forward. Central to his rhetoric was the repeated invocation of “the will of the people”, a phrase that, while sounding democratic, functioned more as a shield than a principle. Rather than reflecting genuine respect for popular sovereignty, this language served to evade responsibility, obscure his monarchist leanings, and mask his own indecision. It was (and remains) a hollow device, used to maintain ambiguity, deflect accountability, and project a legitimacy he has not earned.

In 1991, during an interview with CNN, he stated:

“The Iranian people must decide their future. I am here to offer guidance and perhaps, one day, leadership.”

He repeatedly attempted to form numerous organizations which failed due to lack of coordination, no clear structure, incompetent leadership and limited membership.

In the early 2000s, with the rise of satellite TV and internet media, Reza Pahlavi gained renewed exposure among segments of the Iranian diaspora, particularly in Los Angeles. where Farsi-language channels like NITV fueled nostalgia for his father’s era among those who prospered under the monarchy. In a 2002 interview on NITV, he described his vision:

“We must look beyond monarchy and republic. What matters is democracy, transparency, and the will of the people.”

Despite this rhetoric, he continued to use the title of Crown Prince and avoided taking a definitive position on the future structure of Iran’s government. His reluctance to clearly renounce monarchy while appealing to democratic slogans became a hallmark of his ambiguous political branding.

In 2009, following Iran’s Green Movement, Pahlavi again resurfaced in Western press. He wore a green wristband and supported the reformist factions of the regime, aligning with figures like Mir-Hossein Mousavi whose histories were tied to the Islamic Republic’s early repression, further blurring his democratic credentials.

By the 2010s, his image had solidified: not as a leader of action or vision, but as a symbol floating above Iran’s complex political terrain, unwilling to take responsibility yet eager to absorb attention.

In 2023, as protests surged again after the killing of Mahsa Amini, Pahlavi gave high-profile interviews, most notably with Iran International and France24. When asked what concrete steps he was taking to support the movement, he replied:

“My role is not to lead. It is to serve. Leadership must emerge from within.”

However, when attending rallies, he responds with smiles and appreciative gestures while his supporters chant:

“The God of All Iranians is King Reza Pahlavi”

Reza Pahlavi’s conduct during the June 2025 12-Day War further underscored his erratic positioning and detachment from the realities on the ground, earning widespread ridicule from Iranians inside Iran and in the diaspora. While Iranian cities faced unprecedented regional instability and the regime intensified its crackdown on activists, Pahlavi issued a series of contradictory and, at times, astonishing statements , including appeals to “stand with our patriots in uniform” that implied sympathy for regime forces like the IRGC. In parallel, many of his close followers, and some monarchist outlets, openly celebrated in the streets and on social media, anticipating that, like his grandfather and father, he would soon be flown into Iran and crowned, not by the will of the Iranian people, but by foreign powers exploiting the chaos.

Despite 48 years in exile, repeated opportunities, media access, and substantial inherited wealth, Reza Pahlavi has not built a political institution, authored a political roadmap, or committed to any political doctrine. His career, sustained by the faded robes of monarchy and nostalgic distortions, has been defined not by leadership or sacrifice, but by a persistent refusal to disavow his father’s authoritarian legacy or sever ties with figures linked to SAVAK, IRGC and regime insiders, undermining Iran’s democratic aspirations.

3. Absence of Domestic Legitimacy

Reza Pahlavi’s claim to leadership, rooted solely in hereditary privilege, finds no echo in Iran’s internal opposition, nor is he recognized by its civil society organizations. Unlike activists who risk imprisonment, torture, or death to dismantle the Islamic Republic, he has never directly engaged with domestic groups, including ethnic communities such as Kurds or Balochis, nor visited bordering countries where Iranian activists sought refuge after brutal crackdowns.

No civil society organization, labor union, or student group inside Iran has ever endorsed him as a leader or symbol of their cause. During the 2009 Iran Green Movement, his name was conspicuously absent from protest slogans and placards, which instead demanded democratic reform and condemned the regime’s brutality. The same was true during the 2022–2023 Mahsa Amini protests, where a prominent chant, “Down with the dictator, be it Shah or Supreme Leader,” explicitly rejected monarchist figures like Pahlavi and his father’s authoritarian legacy in favor of a secular, democratic republic. A protester interviewed by Deutsche Welle during the Mahsa Amini protests captured this sentiment:

“We are not dying for a return to the past. We want freedom, not another crown.”

This rejection reflects a broader repudiation of Pahlavi’s dynastic claims, amplified by nostalgic distortions on Farsi-language TV channels that glorify his father’s regimeWhile other exile opposition groups have invested in clandestine communications with networks inside Iran, formed resistance committees, or amplified calls from political prisoners, Reza Pahlavi’s engagement remains confined to public relations, especially in Western media. He has not organized underground press briefings, nor visited refugee communities in border regions, nor provided logistical support to movements like organized labor, student unions, or women’s rights networks.

In 2023, an informal survey of 12,000 Iranian Twitter users found that only 6% viewed Pahlavi as representing their political aspirations, with the majority favoring a republic over any form of monarchy. When pressed on his lack of domestic support in a 2022 interview, Pahlavi stated:

“It’s not my role to dictate to the people of Iran.”

Despite claiming to support secular democracy, Reza Pahlavi has repeatedly undermined his own position through contradictory statements. In a 2023 meeting in London, he suggested that during a political transition, Iran might “return to laws that existed before the revolution”, a reference to his father’s constitution. Yet that very constitution explicitly established Shi’a Islam as the state religion and subjected legislation to review by Islamic jurists. Articles 1 and 2 of the 1967 supplement required that all laws conform to Islamic principles and be approved by a religious oversight body, a structure entirely incompatible with secular governance. By citing this document as a transitional model, Pahlavi revealed either a disregard for democratic principles or a fundamental misunderstanding of secularism itself.

This contradiction has deepened public skepticism inside Iran. Protesters in recent years have chanted:

“Down with the oppressor, be it the Shah or the Leader,”

rejecting both monarchy and theocracy as failed authoritarian models. Far from offering a clear break with the past, Pahlavi’s repeated appeals to royalist frameworks and revisionist nostalgia expose his detachment from Iran’s current political reality. While the people call for accountability, equality, and secular governance, he continues to offer echoes of a discredited order.

4. A Legacy of Failed Initiatives

Perhaps the most glaring indicator of Reza Pahlavi’s unsuitability as a political leader is his failure to establish any form of organization, coalition, or institutional mechanism. Over the past three decades, Reza Pahlavi has launched or led multiple political organizations that have failed to achieve traction, visibility, credibility or durability, often collapsing within months or even weeks due to lack of transparency, structure, or competent and inclusive leadership. Notable examples include:

Council of Iranian Solidarity (1990s) (شورای همبستگی ایرانیان) Founded in the early 1990s, this early attempt at political coalition-building quickly disintegrated due to weak structure, poor coordination, and internal disagreements. It was short-lived and left no meaningful legacy.
Foundation for the Children of Iran (1991) (بنیاد کودکان ایران) Founded in 1991 with involvement from Pahlavi’s wife Yasamin Yasmine, this organization claimed a humanitarian mission. Over time, it became controversial due to a lack of financial transparency and minimal activity. Allegations surfaced regarding the suspicious disappearance of funds, with no public audits or programmatic outcomes ever released.
Iran National Council (2013) (شورای ملی ایران) Established around 2013 with Pahlavi as spokesperson, this council was intended to unite monarchists and republicans behind a vision of free elections. It was widely criticized for lacking transparency, structure, and democratic process, and it quietly faded into obscurity.
Ofogh Iran International Media Network (2014) (شبکه افق ایران) Created in 2014 to broadcast opposition messaging, the network struggled with funding, audience credibility, and strategic direction. Pahlavi withdrew by 2017, and the project quietly collapsed.
Phoenix Project of Iran (2019) (پروژه ققنوس ایران) Launched in 2019 as a think tank to mobilize diaspora expertise in science and policy, the project attracted a small number of academics but quickly lost momentum. It suffered from poor leadership structure, limited impact, and ultimately faded after high-level resignations and internal discord.
New Covenant (2020) (پیمان نوین) A vague initiative to unite opposition groups under Pahlavi’s leadership, abandoned due to lack of clear strategy and diaspora support.
Alliance for Democracy and Freedom in Iran – (ADFI, 2022-2023) (ئتلاف برای دموکراسی و آزادی در ایران) Also known as the “Georgetown Coalition,” this initiative emerged during the 2022–2023 Mahsa Amini uprising and initially brought together figures like Nazanin Boniadi, Hamed Esmaeilion, Masih Alinejad, and Shirin Ebadi. The alliance collapsed within weeks after members exited, citing Pahlavi’s unilateral decision-making, lack of inclusiveness, and the toxic behavior of his online supporters.
Georgetown Summit Front (2023) (جلسه اتحاد جورج‌تاون) An informal follow-up to the ADFI, this summit-based effort was launched in early 2023. It lacked formal structure or a public platform, and it dissolved quickly after Pahlavi abruptly withdrew—stating that he must remain “above” others in any opposition framework. His exit once again led to disillusionment and fragmentation.
Strike Fund for Iranian Workers (2022-2023) (صندوق حمایت از اعتصابات) Introduced in 2022–2023 and revived in 2025, this initiative aimed to support striking workers with diaspora donations or frozen regime assets. However, despite funds collected, no infrastructure, disbursement, or transparency ever materialized. A safe mechanism for distributing funds among striking workers was never considered or discussed. Activists and journalists have criticized it as a political smokescreen, with concerns over disappearing funds and Pahlavi’s refusal to provide any public accounting.
I give the mandate Campaign (2023) (کمپین من وکالت می‌دهم) Launched as an online campaign in early 2023, “Man Vekalat Midaham” (“I give the mandate”) invited Iranians to symbolically grant Reza Pahlavi political authority. While Pahlavi did not publicly initiate the campaign, it was widely understood to have originated from his inner circle and promoted aggressively by Manoto TV, a Persian-language outlet often accused of ties to the Islamic Republic. Pahlavi publicly embraced the campaign, stating that such vekalat (proxy) would give him the legitimacy to negotiate with foreign governments on behalf of the Iranian people. The platform required no identity verification, allowing anyone to submit entries without name, email, or IP restrictions. This meant responses could be duplicated endlessly, undermining the credibility of participation figures. Though marketed as a movement of national unity, the campaign had no structure, no next step, and no oversight. It operated more as a political performance than a serious initiative. Soon after its launch, the campaign faded into irrelevance. Its principal initiator, Ehsan Karami, a media figure recently separated from the regime’s official media—admitted its failure and publicly expressed regret, acknowledging that he should not have launched it in the first place. What was meant to bolster Reza Pahlavi’s political standing instead became another example of overreach, poor planning, and lack of follow-through that has characterized many of his initiatives.
Iran Prosperity Project (2025) (پروژه شکوفایی ایران) Announced in 2025 as a post-regime economic roadmap, this professionally branded 10-point plan lacked any grounding in domestic networks. It failed to engage grassroots movements or economic stakeholders inside Iran, functioning instead as a diaspora publicity stunt.
National Collaboration Campaign (2025) ( همكارى_ملى کارزار ) In late June 2025, Reza Pahlavi launched a new initiative under the banner of Hamkāri-ye Melli (“National Collaboration”), promoting it as a secure communication channel for members of the IRGC, Basij, and Ministry of Intelligence who wished to join the opposition. While presented as a bold move to facilitate regime defections, the campaign was almost immediately condemned by veteran dissidents, cybersecurity experts, and human rights advocates. The platform, reportedly a registration site without proper encryption or identity verification, invited regime operatives to disclose their affiliations and contact Pahlavi’s “team” directly, a proposition many warned could be a trap for both genuine defectors and opposition figures. Critics emphasized that such a system, lacking rigorous vetting or oversight, not only poses grave counterintelligence risks but also opens the door to widespread infiltration of diaspora networks by regime agents. Within a week, Pahlavi publicly claimed that nearly 20,000 members of the Iranian armed forces and security institutions had joined the platform, an assertion so implausible that it was met with ridicule and disbelief, even among his own former allies. No documentation, verification process, or independent audit has been offered to support the claim. Worse, the announcement was widely seen as reckless propaganda, raising fears that it could expose hopeful defectors or low-level sympathizers inside Iran to regime retaliation. This episode added a new layer of danger to Pahlavi’s long pattern of ill-conceived solo initiatives. By encouraging regime enforcers to switch sides without offering accountability, and by promoting unverifiable success metrics, Pahlavi not only erodes trust within the opposition but undermines the very seriousness of organized resistance. Rather than confronting tyranny with clarity and principle, Hamkāri-ye Melli serves as yet another public-relations stunt cloaked in false hope, and potentially as a surveillance gift to the regime it claims to oppose.
Multiple diaspora summits and media appearances – produced no institutional or political continuity.

These repeated failures form a consistent pattern: high-profile launches, vague goals, short-lived lifespans, incompetent leadership, opaque structures, and eventual collapse. Each initiative has left behind confusion, mistrust, and further fragmentation among diaspora and domestic opposition forces.

In his own words, Reza Pahlavi admitted during a 2023 VOA Persian interview:

“We are not a party. We are not creating a structure. We are here to offer a vision, not a program.”

This admission reveals not just incompetence but a mirage of organized opposition that diverts energy from Iran’s democratic resistance.

5. Political Inconsistencies and Identity Evasion

A defining feature of Reza Pahlavi’s political conduct is his persistent ambiguity. Over more than four decades, he has consistently avoided committing to a clear political framework for Iran’s future. Instead, he has offered carefully hedged statements, designed to appeal to monarchists, republicans, liberals, and conservatives alike, without taking a firm position. This strategy has bred confusion, suspicion, and ultimately, mistrust among activists and citizens alike. Some examples are listed below.

At various points, Pahlavi has stated a personal preference for a republican system. In a 2021 leaked audio clip, he said:

“If you ask me, I prefer a republican system because it has clear election cycles and the person [who is elected must] assume responsibility.”
— Iran International audio leak, 2021

In another comment, he added:

“I see the very foundation of democracy as based on republic, on people choosing their destiny through elections, holding their rulers responsible.”
“من اساس دموکراسی را بر مبنای جمهوریت می‌بینم … حق انتخاب مردم در تعیین سرنوشت خودشان و حکومت بر خود.”
— Iran International (Persian), March 2021

Yet, in other statements, he introduces the idea of a non-hereditary monarchy, further blurring his stance:

“As a democrat, I cannot justify hereditary succession, even symbolically… If Iranians want a constitutional monarchy, I prefer an elective monarch—not a hereditary one.”
— Leaked audio and interviews, 2021–2023

These seemingly contradictory remarks reveal a strategy of deliberate ambiguity. While acknowledging the democratic superiority of a republic, he refuses to renounce monarchy outright, thus keeping both royalist and republican audiences engaged, without offering either clarity or commitment.

This pattern of equivocation is long-standing. In a 1995 interview with BBC Persian, he said:

“I am the heir to a dynasty. I have responsibilities that come with that name.”

Years later, in a 2002 NITV interview, he appeared to shift tone:

“It’s not about monarchy or republic. It’s about democracy.”

By 2023, speaking to France24, he claimed:

“I am not seeking power, I am offering service.”

And in 2025, he returned to a more assertive role:

“Step down, Khamenei… I am ready to take over.”
— Times of India summary, 2025

In a 2016 BBC Persian interview, he tried to square both sides again:

“I do not insist on monarchy. But I believe monarchy can provide stability. The final decision is up to the people.”

When asked in 2023 whether he would accept a referendum outcome rejecting monarchy, he answered:

“Of course, but we must first see if the people are free to choose. Until then, I represent a unifying symbol.”

Such evasive phrasing has become his trademark, projecting flexibility while avoiding accountability. By constantly appealing to “the will of the people” without defining or organizing it, Pahlavi creates the illusion of democratic principle while maintaining personal ambiguity.

What has perhaps most starkly exposed the hollowness of his posture is his own admission that he is unwilling to sacrifice anything in the struggle for freedom. In a 2024 Persian-language interview, he stated:

“من الان یک فرد آزاد هستم و حاضر نیستم اولین قربانی این آزادی باشم”
“I am now a free person, and I’m not willing to be the first victim of this freedom.”

And again:

“من به هیچ قیمتی حاضر نیستم آزادی خودم را فدای مبارزه در راه آزادی مردم کنم”
“Under no circumstances am I willing to sacrifice my own freedom in the fight for the people’s freedom.”

In a different interview (with Aparat, widely available on internet) Reza Pahlavi doubles down on his detachment by stating,

“حتی اگر روزی مردم ایران بخواهند سلطنت مشروطه را بازگردانند و من پادشاه شوم، باز هم نمی‌خواهم در ایران زندگی کنم. … راستش را بخواهید، زندگی من در چهل سال گذشته در آمریکا بوده. بچه‌هایم اینجا زندگی می‌کنند. دوستانم اینجا هستند. همه کسانی که می‌شناسم اینجا هستند … مردم این تصور را دارند که شاید من بخواهم برگردم و کسی بشوم. اما من به چی برگردم؟ من به چی برگردم؟

“Even if one day the people of Iran choose to restore a constitutional monarchy and I become king, I still do not want to live in Iran. …. Honestly, my life for the past 40 years has been here in America. My children live here. My friends live here. Everybody that I know is here …….. People have this idea that maybe I want to go back and be something. But what do I go back to? What do I go back to?”

expressing not only hesitation but a complete lack of vision or commitment to Iran’s future.

While in a 2025 interview with The Times, Pahlavi made this striking declaration:

“Iran needs regime change—I’d die for it.”

These contradictions in Pahlavi’s statements reveal a troubling inconsistency and a lack of sincerity. They stand in sharp contrast to the lived experiences of millions of Iranians who have risked their lives in street protests, endured prison cells, and survived torture chambers in both Shah’s regime and the current dictatorship. The gap between his rhetoric and reality is not just political—it is moral. Additionally this chronic deflection enables authoritarian nostalgia to linger in his camp. Online monarchists continue to refer to him as “His Majesty,” romanticize the Shah’s era, and advocate for a return to royal rule. Pahlavi refuses to reject these views.

6. Illusions of Strategy: Demobilization, IRGC Fantasies, and the Neutralization of Uprisings

Reza Pahlavi’s most enduring legacy may not be in what he has done, but in what he has prevented. Rather than offering leadership, vision, or a democratic roadmap, he has championed a series of passive, illusory strategies that have obstructed real resistance and divided the opposition. Chief among these is his fantasy of regime change from within—particularly via the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other regime enforcers. This delusion, coupled with his absence during critical national uprisings and his habit of issuing contradictory or pacifying statements at peak moments of resistance, has done measurable damage to Iran’s democratic struggle.

The IRGC Defection Fantasy

Pahlavi has repeatedly proposed that Iran’s security forces, especially the IRGC, could become partners in a democratic transition. As early as 2016, he told BBC Persian:

“The IRGC could have a role even after this regime ends. Not all of them are terrorists. Some have fought for Iran.”

In 2017, he told VOA Farsi:

“Are all the Revolutionary Guards terrorists? No… You are part of the Iranian people.”

In a 2018 interview, he made an even more audacious claim:

“I have bilateral contacts with the Army, the IRGC and the Basij, and we communicate.”

This messaging not only blurred the line between perpetrators and victims but offended the families of protestors killed by those very forces. It also lacked any evidence of real defection. No substantial resignations, verified contacts, or organizational plans were ever offered. Yet, the fantasy persisted.

As mentioned earlier, in July 2025, Pahlavi launched Hamkāri-ye Melli, a so-called secure registration platform to “facilitate defections.” Within a week, he claimed that:

“Nearly 20,000 individuals have joined this campaign. The submitted data is currently being reviewed, verified, and filtered, and the process of establishing contact is underway.”

This figure was implausible on its face and was met with widespread ridicule, including from his own former allies. No verification mechanism, encryption standards, or independent audit was provided. Veteran dissidents, security analysts, and opposition leaders condemned the move as reckless. Rather than a bridge to defection, it was likely a gift to regime intelligence, a trap that jeopardized both hopeful defectors and the wider opposition.

Neutralizing Uprisings with Passivity

Just as damaging has been Pahlavi’s repeated calls for inaction at the most critical junctures. During the 2022–2023 Mahsa Amini uprising, when the regime appeared vulnerable, Pahlavi offered not mobilization, but retreat. Speaking to NUFDI, he said:

“It is unrealistic, nor in that sense necessary… Would you rather see our children be shot in the eye or poisoned by chemical attacks? If they were to stay home, nobody can force them out of their home if they choose not to show up for work…”

In other interviews, he doubled down:

“Change doesn’t require everyone to be visible. If people want to stay home, stay home. You can resist by not going to work.”

These statements, while framed as harm reduction, directly contradicted the energy and demands of protesters. They were echoed during the 2025 “12-Day War,” as the regime launched a brutal crackdown and hopes for international attention peaked. Pahlavi responded with pacifying generalities like:

“We must reduce tension… You can protest by working one hour less, by slowing down your routines.”

Rather than using his platform to galvanize resistance, he emphasized:

“Iran must not become another battlefield.”
“We must stand with our patriots in uniform.”

This ambiguity (i.e. labeling regime forces as “patriots“) blurred the moral lines again, effectively rehabilitating state enforcers in the middle of repression.

At the same time, Pahlavi issued grand proclamations:

“I am stepping forward to lead this national transition… I have a clear plan.”
— Politico, June 24, 2025

“I am here today to submit myself to my compatriots to lead them down this road of peace.”
— Politico Europe, June 2025

“I am ready to be [Trump’s] partner in this process and this mission and lead our nation into a peaceful, democratic future once again aligned with regional stability and American interests.”
— Fox News Digital, June 2025

Critics rightly asked: where is the structure, the domestic support, the plan?

Demobilization and Division

The cumulative impact of these postures—fantasies of defections, fear of street politics, glorification of regime elements, and rhetorical self-promotion—has been to demobilize, distract, and divide the opposition. Pahlavi’s narrative invites inaction:

That the IRGC will defect.
That protesters should retreat.
That change requires no grassroots confrontation.
That his return is enough to ensure democratic transition.

All the while, serious organizers inside and outside Iran are sidelined. Women’s rights leaders, student unions, labor organizers, and secular republicans, those with actual risk and credibility are ignored or harassed online by his supporters. The result is a fractured movement, suffocated by illusion and toxic loyalty tests.

As one former ally summarized:

“This is not unity. This is silencing.”

7. Absence During Critical Moments

The consequences of Reza Pahlavi’s passive strategies and illusion-driven initiatives are most clearly exposed in his conduct during Iran’s major protest movements. Far from providing leadership during moments of national uprising, he repeatedly responded with ambiguity, strategic withdrawal, or empty symbolic gestures. Just as Section 6 showed his role in demobilizing resistance through fantastical appeals to IRGC defections, what follows documents how this same tenet, marked by passivity, misdirection, and missed opportunities, played out during the country’s most pivotal crises.

2009: Embracing the Reformist Illusion
When the 2009 Green Movement erupted in response to election fraud, Pahlavi had an opportunity to distinguish himself from both the regime and its internal factions. Instead, he aligned with the very figures whose histories were rooted in the Islamic Republic. In a Persian-language interview, when asked whether he would support Mir-Hossein Mousavi, he responded:

“بله، من از موسوی حمایت می‌کنم.”
(“Yes, I support Mousavi.”)

He later praised the broader movement:

“جنبش سبز بسیار فراتر از اعتراض به نتایج انتخابات بود—فرصتی بود که اپوزیسیون باید حفظ می‌کرد.”
“The Green Movement was much more than a protest over election results—it was an opportunity the opposition needed to preserve.”

Pahlavi even wore a green wristband—publicly signaling solidarity with a movement that many Iranians saw as an internal regime dispute. In a Spiegel interview, he stated:

“I’m glad that Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami are moving in the right direction.”

Rather than exposing the reformist façade, Pahlavi reinforced it. He told reporters:

“This is not the time to inject monarchy into the conversation. I support the people but remain outside politics.”

At a moment when the nation needed principled alternatives, he chose ambiguity, reinforcing the illusion that change could come from within the regime.

2017–2019: Silence Amid Escalation
Protests erupted again in late 2017 and 2019, with chants like:

“Reformists, hardliners—the game is over!”

The public rejected the entire ruling system. Yet Pahlavi offered only vague statements:

“I stand with the Iranian people.”

There was no effort to build international coalitions, no mobilization of diaspora resources, and no leadership offered to those risking everything on the streets.

2022–2023: The Mahsa Amini Uprising
The death of Mahsa Amini ignited the most sustained wave of protests in decades. Women, students, and labor organizers led decentralized movements across the country. Yet again, Pahlavi maintained symbolic distance. Initially, he downplayed his role:

“My role is symbolic. I don’t claim leadership, I offer solidarity.”

Then abruptly, he shifted:

“I accept the role of transitional leadership.”

But the announcement came without any concrete structure, plan, or collaboration with those risking their lives. It appeared self-promotional rather than strategic—alienating frontline activists who had received no prior recognition or support.

During the peak of the 2022–2023 street demonstrations, when the regime appeared most vulnerable and mass mobilization hinted at a real possibility of overthrow, Reza Pahlavi delivered a strikingly passive message in a speech to the NUFDI organization. Instead of supporting the momentum of the uprising, he cast doubt on the necessity of street protests altogether. Referring to the demonstrations, he stated:

In another interview at the same time, he said:

“We don’t want a Syria situation… It’s not about people being in the streets.”
“Change doesn’t require everyone to be visible. If people want to stay home, stay home. You can resist by not going to work.”

These statements, framed as concern for protester safety, echoed his repeated calls to demobilize mass protests, even during peak moments of civil unrest, and redirected them toward a vague strategy of passive resistance. Notably, this rhetoric aligned with the regime’s urgent interest in de-escalating unrest and neutralizing uprising momentum.

His 2023 Israel visit, far from building resistance, handed the regime a propaganda victory and further alienated activists. This was consistent with his broader narrative of seeking transformation not by dismantling the regime’s coercive apparatus, but by inviting its enforcers, like the IRGC and Basij, to become agents of transition. It blurred the moral lines at a time when unity required drawing them sharply.

Pahlavi’s failure to act at critical junctures cannot be separated from the loyalist bubble around him, a network more committed to preserving dynastic symbolism than building democratic infrastructure. His absence, coupled with misleading gestures and empty promises, has not only disillusioned a hopeful population, but provided a perfect vacuum into which the regime has inserted control and division.

8. Inner Circle and Enablers

Reza Pahlavi’s inner circle, a cadre of loyalists remnants SAVAK (the former regime’s notorious security instrument), and figures recently separated from current (but with sustained ties to the regime), amplifies his political dysfunction and undermines Iran’s democratic aspirations. Rather than fostering an inclusive, transparent leadership structure, Pahlavi surrounds himself with enablers who protect his dynastic image, glorify his father’s authoritarian legacy, and suppress dissent, revealing a troubling refusal to confront past or present abuses. By cultivating a cult of loyalty over competence, this circle perpetuates Pahlavi’s mirage of leadership, alienating activists and fragmenting the opposition’s fight for a free Iran.

Ties to Former SAVAK Officials

Among the most disturbing elements of his entourage is the continued presence or support of individuals with ties to SAVAK, the Shah’s notorious secret police. At a 2023 rally in Munich organized by Pahlavi’s supporters, posters of Parviz Sabeti, a former deputy head of SAVAK, were prominently displayed with the slogan: “Nightmare of future terrorists.” SAVAK’s flag is prominent in many of Pahlavi’s supporters sporadically attending rallies.

Sabeti, who reportedly advised Pahlavi informally in the early 2010s, was implicated in torture and surveillance operations under the monarchy. His glorification at events aligned with Pahlavi sends a clear message: this circle is not interested in confronting past abuses, but rather in rehabilitating their legacy.

Lack of Transparency and Internal Accountability

Pahlavi’s inner circle functions without any formal decision-making structure or internal democratic oversight. Key advisors remain unknown to the public, chosen for loyalty rather than qualification. Activists and intellectuals who question his strategy or decisions are swiftly sidelined or publicly disparaged. This closed-door culture has fostered a deeply unaccountable and insular organization. As one former associate told an Iranian diaspora outlet in 2023:

“Everything is about image. No one dares offer criticism, and the few who try are frozen out.”

Connections to the Regime’s Former and Current Personnel

Even more troubling is the presence of numerous individuals close to Pahlavi with prior affiliations to the Islamic Republic, individuals who have neither publicly acknowledged nor explained their transitions. According to multiple diaspora researchers and social media exposés, several of Pahlavi’s visible advocates in Los Angeles and Europe have previously worked within regime institutions, including the Ministry of Intelligence.

As noted earlier, Pahlavi’s proposal to establish a recruitment channel for IRGC members—without vetting or transparency, was widely interpreted as an open invitation to regime infiltration.

“This is either naïveté or complicity,” wrote one Iranian human rights lawyer. “You don’t invite torturers into a freedom movement.”

Authoritarianism in the Name of Opposition: The Culture of Intimidation Around Reza Pahlavi

Reza Pahlavi’s political camp has become defined by a toxic online culture of intimidation. His core supporters, on the streets of the US and Europe, and on platforms like X, Telegram, and Clubhouse—routinely harass critics with vulgar, misogynistic, and sometimes violent attacks. Journalists, women’s rights advocates, republicans, and exiled dissidents face coordinated smear campaigns, doxxing, and even death threats. These tactics often mirror the methods of the regime’s own cyber army, raising concerns about shared behavior or alignment.

This isn’t just digital chaos, it reflects a political ethos hostile to dissent. Pahlavi’s inner circle, including his wife Yasmine, amplifies or tolerates the abuse. Rather than promoting pluralism, they demand loyalty and punish critical inquiries.

This has alienated progressive, secular, and youth activists. Many voices have been driven offline or excluded from political spaces for questioning strategy, leadership, or funding. The environment discourages unity and replicates the authoritarianism Iranians seek to escape.

“Every time someone raises a basic political question—about accountability, strategy, or financing—they are smeared,” wrote a former ally of Pahlavi in a 2024 open letter. “This is not unity. This is silencing.”

9. The Role of Persian Language Media in Elevating a Hollow Figure

Reza Pahlavi’s prominence as a supposed opposition leader stems not from political merit but from a media-driven mirage. Farsi-language outlets like BBC Persian, VOA Farsi, and Iran International, captivated by monarchist nostalgia, grant him uncritical platforms that amplify his dynastic image while sidelining grassroots activists. By failing to challenge his ties to figures linked to the Shah’s SAVAK or the Islamic Republic’s IRGC, these media outlets perpetuate a false narrative of leadership, fragmenting the opposition and diminishing the sacrifices of those fighting for a democratic Iran. These media also failed to critically examine his long list of failed initiatives, or misused or lost funds collected.

During the Mahsa Amini uprising, for example, Pahlavi was repeatedly featured, stating:

“My role is symbolic. Leadership must come from within.”

Although he later declared himself a transitional leader, interviewers failed to probe the inconsistency or demand specifics. Meanwhile, opposition figures with deep roots in resistance were ignored or negatively portrayed, often echoing regime narratives.

This media bias has had real consequences. It distorts public understanding of the opposition landscape, sidelines legitimate actors, and fosters division. Most dangerously, it enables a false image of leadership, which the regime exploits to undermine the credibility of the broader movement.

10. What Explains Reza Pahlavi’s Sudden Return to Political Visibility?

After decades of political inconsistency, organizational failure, and repeated declarations of personal detachment, Reza Pahlavi’s recent surge in activity demands closer scrutiny. This is a figure who has openly stated that he does not wish to return to Iran, even in the hypothetical case of being crowned king, and who has repeatedly avoided personal sacrifice, public accountability, or direct engagement with the democratic opposition inside Iran.

Yet in 2023–2025, he has re-emerged with heightened visibility, new campaigns, and international lobbying efforts. Why? After examining the long-term pattern of behavior analytically and without bias, one must consider that such a shift is unlikely to be spontaneous or driven by a sudden change of heart. Instead, two interrelated factors, grounded in documented evidence, offer a plausible explanation:

a. Regime Strategy: Promoting a Harmless Symbolic Opposition

There is growing evidence that elements within the Iranian regime have actively promoted Reza Pahlavi as a symbolic, non-threatening opposition figure. This tactic serves the regime’s interest by creating the illusion of political diversity, while ensuring that genuine threats, particularly those advocating organized, secular republican change, remain marginalized.

This is not merely conjectural. In a public admission, former IRGC strategist Hassan Abbasi revealed that the now-popular protest slogan “Reza Shah, roohat shad” (“Reza Shah, Rest in Peace“), once seen as an organic expression of nostalgia, was in fact deliberately manufactured by regime insiders. Abbasi stated:

“شعار ‘رضا شاه روحت شاد’ را ما ساختیم تا جهت اعتراضات را عوض کنیم.”
(“We created the slogan ‘Reza Shah, Rest in Peace’ to redirect the protests.”)

This revelation is further substantiated by a February 2025 article in the regime’s own daily Vatan Emrouz, in which political scientist, and regime strategist Mohsen Raddadi describes monarchism as a “weak and rootless movement” that serves the regime’s interests. He writes that by dividing the opposition, by diverting opposition energy into harmless channels, and posing no real threat, Reza Pahlavi’s movement has rendered a “service” to the Islamic Republic unmatched by any orher regime friendly organization.

These acknowledgments show that Pahlavi’s positioning, symbolic leadership without strategy, accountability, or domestic legitimacy, plays directly into a regime-designed framework of controlled dissent.

b. Financial Incentive: Positioning for Unfrozen Asset Windfalls

A second critical factor lies in the evolving geopolitical environment. As Western governments contemplate releasing tens of billions of dollars in Iranian frozen assets, currently held in banks abroad, Reza Pahlavi has actively positioned himself to claim or influence these funds.

In his April 2025 speech at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, titled “Maximum Support: Operationalizing the Other Iran Policy,” Pahlavi explicitly called for Western governments to redirect frozen Iranian assets to “trusted” opposition figures and civil society actors. While cloaked in the language of transition planning, his statements made clear that he sees himself and his affiliates as rightful recipients of these potentially massive resources.

This approach raises serious concerns given Pahlavi’s prior track record with funding initiatives, most notably the Strike Fund for Iranian Workers. Despite bold claims, no infrastructure, disbursement records, or public accounting ever materialized. To this day, activists and journalists continue to raise questions about where the money went. Should even a fraction of the unblocked assets be funneled to such opaque and unaccountable channels, there is every reason to fear a repeat of the same pattern: political theater masking financial extraction.

Taken together, these two dynamics, covert regime support and financial opportunism, form a coherent and evidence-based explanation for Reza Pahlavi’s sudden reactivation. His reappearance is not necessarily a response to the needs or voices of the Iranian people, but a strategic move shaped by external pressures and potential material gain, at the very moment when Iran’s political future is again being debated in foreign capitals.

11. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Reza Pahlavi’s political career has been marked by a consistent pattern of withdrawal, unfulfilled initiatives, and organizational collapse. Over the span of four decades, he has failed to build a political structure, mobilize a cohesive opposition, or even articulate a clear vision for Iran’s future. Each time the Iranian people have risen up, in 2009, in 2017, and especially in the 2022–2023 Mahsa Amini uprising, he has either hesitated, deflected, or attempted to co-opt the moment with slogans and symbolic gestures devoid of follow-through.

The repeated failure of his initiatives cannot be explained by bad luck or external sabotage alone. As the evidence shows, they stem from a deeper unwillingness to lead, an aversion to accountability, and an instinct for self-preservation over solidarity. His own words betray this mindset: a man who proclaims no desire to return to Iran even if crowned king, and who asks rhetorically, “What do I go back to?”

Yet, his sudden reactivation in recent years now appears not as a contradiction, but as a calculated alignment with two converging forces:

The Islamic Republic’s interest in promoting a symbolic, ineffective opposition figure to drain revolutionary energy into safe channels, and
The potential access to massive financial windfalls from unblocked Iranian assets, resources that could be redirected under the pretext of supporting regime change or post-regime reconstruction, but without institutional oversight or democratic legitimacy.

This context reframes Reza Pahlavi not as a passive byproduct of exile, but as an actor whose relevance has been sustained, if not manufactured, by a combination of regime manipulation and opportunistic positioning. Far from representing the future of a democratic Iran, he has increasingly become a placeholder, a convenient distraction for foreign powers and a controlled variable for the regime itself.

If Iran’s future is to be shaped by authentic, homegrown, and democratic forces, then the façade of royalty must finally be set aside. The path forward will not be built on nostalgia, opportunism, or foreign choreography, but on organization, sacrifice, transparency, and the will of the Iranian people themselves.

Policy Recommendations

To shatter Reza Pahlavi’s dynastic mirage and forge a true path to Iran’s democratic future, the opposition, inside and outside the country, must take decisive action:

Reject Pahlavi’s hereditary privilege and all dynastic pretenders. No movement for freedom can tolerate the faded robes of monarchy masquerading as leadership. The opposition must unequivocally disavow Pahlavi’s unearned claim, rooted in biological descent, and champion leaders who earn legitimacy through sacrifice, service, and a clear democratic vision.
Amplify grassroots resistance groups with proven structures and accountability. Organizations like the NCRI, labor councils, women’s movements, and democratic republicans have borne the cost of resistance through imprisonment and martyrdom. The opposition must prioritize these battle-tested groups, whose sacrifices far outweigh Pahlavi’s hollow rhetoric, to build a unified, credible front.
Challenge Pahlavi’s media-fueled illusions and monarchist narratives. Nostalgic Farsi-language media like Iran International, which glorify Pahlavi’s dynastic image, must be challenged to stop peddling fantasies of regime collapse or IRGC defections. Opposition leaders must speak with unflinching clarity, exposing these narratives as distractions that serve the mullahs’ survival.
Expose and ostracize Pahlavi’s authoritarian allies and opportunists. Those who cling to Pahlavi’s banner, including figures tied to the Shah’s SAVAK or the Islamic Republic’s IRGC, must be publicly denounced and isolated. The opposition cannot afford infiltrators or self-serving opportunists who exploit the struggle for personal gain.
Rally around a secular, democratic republic as Iran’s only future. Iran’s people have rejected both the Shah’s crown and the Supreme Leader’s turban, demanding a republic rooted in equality, justice, and freedom. The opposition must unite behind this vision, casting aside Pahlavi’s dynastic ambitions to forge a collective path to liberation.

Final Words

Reza Pahlavi is not Iran’s savior but a deceit, engineered to obstruct the nation’s path to freedom. His refusal to renounce the Shah’s SAVAK atrocities or sever ties with IRGC-linked figures, combined with his media-driven mirage propped up by outlets like Iran International, betrays the sacrifices of activists who face death for democracy. By peddling monarchist illusions, he perpetuates a cycle of division and defeat, serving as a tool of distraction rather than a beacon of hope.

Iran’s future demands no prince, no crown, no faded robes of a discredited past. It requires a disciplined, united movement forged by the courage of those who confront tyranny on the ground, labor organizers, students, and women’s rights defenders who risk all for liberation. Their voices, not Pahlavi’s hollow rhetoric, must define the struggle, untainted by dynastic delusions or authoritarian shadows.

The path to a free Iran lies with those who dare to fight, organize, and sacrifice for a secular, democratic republic. Pahlavi’s dynastic failure, marked by his alignment with SAVAK and IRGC figures and amplified by nostalgic media, must be cast aside to empower the true resistance. Only through their unwavering resolve will Iran break free from tyranny’s grip, reclaiming a future of equality, justice, and freedom for all its people.