Dr. Khalil Khani, Professor Emeritus, Tehran University
Dr. Khalil Khani is an Environmental Specialist and a Human Rights activist. He holds a Ph.D. in Ecology, Botany, and Environmental Studies from Germany and has taught at the University of Tehran and the Hesse State University in Germany. He is also a Doctor of Medical Psychology from the United States.
Note: FISN research reports and papers may be used freely with proper referencing and credit to the authors and the Free Iran Scholars Network.
Water scarcity which is exacerbated by climate change is posing a serious threat to global “hotspots” with Iran among the most vulnerable. The depletion of water resources in Iran resulted from a complex interplay of factors, including mainly not scientific water policies, corruption, recurrent meteorological droughts, and high climatic variability. Human activities notably, population growth also driving increased demand, along with inefficient agricultural water utilization, and unsustainable management of water resources.
As a water-stressed nation, Iran’s usage of water resources surpasses their natural replenishment rate. Iran’s renewable internal freshwater resources per capita, internal river flows and groundwater have been declining for decades. Therefore, Iran is swiftly approaching a state of “water bankruptcy,” marked by a perilous imbalance where water demand surpasses the available natural supply. The relentless depletion of non-renewable water resources has triggered a cascade of environmental and socio-economic challenges nationwide. This deepening crisis is poised to disrupt livelihoods, worsen food security, negatively impact water dependent industries and services, driving migration decisions, and intensifying social tensions.
Severe water crises are due to frequent droughts, destruction of natural inhabitants such as rangelands, watershed areas, rising water demand, degradation and mismanagement of water resources. These put pressure on society and feed into wider grievances and political unrest. Uncertainty about future water supply due to climate change and tensions over water between Iran and neighboring countries further compound this situation. Water-related conflicts have increased dramatically since 1999, when a severe drought revealed Iran’s vulnerability to such extreme weather events. Resulting grievances and unrests, which have been straining state-citizen relations ever since.
Water consumption has rapidly intensified following a push for water-intensive cash crops since the 1930’s. During the 1960’s and 1970’s the country introduced land reforms, which included the development of the industrial sector in or near major urban areas. Those and other not well thought decisions largely ignored hydrological concerns. Giant industrial facilities such as the steel refinery, the Mobakareh steel mill and atomic facilities near Isfahan were built on arid areas despite their significant impact on scarce local water resources.
The anti-dictatorial Revolution of 1979 and the Iraq-Iran-War 1980-1988 devastated the country’s infrastructure, which in combination with the sanctioning of the Iranian regime due to its massive violations of human rights and its antagonistic behavior toward other nations. Western countries and especially the US sanctions suppressed technological advancement and protracted the development of critical water infrastructure. As a result, water treatment facilities remain poor in many areas. Structures are inadequate, and technology is often outdated in smaller cities and rural areas.
Also, Iran’s post-revolutionary clerical regime has promoted unsustainable agricultural practices, including the expansion of water-intensive crops like wheat, rice, and sugar beet, as well as the cultivation of agricultural products in arid and semiarid areas. The government has also authorized numerous river diversion schemes not only to meet the water demands of heavy industries but to accommodate the expansion of agricultural activities in favor of influential players and entities under supreme leader supervision along with rapid population growth with restricted opportunities for new employment and business ventures.
Iran’s problems have received significant media attention this year. Among those is water scarcity in the country, but this is not a new issue. For decades, the regime’s corruption and poor planning have plagued Iranian water policy, with a biased impact falling upon its increasingly disadvantaged provinces and, ultimately, on its ethnic minorities. Poor water policy also has contributed to an increasing number of cross-border disputes.
These issues that have plagued water policy throughout the history of clerics rule will continue to pose challenges to its population and exacerbate its national security concerns as domestic and international tensions deepen as the climate crisis progresses. Poor management of the country’s water resources is a longstanding problem.
Since the 1979 anti-monarchical revolution, much of Iran’s accessible water has been allocated to ambitious agricultural development endeavors aimed at achieving food self-sufficiency, often disregarding natural constraints. Irrigated agriculture represents the largest consumer of water in Iran, accounting for 92% of usage, yet water efficiency remains alarmingly low, with agricultural water productivity ranking among the lowest in the region.
Iran receives on average 250mm precipitation per year, most of which only benefits 26% of the country, mainly along the Caspian Sea and the north-western regions, and leaving other parts of the country with only sparse rainfall, approximately 200mm, which occurs at irregular intervals.
Water scarcity, further exacerbated by growing and unsustainable water consumption. The population of Iran has grown continuously from roughly 38.67 million in 1980 to now around 90 million, putting increasing pressure on Iran’s water resources. Here one has to mention the development of hydroelectric dams to satisfy Iran’s growing demand for electricity. There are 647 dams already present in the country, 523 of them large dams. Agricultural intensification and evaporation due to inefficient irrigation techniques additionally exacerbate pressure on water resources.
The water crisis is inextricably linked to Iran’s politics. This is evident in the government’s subsidy policies, a problematic legacy of the 1979 revolution, which was carried out in the name of “the oppressed.” The Islamic Republic has remained committed to a welfare state ideology centered on “social justice” ever since. Initially introduced to alleviate the difficulties of the eight-year war with Iraq, subsidies have been maintained to counteract political and economic challenges.
Besides the mounting fiscal costs of subsidies, a large portion of the state budget is directed towards various water management schemes. While the principal financial beneficiaries of such schemes are regime “insiders,” most notably entities affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the so-called “water mafia.” Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), the principal engineering and construction entity under IRGC control and one of Iran’s largest economic conglomerates, has served as a primary contractor for major civil and military projects, including the construction of dams and water diversion schemes. Thus, financial gain and political influence have come at the expense of environmental wellbeing.
Moreover, there is a lack of incentives for farmers to increase efficiency in water use, due to high water and energy subsidies. Many farmers use private wells often without permission, which they just dig a little deeper as soon as they fall dry, resulting in a further decrease in water table. This practice consequently leads to over extraction of water in Iran’s agricultural sector, which mentioned earlier accounts for 92% of the country’s water consumption. Estimates suggest that Iran has already used almost all of its groundwater reserves.
Corruption plays a significant role as well, especially in lower governmental bodies, leading to inefficient water management and sometimes arbitrary appointments of not qualified officials. In addition, water resources are sometimes diverted to serve the interests of institutions directly under supervision of supreme leader, main clerics associated with him and influential politicians rather than according to societal needs. Academics that denounce and fight against these problems are harassed and sometimes even arrested and placed in prison.
Ongoing corruption and poor planning in water policy will continue to plague Iran as it confronts increasing water scarcity in the face of climate change. Without sensible domestic and foreign policy, the Iranian government risks more water-induced protests from all and especially marginal provinces. Also will face increased international tensions with its neighbors.
While much of the water stress can be attributed to mismanagement and corruption, other factors certainly play a role. The growing threat of climate change is perhaps the most important factor. However, this crisis is a regime made one. This summer, certain Iranian provinces, including Khuzestan, Hormozgan and Sistan and Baluchistan recorded temperatures up to 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit).
Concerns over dwindling water supply and grievances over resource mismanagement in Iran are straining state-citizen relations and fueling existing tensions. Over the past 20 years, civil unrest has been linked increasingly to water-related issues. For instance, repeated protests around Lake Urmia, which is seriously affected by dam construction and groundwater over-extraction. Security forces used teargas and rubber bullets to disperse protestors. Comparable crackdowns occurred on farmers’ water-related protests in March 2018 around Isfahan, the province of Khuzestan and elsewhere, following corruption scandals on the diversion of water resources towards the constituencies of influential politicians. Protests over water have become a regular feature of the country’s political landscape.
Amid worsening water scarcity, disastrous mismanagement, and corruption, the rise in public discontent comes as no surprise. Access to water has emerged as a common cause, transcending societal boundaries and ethnic backgrounds. The shortages have spurred individuals, including those typically less inclined to protest, to take to the streets to voice their frustrations, a sentiment shared even by those benefiting from government subsidies and aid.
Most notably, water-related grievances have been highly visible since the early 2000’s, when a major drought revealed the poor condition and vulnerability of the Iranian water sector. Affecting the country from 1999 to 2001, it led to massive migrations of villages and nation-wide water shortages. Already burdened groundwater reservoirs lost more water, leaving wells dry and preventing farmers from compensating for poor rainfall.
Iranian officials have acknowledged not just the scale of the water crisis but also the shortcomings of their own actions in addressing it. In 2018, referring to the folly of Iran’s relentless dam-building, Issa Kalantari, then head of the country’s Environment Department and a former Minister of Agriculture, admitted: “We made these mistakes in the 1980s … We came to realize that we built dams where they were unnecessary and neglected to build them where they were essential.” In October 2023, also the parliament’s research arm, underscored that mismanagement has played a significant role in worsening the water crisis. The Center also warned that the current approach, which aims for self-sufficiency in food production for the Iranian population, lacks the requisite water resources to support this objective. Yet, despite growing awareness of the environmental repercussions of dam construction, policymakers appear to have continued to favor dictator’s rule over science and succumbed to corrupt practices.
Also, Mohammad Hassan Paplizadeh, a university professor, said about the water crisis in Iran: “Water is an important and strategic commodity. In the last 60 years, a mafia has been behind this commodity. A complex mafia has been formed around the water economy in Iran and no one can do anything. The water mafia’s money is provided by consumption, not by reducing consumption. 97% of the revenues are in surface water and only 3% of the Ministry of Energy’s budget is allocated to groundwater.”
It is recalled that the ownership of surface and groundwater is in the hands of the government, and the monopoly on dam construction for the accumulation and sale of water is in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards and the Anti-Khatam Headquarters.
Another government expert added, without referring to the IRGC and the Khatam base: “Now that the dam construction is complete, they are looking to transfer water and desalination.”… Now that you want to solve the water problem of Khuzestan after 50 years, you no longer go to companies and NGOs, but rather a group of tough companies that are still working, which previously created water problems for Khuzestan, Sistan and Baluchestan, etc.” This expert in the field of water and climate, pointing out that the water mafia in Iran cannot be dismantled. Water has become a serious political issue and every aspect of it is connected to the supreme leader.
The excessive exploitation of groundwater and surface water have disrupted natural water flows driven by poorly planned dams and hydraulic constructions as well as water transfer schemes. This disruption has led to the desiccation of local water bodies, depletion of groundwater reserves, and even land subsidence, sinkholes and massive landslides. Unrestrained water extraction and water-intensive agricultural techniques have endangered vast areas of the country’s plains.
Along with serious infrastructural weaknesses and a lack of modern water technology in rural areas, moreover, available surface water was distributed unevenly due to corruption and lack of professionalism in the relevant administrations. Hundreds of thousands of farmers lost their jobs, livestock died, and millions of tons of crops were lost. For example, Lake Hamoun, formerly one of the largest water bodies in the country, dried out completely by September 2001. Local fishermen lost their entire livelihood and whole regions were left relying only on brackish groundwater.
Measures taken by the government such as water rationing and power cuts were met with violent demonstrations. Following this episode, which highlighted poor water management and a lack of political commitment, water issues have increasingly become a matter of public discontent and tensions in Iran.
The Iranian water crisis feeds into and is further compounded by diplomatic incompetence created tensions between the country and its neighbors with whom it shares transboundary water resources. Examples of transboundary conflicts include a dispute with Afghanistan over the Helmand and Harirud rivers, conflicts about the Caspian Sea with Russia, as well as around the Euphrates-Tigris system, which Iran shares with Turkey, Iraq and Syria.
Even though the relations in other regional aquifers have, so far, been largely peaceful, however, Iran’s significant withdrawal of groundwater resources holds potential for rising regional tensions, as the country shares numerous aquifer systems with other nations.
In this context, climate change is an important factor to be considered. Experts predict climate change will have a significant effect on Iran’s natural hydrological systems such as the Karkheh aquifer or the aquifers below the Iranian province of East Azerbaijan through intensifying weather events linked to the hydrologic cycle around these aquifers. Similarly, impact assessments predict negative effects on crop production and yield if current trends in global temperatures carry on. Such developments could exacerbate water related tensions, not only within Iran but also between Iran and its neighbors. Iran’s water crisis cannot solely be attributed to natural causes without thorough consideration of regime policies, which are main causes of massive reduction of the country’s wetlands, rangelands, forestlands and shrub lands. These decreases are predominantly linked to cropland and urban land expansion.
Another very important factor or main contributing factor is engineers in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who became involved in infrastructure development and water resource management during the Iran-Iraq War and thereafter. Following the conflict, Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei created Khatam al-Anbiya, the construction arm of the IRGC. Sepsad, Khatam-al Anbiya’s dam-building arm, was created in 1992. The aim was to create jobs for IRGC engineers, and supply resources for reconstruction of war-ridden country under the administration of Rafsanjani.
At the end of the 1980s, the IRGC established a construction firm upon orders from the regime’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Since then, Khatam al-Anbiya has grown to become the largest player in its field by far, and the recipient of countless government contracts, often on the basis of no-bid arrangements. Khatam al-Anbiya with the sole purpose of handling dam-building projects with a regime-linked consulting firm known as Mahab Ghodss, it came to be known as part of Iran’s “water mafia,” exerting control over virtually all domestic waterways for personal enrichment and at the expense of ecological and civilian wellbeing.
IRGC-linked damming projects routinely run over cost, receive little to no oversight, and are undertaken either in absence of environmental impact studies or in direct defiance of warnings from experts about the potential effects on wetlands, groundwater access, salinity, and so on. Prior to the 1979 revolution, fewer than two dozen large-scale dam projects were either completed or in progress through 1979. Since then, many more such projects have been added, and water shortages have simultaneously expanded to affect more than a half of Iran’s 90m million population.
Sepsad and its partner Mahab Quads, a contractor which oversaw the construction of dams in a variety of water-vulnerable provinces, both have pushed for construction projects that spread wealth only among the elite involved in running them. The methods deployed to do so include inflating the cost of dams while providing shoddy work in the absence of monitoring, not accountability, and not independently work oversight evaluation.
The IRGC and this “water mafia” have been known to lobby for new dams while most of the existing ones are not functioning at full capacity to provide the illusion of productivity. This policy affects Iranian irrigation and hydroelectric power supplies. The absence of reliable information is pronounced as well. For instance, on Iran’s Water Ministry’s website, most of the data on dam projects effectiveness and existence is missing.
Conclusion
Iran is suffering from an acute water crisis. Iranian officials cite climate extremes and international sanctions as the main culprits behind the country’s water crisis. However, water and environmental experts are offering a different perspective. The exogenous factors are “only crisis catalyzers, not the main cause of the water crisis.” They attribute the crisis instead to a water management paradigm characterized by “uncoordinated development” and a focus on immediate economic gains. The persistent and largely ineffective approach marked by short-term, reactive measures that was clearly seen in Khuzestan, where water scarcity sparked protests in mid 2021, reflecting the socio-economic and environmental pressures in the province that mirror those confronting the nation as a whole. Iran’s water management approach is symptomatic of broader governance issues, including ideological policymaking, biased decision-making, preference for quick fix solutions, and conflicts of interest. Experts in the field as well as the general public believe that “an absolute transition towards a free, democratic, non-ideological state, free market economy and pluralist political governance” is imperative for tackling Iran’s water resources bankruptcy problem.
The regime’s failure to effectively address the country’s water challenges along with other hand full crises mark regime illegitimacy further. But also increases tensions with neighboring states, especially those sharing transboundary basins. Additionally, it risks perpetuating cycles of civil unrest and repression, fueling mass migration and localized violence, and intensifying competition for resources within shared river basins. Without a fundamental paradigm shift that prioritizes proactive management of water resources and fosters broad citizen and stakeholder engagement, the risks and costs will continue to accumulate and escalate.
Yet, as hardline clerics continue to push for a full-scale resistance economy without economic integration into the global system, the Iranian people are running out of patience, marginalized communities are running out of options, and Iran is running out of water.