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Iran: The Tide Turning for Regime Change?

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By Dr. Majid Rafizadeh

May 2025

Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated political scientist and alumnus. He holds a Ph.D. in Government and International Affairs, a Master’s degree in Global Politics, a Master’s degree Journalism, and a Master’s degree Linguistics. He also earned a Bachelor’s degree in Translation with a focus on English, Arabic, and Persian. Dr. Rafizadeh is fluent in Arabic, English, and Persian. He serves on the advisory board of the Harvard International Review, a publication of the Harvard International Relations Council at Harvard University. He can be reached at dr.rafizadeh@post.harvard.edu.

Introduction

The State of Affairs in Iran, 2025

Since the end of 2017, there has been a paradigm shift regarding Iranian affairs. December of that year saw the outbreak of a nationwide uprising which featured explicit calls for regime change and participation from virtually all segments of Iranian society. This was followed by similar uprisings in November 2019, January 2020, and September 2022, the last of which continued to spawn major protests for approximately six months before the regime’s violent crackdown managed to suppress it. But even then, popular unrest persisted, and continue to challenge the regime’s authority and to raise questions about the potential for its overthrow.

Of course, these uprisings took place within a broader historical context, being the culmination of a process that Iranian society had been undergoing since shortly after the 1979 revolution and the inception of the Islamic Republic.

Failed Economy

Insofar as the successive uprisings represent the vast majority of Iranians rejecting the regime in Iran’s economy is in shambles, and while US-led sanctions have certainly contributed to the decline, but lack of investment, allocating the country’s resources to strengthen its security forces, weapons of mass destruction program,  and creating and promoting proxy groups in the region, as well as corruption and mismanagement by Iranian elites  are the real cause for the hardships faced by ordinary citizens, rather than the sanctions imposed on the regime as some in the West argue.

One of the main indicators of that hardship is the declining value of Iran’s national currency. As the rial has weakened relative to the US dollar while Iranians’ wages have largely remained stagnant or even declined, many have found it increasingly difficult to meet even their most basic daily necessities.

The value of the rial has declined in periods of greater and lesser international isolation for Iran, thus illustrating that the trend has been influenced by domestic mismanagement, rampant corruption and the regime’s priorities, and not just by foreign-imposed sanctions. Sanctions were eased after the 2015 signing of the Iran nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, giving the Iranian regime access to foreign exchange reserves between $50 billion and $100 billion[1], yet the value of the rial decreased significantly that year, trading at around 35,000 IRR to 1 USD[2].

The decline continued thereafter, dropping the currency’s value to a series of new lows:

2018: Around 95,000 IRR to 1 USD by mid-year, spiking to 112,000 IRR/USD by July.[3]

2020: Around 200,000–250,000 IRR to 1 USD[4].

2021: Roughly 270,000–300,000 IRR to 1 USD.

2023: Around 500,000–600,000 IRR to 1 USD[5].

But this decline has accelerated to unprecedented levels over the past year. When Massoud Pezeshkian took office as president in August 2024, the exchange rate of the dollar against the rial was about 630,000[6]. In April 2025, it reached a historic low of about 1,050,000 to one.

This critical situation has also manifested itself in the trend of the prices of the most basic food items. While the overall inflation rate has averaged above 40 percent in recent years[7], the trend has been much worse where food is concerned, reaching 80 percent in some areas.

These prices have caused the consumption basket of the Iranian people to be constantly decreasing, and many items such as red meat and chicken have long since disappeared from the table of the majority of the Iranian people.

Meanwhile many Iranians also suffer from shortages of government-provided utilities. Although Iran has the world’s second largest gas reserves and fourth largest oil reserves, the country experienced serious shortages when access to these resources was most needed amidst low temperatures in the winter of 2024-2025. Both residential and industrial areas have also experienced electrical power cuts lasting several hours at a time.

Chronic and widespread unemployment, especially among the youth

Government estimates published by the Statistical Center of Iran place the nation’s overall unemployment rate at between 8 and 12 percent.[15] For young people (under 35 years old) the estimate is between 20 and 26 percent. But these numbers reflect a narrow definition of “unemployed” and do no account for those who have dropped out of the labor market after losing hope of finding legitimate employment.

Following efforts to include these people, the youth unemployment rate was already estimated at between 20 and 25 percent in 2015. In an interview with the state-run Mehr News Agency at the time, Adel Azar, the head of the Statistics Center at the time, explicitly stated that the youth unemployment rate was twice the total rate and that the situation had become “crisis-provoking.”[16] In 2017, government economist Hossein Raghfar estimated in an interview with Mashregh news that the real overall unemployment rate had reached 35 to 40 percent[17]. At the same time, youth unemployment was estimated at 45 percent, and unemployment among college-educated Iranians also increased significantly.

In early 2025, economists estimated the real unemployment rate to be around 45 percent overall[18] and 65 and 70 percent among the youth. This trend and its particular impacts on educated segments of society and suburban communities have effectively demolished Iran’s middle class, exacerbating the social divide and increasing the potential for explosive unrest.

Unbridled Corruption and Embezzlement at the Highest Levels of Government

The scale of corruption in the Islamic Republic is staggering by the standards of major global economies. It is especially severe within the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and among the leadership of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC).

In the impeachment hearing which led to his dismissal on March 2, 2025, Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati said: “20 million liters of diesel are smuggled out of the country every day.[19] Smuggling is not in the hands of customs.” He valued this smuggling at more than $30 billion per annum.[20]

In 2023, it was revealed that over the previous three years, the Debesh Agro-Industry Group had taken advantage of preferential currency rates to embezzle more than three billion dollars through its Debesh Tea brand.[21] With the support of senior government officials under two successive presidencies, those of Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi, the company exchanged currency at an artificially low rate, ostensibly for use in importing tea and industrial machinery[22], only to re-sell much of that currency for profit on the open market.

This largest known instance of embezzlement was assessed to involve sums of money roughly equal to 14 years’ worth of tea imports or the entire annual budget for medicine and powdered milk by the government. But in recent years, there has been almost no sector of the Iranian economy that has not witnessed embezzlement on astronomical scale. For example, on April 7, 2025, MP Salman Eshaqi revealed on Khabar news network a $140 million embezzlement[23] from funds allocated to medical equipment. This case was presented as an example of corruption in the public sector, which had been hidden from the public until then. 

A parliamentary investigation in 2022 showed that financial corruption occurred in Mobarakeh Steel Company in the amount of 920 trillion rials[24] (nearly $2 billion at the contemporary exchange rate). These violations included abuse of contracts, nepotism, and illegal allocation of resources. Ultimately, the General Inspection Organization confirmed these violations, and the case was referred to the Tehran Prosecutor’s Office. However, the exact details of the defendants’ punishment or return of property were not known.

Even when cases like these are investigated by government authorities, they rarely lead to significant punishment.

Disintegration of Iran’s Middle Class

Each of the above trends has contributed to a situation of severe economic polarization which makes Iran ripe for popular unrest. According to the World Bank, the Iranian middle class contracted from 45% of the population in 2011 to under 30% by 2022.[25] What remains of the middle class no longer serves as a buffer against upheaval; it now furnishes the very engine of dissent.

The erosion of Iran’s middle class is not merely an economic statistic; it is a socio-political earthquake. The severe economic decline of Iran’s middle class, driven by inflation, unemployment and corruption, has clashed with their persistent expectations of prosperity and social mobility. This widening gap has turned into a deep social crisis, fueling widespread protests. Historically, middle classes seek stability, and cultural liberalism. But when structurally immiserated and politically disenfranchised, they radicalize. What is worse, this economic collapse is structural. The regime no longer faces protest—it faces a revolutionary undercurrent that is organized, inclusive, and irreversible.

The middle class, robbed of its aspirations, now aligns with radical change. Their intellectual, economic, and digital capital has become a formidable tool in the organized resistance’s arsenal.

Growth in Public Access to Information, Despite Censorship

In the face of economic crises and a bleak social outlook for Iran’s young and well-educated population, the regime has increasingly struggled to enforce censorship and obstruct access to information. Around 80 percent of Iranians have access to the internet[26], and an ever-growing number of them uses VPNs to bypass government massive restrictions.

This access to foreign and independent news and opinion has also helped growing numbers of Iranians to adopt the view that serious political reform is prerequisite to any serious economic reform and to understand that the critical economic situation is mainly the result of the government policies that prioritize budgeting for repression of dissent, interference in the region, and development of weapons of mass destruction, while also facilitating the consolidation of economic power by the IRGC and the armed forces.

This policy and strategic orientation have intensified in recent years, contributing to the trend of escalatory social unrest.

Government Officials and Analysts Expect More Major Uprisings

Senior officials and government analysts have made repeated statements in recent years which reflect the perceived inevitability of more intense challenges to the regime’s hold on power:

Loss of Regional Influence

Over the past four decades, the mullahs’ regime has fueled wars and generated crises in the surrounding region as part of its strategy for maintaining its own hold on power. In fact, at times, the mullahs have been able to overcome domestic crises by relying on regional leverage, which Tehran calls “the depth of its strategy” in its parlance.

But that strategy has begun to falter. In 2024, Hezbollah, faced unprecedented blows that greatly reduced its potential effectiveness as a militant proxy for Tehran. The Houthis, another important proxy, have also faced sustained and heavy blows, particularly in 2025. But the climax of Tehran’s regional blows was the shocking overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. For four decades, Assad’s rule was practically the backbone of the mullahs’ regional strategy.

The mullahs have attempted to compensate for their loss of “strategic depth” by intensifying repression of dissent and accelerating an already world-leading pace of executions to create an atmosphere of terror at home. According to Amnesty International’s annual report for 2024, Iran carried out 972 executions, or 64% of all executions in the world, excluding China, for which statistics are unavailable. According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), as of May 27, 2025, there have been 1,211 executions since Pezeshkian’s presidency. [31]

In parallel with the intensification of executions, the regime has intensified its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons as a strategic guarantee of its survival. This does not only include a surge in uranium enrichment to a concentration of 60 percent, but reports point to an intensification of weapons activities and work on nuclear warheads.

An Overview of Recent Uprisings

Since 2017, the Iranian regime has been convulsed by a series of mass uprisings that have fundamentally redefined the relationship between the governed and the governing. No longer transient eruptions of discontent, these protests have revealed a political landscape in irreversible transformation. The slogans have grown sharper, the demographics broader, and the demands unmistakably radical: this is a society that no longer seeks to recalibrate its regime, but to remove it altogether.

At the core of this historic rupture lies a frustrated nation, with both lower-income and middle class populations demanding radical change.

These uprisings are not incidental or fleeting. They are cumulative, strategic, and sustained, prominent hallmarks of a maturing opposition movement that is learning to endure, adapt, and strike with ever greater precision. Regime change is the prevailing demand on the Iranian street. The regime is besieged not by external pressure alone, but far more importantly by a society that has outgrown it. Understanding this evolution—its causes, contours, and consequences—is essential for any serious strategy that seeks to address the Iranian challenge not merely as a security threat, but as a crisis of political legitimacy playing out in real time.

The 2017–2018 Uprising: Economic Despair Meets Political Awakening

Catalysts and Scope

The first tremors of defiance emerged in December 2017, when protests ignited spontaneously across all 31 provinces, sweeping through more than 140 cities with astonishing velocity. While catalyzed by economic despair, the protests swiftly shed any pretense of reformism. Unlike the 2009 Green Movement, these demonstrations rejected the system wholesale. The slogans were unambiguous: “Death to the dictator” and “Reformists, hardliners: the game is now over.”[32] Interestingly these protests took place not long after the implementation of the JCPOA and release of billions of dollars and easing the sanction. At the surface, economic collapse provided the spark. Inflation surged from 10% in early 2017 to over 29% in 2018, with official forecasts projecting 35% by 2019. The Iranian rial hemorrhaged value, losing over 70% in less than two years. According to the International Monetary Fund, the economy contracted by -1.5% in 2018 and was set to shrink by an additional -3.6% the following year.

Beneath these statistics lies a more explosive reality: a young, educated, and digitally connected population, adrift in a collapsing economy and increasingly alienated from a regime that offers them neither livelihood nor liberty. With youth unemployment exceeding 27%, and nearly two-thirds of the population under the age of 30, economic exclusion metastasized into political radicalization.

Source: World Bank

Over 25 demonstrators were confirmed killed and thousands arrested during the uprisings. Despite this brutal suppression, the resistance endured through labor strikes, especially among truck drivers, teachers, and bazaar merchants in subsequent months.

The most seismic outcome of this uprising was its dismantling of the illusion that reform could ever emerge from within the Iranian regime. The slogan “Reformists, hardliners, the game is over” crystallized a stark truth: the Iranian people have decisively moved beyond the futile debate of internal reform. It exposed the regime’s hollow promises as a manipulative charade, shattering any lingering hope that change could come from its ranks. Society has spoken with unrelenting clarity—the era of waiting for a rotten system to fix itself is dead.

The November 2019 Uprising: The Politics of No Return

The regime’s decision to triple fuel prices overnight in 2019, a move cloaked in bureaucratic opacity and announced without warning, detonated the social powder keg. Within 72 hours, over 100 cities were engulfed in revolt. This was no longer grievance-driven protest; it was a national insurrection.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, viewing the unrest as an existential threat, ordered a swift and brutal response. In scenes reminiscent of wartime urban combat, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) deployed tanks, helicopter gunships, and heavy artillery to reclaim control. In the port city of Mahshahr alone, scores of protesters were encircled and gunned down. According to Reuters (December 23, 2019), over 1,500 citizens were killed within days.[33]

Defining Characteristics of the Uprising

  • Organized Resistance: The regime openly acknowledged what many observers had long suspected: the protests bore signs of structure and leadership. Senior IRGC commanders and state-run media explicitly accused the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and its “Resistance Units” of orchestrating the uprising. These acts of defiance reflected an increasingly mature opposition network operating across the country.
  • Strategic Radicalization: Protesters attacked banks, seminaries, and IRGC outposts, a clear departure from earlier, defensive protest behavior. In response to the regime’s brutal suppression, the protestors confronted the suppressive forces and thousands of regime’s facilities and buildings were targeted by youths.
  • Irreversibility: The psychological barrier of fear had been irreparably shattered. Protest became a civic expectation. The regime could suppress bodies, but it could not reclaim the monopoly on fear.

Contrary to the previous uprising, the core of the people who took to the streets around the country in 2019 were the most financially deprived segments of the society, which Western observers had wrongly assumed to be a solid bedrock of support for the regime. This demonstrated a significant shift.

Additionally, following heavy suppression of the uprising, the defiance of the youths in confronting and targeting the regime’s institutions highlighted the fact that Iranian people and Iranian society have concluded that their only avenue to end the clerical regime is to fight. This in turn underscored the need for an organized and structured resistance movement to confront the regime’s suppressive forces.

The 2022 Uprising: Gender, Generation, and the End of Illusion

In 2022, the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in the custody of the Iranian regime’s so-called “morality police” ignited a national uprising whose symbolism and scope proved unprecedented. What began as an act of mourning rapidly morphed into a seismic revolt against the clerical regime itself.[34] By September 22, 2022—barely a week after the killing—protests had erupted in over 280 cities across all 31 provinces, signaling that this was not a localized outcry, but a countrywide indictment of the regime’s moral and political legitimacy.[35]

The uprising was not spontaneous and was rooted in over four decades of suppression of freedom, social restriction, economic hardship and an ongoing nationwide resistance during which more than 100,000 were executed on political grounds and hundreds of thousands more imprisoned and subjected to torture.

Characteristics of the Uprising

  • Women at the Vanguard: For the first time in Iran’s modern history, women not only participated in but led a national revolt. The uprising, far from being limited to women’s issues, demanded an end to the entirety of the clerical regime.  The women’s leadership was rooted in four decades of women fighting the regime with tens of thousands being imprisoned, tortured and even executed. The leadership role of women in the principal opposition movement was also very significant factor. Thus, women being at the forefront of the uprising was not symbolic—it was strategic and operational.
  • Interclass Unity: From university students to laborers and bazaaris, from Tehran’s affluent to the marginalized residents of Kurdistan and Baluchstan, a unified rejection of the regime emerged.
  • Sophisticated Coordination: Protesters employed tactics such as rotating demonstrations, flash protests, and digital mobilization, signaling a high degree of organization.
  • Slogans: The most prevalent chant heard across virtually every city was down with Khamenei and “down with the oppressor, be it the Shah or the Leader (Khamenei),” making it abundantly clear that the Iranian people reject all forms of dictatorship whether theocracy or monarchy.
  • Resistance Units: Khamenei explicitly named the MEK’s Resistance Units as orchestrators, an acknowledgment of their influence and operational capacity.

The Politics of the Inevitable

Iran’s crises are deep and multifaceted, and have intensified over the past decade with waves of nationwide uprisings-in 2009, 2017-18, 2019, 2021, and most forcefully in 2022. What began as protests against economic despair—skyrocketing inflation, a plummeting rial and widespread poverty—quickly morphed into demands for regime change. Chants of ‘Death to Khamenei’ echoed through the cities, signaling a rejection of the theocracy itself. These movements, often led by women and youth, reveal a society that is no longer willing to endure a regime that offers no hope of reform.

At the heart of this impasse is Ali Khamenei, who rules not as a mere authoritarian but as the embodiment of divine authority. The velayat-e-faqih framework vests ultimate power in the Supreme Leader and subordinates all civil institutions to religious control. Unlike secular dictatorships, which might adapt under pressure, this system regards reform as existential heresy. Any concession risks unravelling the ideological foundation that justifies the mullahs’ grip on power. Khamenei has learned this lesson from history: in the late 1970s, under pressure from US President Jimmy Carter, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, relaxed repression – halting torture, easing press restrictions and signaling openness.

Yet these actions came too late, and the Iranian people were no longer willing to accept the Shah’s belated acknowledgment of his errors. Instead of stabilizing his rule, these measures slightly eased the prevailing climate of fear, ultimately emboldening millions of Iranians to take to the streets in protest. The Shah’s fall in February 1979 was a cautionary tale that Khamenei internalized. Today, he knows that concessions could ignite a similar fire – one that the regime, weakened by decades of mismanagement and dissent, might not survive.

This fear permeated Khamenei’s speeches on the eve of the Iranian New Year in March 2025. Addressing the nation, he warned of ‘enemies’ plotting rebellion, drawing parallels with the 2022 protests that rocked the regime. His rhetoric betrays a ruler on the verge of collapse, but his response remains unyielding: more repression, not reform.

The past 46 years have demonstrated beyond doubt that this regime is fundamentally incapable of reform. Western hopes raised during the presidencies of Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani turned out to be illusions. Neither was truly committed to reform, nor could genuine reform ever be achieved within a system dominated by the absolute authority of the clerical establishment. The 2009 uprising, sparked by electoral fraud, was met with bullets and mass arrests. The 2022 uprising, sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini, saw over 750 people killed and 30,000 arrested. Each wave of protests underlines the same truth: the mullahs will not back down, for to do so would be to sign their own death warrant.

Yet in the midst of this repression, a force for change persists. The PMOI/MEK resistance units – thousands of organized cells led mainly by young people – is the only opposition with a national network inside Iran. From staging protests to defying regime terror, they are increasingly prepared to lead the charge to overthrow the theocracy, offering a glimmer of hope to a nation suffocating under tyranny.

The Endurance of 46 Years of Resistance for Democracy: A Struggle Forged in Fire


When authoritarian regimes marshal the machinery of violence, human dignity does not wither. It adapts, innovates, and rises. Repression becomes the midwife of resistance. In Nazi-occupied France, it was not generals but tailors, schoolteachers, and students who assumed the mantle of defiance. Through sabotage, intelligence networks, and civil disobedience, they reframed national identity as resistance incarnate.

Nowhere is this dynamic more enduring than Iran. Since the fall of the Shah’s dictatorship in 1979, the Iranian people have confronted a new absolutism: a clerical autocracy that fuses divine absolutism with militarized control. Yet from the scorched earth of massacres and censorship, there has emerged a resistance not only unbroken, but institutionalized, globalized, and increasingly central to Iran’s political future.

For nearly half a century, the organized resistance, principally embodied by the Mujahedin-e Khalq, or People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK/PMOI) and the broader National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), has withstood a campaign of annihilation and demonization unparalleled in modern Middle Eastern history. In the 1980s alone, thousands of its members were subject to extrajudicial executions; in 1988, a state-orchestrated massacre sought to physically erase the movement from history, killing close to 30,000 MEK members and supporters.[36]

A July 2024 report by the UN Special Rapporteur for Iran described that massacre as a crime against humanity and genocide.[37] But far from silencing the opposition, that genocide sowed the seeds of a rebellion that has now reached maturity, particularly among political prisoners in Iran. The survival and expansion of the MEK in the face of extermination, across prisons, exile, and assassination, has ensured that the resistance was never extinguished. It adapted. It rebuilt. And it now operates at the heart of Iran’s political battlefield.

The 1988 massacre was followed by assassinations in Europe, blacklisting campaigns, and coordinated defamation efforts, many aided by apologists in Western policy circles. And yet, the resistance endures. Not merely as a relic of the past, but as an evolving, structured, and resolute political force with a modern vision for Iran’s future.

That vision—centered on secular governance, gender equality, universal suffrage, and institutional pluralism—is not rhetorical; it is programmatic, enshrined in the NCRI President-elect’s Ten-point Plan[38] and grounded in years of political praxis. Indeed, the continuity of this resistance, from the Shah’s prisons[39] to Khomeini’s killing fields and the cyber-warfare of Khamenei, constitutes the most destabilizing and persistent political reality confronting the Iranian regime.

The Leadership of Iran’s Organized Resistance

From the 1988 massacre to the violent crackdowns on peaceful demonstrators in 1999, 2009, 2017, 2019, and most recently 2022, the regime’s answer to protest has consistently been the bullet, the noose, and the prison cell. The nationwide uprising in November 2019 represents a watershed moment in the Islamic Republic’s history, revealing both the depth of societal discontent and the growing influence of a highly organized resistance.

On January 8, 2020, Tehran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered a speech that inadvertently pulled back the curtain. “Several days prior to the November incidents,” he warned, “in a small but evil and truly wicked country in Europe… an American element met a number of Iranian mercenaries and traitors and began planning against the Islamic Republic.”[40] That “evil country” was Albania. The American was General James Jones, former National Security Advisor. And the “traitors” were members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), headquartered in Ashraf-3.

Khamenei’s statement did more than reveal paranoia. He confirmed what the protests on the ground had already demonstrated: that Iran’s popular uprisings are not leaderless flashes, but manifestations of a deeper, organized current, one that has matured over decades and now poses a direct threat to the regime’s survival.

The leading role of 2022 uprising was not incidental and did not happen overnight but it was deep rooted in historically unprecedented presence of Iranian women in over Forty years of resistance against the regime and leadership role of women in the principal organized opposition the MEK and NCRI.

Women courage and coordination stunned the regime and inspired the world. Yet, these women had not risen in a vacuum; they stood on the shoulders of a movement that had, for nearly half a century, placed women at the center of its resistance. For decades now, the women of the MEK have led from the frontlines, enduring torture, imprisonment, and execution, yet never ceding the moral high ground. Their prominence in leadership roles, from command positions in armed resistance to high-ranking posts within the NCRI, has served as both a blueprint and a beacon. The women leading Iran’s uprisings today are not only inspired by this legacy—they are direct heirs to it.

A Reckoning on the Horizon


“It always seems impossible until it’s done” – Nelson Mandela

As Iran approaches half a century of clerical rule, the balance of power is shifting. No amount of censorship, torture, or firepower has succeeded in extinguishing the will to resist. What the regime once feared—an organized, indigenous, and credible alternative—is no longer hypothetical. It is operational. The regime’s desperation has grown so acute that it now resorts to judicial murder in broad daylight, hoping to extinguish through execution what it cannot suppress through fear.

As recently as March 2025, political prisoners affiliated with the MEK were subjected to savage beatings, public humiliation, and medical neglect that borders on torture. Two brothers, imprisoned for supporting the MEK, were violently assaulted, their dignity stripped in a grotesque display of cruelty intended to break their spirit. Others, like Kamran Rezaeifar and Ebrahim Khalil Sedighi, gravely ill and in urgent need of medical care, have been shackled to hospital beds or denied treatment entirely—punished not for any crime, but for the ideas they hold and the resistance they represent.[41]

In 2024, nine political prisoners were sentenced to death by Tehran’s Revolutionary Court for supporting the MEK. Their real “crime,” however, is a refusal to surrender to tyranny. These men represent a cross-section of Iran’s defiant conscience, engineers, graduates, former political prisoners, and survivors of earlier crackdowns. That even their family members were sentenced to exile underscores the regime’s pathological fear of an organized opposition.

For Western policymakers, the implications are urgent and unavoidable. The regime’s own leaders have declared, repeatedly and publicly, that their greatest fear is not foreign invasion or economic sanctions; it is the Iranian people and their organized opposition, specifically the MEK. Indeed, the judiciary’s former deputy for international affairs and current deputy foreign minister for international and legal affairs, Kazem Gharibabadi said, “Perhaps at some junctures, the belief was that [MEK] has no support… and that there’s no need for us to refer to them any longer. But this is not our view anymore. In the (Iranian year) 1400 (beginning March 20, 2021), a very good and joint campaign began, and heavy pressure was brought to bear on countries that were hosting [MEK].”[42]

With the regime’s regional strategy in shambles—marked by the crippling of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the military setbacks of the Houthis in Yemen, and, above all, the fall of Bashar Assad in Syria, the linchpin of what Khamenei once hailed as Iran’s “strategic depth”—and compounded by a deepening and irreversible social and economic crisis at home, the regime now finds itself at its weakest and most vulnerable point in its 46-year rule.

So, a recalibration is needed. The Iranian people have rejected the Shah’s monarchy and the mullahs’ regime. They are seeking a secular, democratic, and non-nuclear republic. Supporting the Iranian people does not require speculation about who might replace the regime. That alternative already exists in the form of the organized opposition. It is structured, strategic, and accountable. And unlike the regime, it enjoys legitimacy born not from power, but from perseverance and sacrifice. This is a national reckoning. A contest between tyranny and a generation unshackled by fear. In this struggle, the outcome is no longer a question of if, but when.

The Resistance Units: Iran’s Unyielding Fight for Freedom

In a nation suffocated by one of the world’s most repressive regimes, a powerful force has emerged: the Resistance Units. Affiliated with the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), these units have transformed from small, clandestine teams into a sprawling network of thousands, defying decades of brutal suppression to become the vanguard of Iran’s struggle for democracy.

The MEK’s Resistance Units, built quietly over years of organizing and ideological clarity, had matured into an engine capable of igniting and sustaining revolt.[43] Far from being isolated cells, these units operated with shared tactics, synchronized messaging, and an unambiguous demand: regime change.

The regime itself confirmed this. From 2019 to 2022, top officials—from the commander of the State Security Forces to the head of the Basij—publicly acknowledged the MEK’s operational reach.[44] They cited the discipline of the protests, the methodical targeting of regime outposts, and the psychological shift among youth who no longer feared the cost of resistance. Newspapers such as Jomhouri Eslami admitted that the destruction of banks, IRGC centers, and regime offices was neither random nor reckless—it was planned, coordinated, and purposeful.

In the course of their activities, Resistance Units have burned countless large posters of the Supreme Leader in different cities and towns, as well as posting photographs of opposition leaders, especially Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the coalition National Council of Resistance of Iran and author of a ten-point plan for Iran’s future. They have also conducted more daring act such as destruction of major statue of the Supreme Leaders and other officials of the regime.[45] On January 5, 2022, Resistance Units set ablaze a statue of Qassem Soleimani in Shahr-e-Kord mere hours after its unveiling.[46] These audacious acts ignite hope and expose the regime’s fragility. The Resistance Units stand as a testament to resilience, forcing a regime that once dismissed their existence to publicly grapple with their growing influence.

Historical Roots: A Six-Decade Legacy

The Resistance Units are not a sudden phenomenon isolated from Iranian society, but an extension of the MEK’s 60-year battle against two tyrannies, that of the Shah and that of the mullahs. Founded in 1965 to oppose the Shah’s monarchy, the MEK initially sought a democratic Iran rooted in social justice. After the 1979 revolution, it clashed with the ascendant clerical regime, leading to a relentless crackdown. Over 100,000 members and supporters have been executed, with countless others imprisoned or tortured, particularly during the 1988 massacre of political prisoners.[47] Despite this, the MEK endured, cultivating deep ties within Iranian society. In 2014, it launched the Resistance Units to channel this legacy into a new, organized resistance, adapting to a digital age while retaining its grassroots ethos.

Characteristics: Defiance Forged in Repression

Three traits define the Resistance Units:

  1. MEK Affiliation: Their link to the MEK provides a robust foundation—decades of organizational experience and a history that resonates with Iranians. Unlike transient movements that spring up like mushrooms after the rain, they are a deliberate evolution of a struggle that has shaped Iran’s political consciousness. Indeed, these Resistance Units are well-embedded in the Iranian society.
  • Youth-Driven Resilience: Born under absolute repression, this new generation has grown amid the regime’s multifaceted strategy—brutal executions, public fear campaigns, and the omnipresent slogan “Death to MEK.” Yet, they reject this terror, turning despair into action. As a member of the Resistance Units, who is also a Tehran University Professor said in a 2022 article: “The MEK’s 40-year fight against the clerical regime has inspired today’s young protesters to stand tall in front of that regime’s repressive organs while burning propaganda billboards and images of Khamenei.”[48] In several publicized statements from “Resistance Units” Telegram channels in 2023, students declared, “We don’t just protest—we organize. Every burned poster is a vote for freedom. We are the Resistance Units in our dorm rooms and on our campuses.”
  • Grassroots Integration: Comprising students, workers, teachers, shopkeepers, artists, and unemployed graduates, the Units are woven into the fabric of society. This diversity—from urban youth to rural workers—makes them both relatable and elusive, a movement of ordinary citizens united against tyranny.

Starting as small cells for security, they have swelled into thousands of units by 2025, a remarkable feat under a regime that monitors, arrests, and executes dissenters with impunity.

Expansion Under Repression: A Movement Uncontained

How have the Resistance Units expanded in number and activity amidst such oppression? The answer lies in their adaptability and resolve. The regime’s repressive apparatus—dozens of security agencies, including the IRGC, Basij, and Intelligence Ministry—relies on fear, surveillance, and violence to stifle dissent. Public executions, mass arrests, and internet blackouts exemplify its tactics. Yet, the Units have turned these conditions into fuel for growth:

  • Decentralized Structure: Small, local teams operate independently, minimizing exposure while maximizing reach. This agility has allowed them to spread across all 31 provinces.
  • Covert Communication: Despite internet censorship, they’ve developed encrypted networks to coordinate actions, from leaflet drops to mass protests.
  • Societal Integration: Members live as everyday citizens, evading detection while building trust within communities.
  • Communication Networks: Sophisticated coordination ensures synchronized actions nationwide.
  • Disrupting Repression: Targeting IRGC and Basij centers weakens the regime’s grip.
  • Inspiring Defiance: High-profile acts—like burning Soleimani’s statue—galvanize public courage and foster symbolic momentum, encouraging others to take action as well.

Striking examples of this momentum were broadcast to hundreds of global leaders in Paris during the Free Iran World Summit, after Resistance Units filmed 20,000 acts of resistance in preparation for the event. These included marches, banner displays, and attacks on regime symbols, demonstrating their scale and audacity in the face of relentless crackdowns. Thus turning repression into a catalyst for mobilization, the Resistance Units embodied their mission of dismantling the systemic fear that sustains the theocracy and opening a path for broader revolt.

Resisting Against All Odds: Resistance Units’ Activities in 2023 and 2024

In 2023, the MEK Resistance Units carried out 37,682 documented acts of defiance across Iran. These included:

  • 3,712 operations consisting of arson and Molotov cocktail attacks targeting repression centers and regime propaganda symbols.
  • Over 33,970 publicity and outreach actions, including coordinated public movements while chanting slogans and holding pictures of resistance leaders, installing banners and posters in various cities, writing slogans on walls, projecting leadership images on building facades, and burning or dismantling portraits of regime figures.

In 2024, the number of documented actions rose to over 42,077, a notable increase despite intensified regime crackdowns. The breakdown includes:

  • 3,077 operations, involving targeted attacks on regime facilities and symbols.[49]
  • Over 39,000 publicity and outreach efforts, encompassing the same broad range of creative resistance tactics as in 2023, but carried out with greater frequency and coordination.[50]

This increase of at least 4,395 acts of resistance from 2023 to 2024 occurred despite severe repression. Thousands of Resistance Unit members were arrested, surveillance infrastructure was expanded with thousands of new security cameras in major cities, and the regime deployed new technologies for monitoring and deterrence. Yet the movement grew—fueled by the commitment of Iran’s youth, who continue to join the Resistance Units in defiance of terror.

It is also important to emphasize that these figures only represent documented actions. Many decentralized or security-sensitive operations remain unreported. As such, the true scale of Resistance Unit activity is likely far higher, reflecting the deepening national support for their message and methods.

Regime’s Acknowledgment: From Denial to Dread

For decades, the regime pursued a policy of erasure, denying the MEK existence or relevance. State media dismissed them as insignificant, a relic of the past. Yet, their persistence has forced a dramatic shift. Senior officials now openly acknowledge their threat:

  • Kazem Gharibabadi (June 24, 2022): On state TV, the Deputy for Legal and International Affairs at the Foreign Ministry admitted, “Perhaps at some junctures, there was a belief that [MEK] had no support… and there was no longer a need to mention them. However, this is no longer our stance.” He revealed a “robust and coordinated campaign” since March 2021 to pressure countries hosting the MEK, adding, “There has been no meeting with European delegations in which [MEK] was not discussed. At the Human Rights Council in February, I dedicated 2-3 minutes of my seven-minute speech to [them].”
  • Ebrahim Raisi (October 6, 2022): “The U.S., MEK, and other enemies tried to pursue their anti-revolution ambitions.”
  • Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf (July 13, 2023): “At the top is the MEK, which played the most important role in organizing & executing [2022].”
  • State Radio (August 22, 2023): Analysts warned, “The threat posed by the PMOI is much greater than before… Whenever you witness instability, you observe traces linked to the PMOI… It operates under the cover of other platforms, a deeply concealed danger.”
  • ISNA (August 2, 2023): Ebrahim Fayaz noted, “The PMOI persists and has preserved its structure… There’s a significant domestic narrative about the MEK.” Mohammad Quchani added, “This Organization has amplified the rift between the citizenry and the clergy.”
  • An internal security memo, paraphrased by regime media, concluded: “Wherever there is unrest in Iran, the hands of the PMOI are present. They use other names, but the core is the same. This is the most organized threat the Islamic Republic has ever faced.”

This shift—from silence to obsession—is evident in the sham prosecution of 104 MEK/NCRI members which began in December 2023,[51] in monthly propaganda barrages, and in diplomatic pressure on nations like Albania, where the MEK is based. The regime’s fear is palpable, a testament to the Units’ impact.

Most revealing is the regime’s shift in language. No longer dismissing the MEK as “outsiders,” several state-linked commentators now warn of its “domestic appeal.” In an unprecedented statement, sociologist Ebrahim Fayaz told ISNA: “The PMOI persists and has preserved its structure. There is now a domestic narrative about them—they are not simply imported trouble.”

Another editorial ominously cautioned: “The PMOI’s strength is not just in their numbers, but in the fact that they articulate what many Iranians feel.”

Repression, Resilience, and Recognition

The regime’s response is ruthless: 3,626 members of the Resistance Units disappeared in 2022, likely imprisoned. At least nine were sentenced to death,[52] with several executed. Mass arrests, infiltrations, and disinformation campaigns intensify, yet the Units grow, exposing the regime’s failure to extinguish them.

Their courage has won international acclaim. In 2024, 137 former world leaders signed a statement supporting their right to resist, joined by Mike Pence and Mike Pompeo, who spoke at the Free Iran Summit, amplifying their call for a democratic Iran. This global chorus underscores their legitimacy.[53]

The Resistance Units are Iran’s beacon of hope. Their expansion under repression, from small cells to a national force, defies the odds. Their 20,000 acts before the 2024 Summit[54] and the regime’s reluctant recognition—from denial to dread—prove their power. For journalists and politicians, they are a grassroots movement with a 60-year legacy, offering a viable alternative to tyranny. Their vision—a free, democratic Iran—ignites a nation and demands global attention.

Past Failures, Present Opportunities for Western Powers

Iran today stands on a precipice. Forty-six years after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the nation is suffocating under a religious dictatorship that has reached a paralyzing impasse. Social unrest, economic collapse and political repression have become the hallmarks of life under the rule of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – a theocratic absolutism rooted in the doctrine of velayat-e-faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist). Meanwhile, the West’s policy of appeasement has prolonged the regime’s survival, sidelining the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people.

Driven by economic interests, geopolitical calculations and fear of Tehran’s reprisals, this approach has ignored the democratic aspirations of Iranians and marginalized the NCRI as a viable alternative. The result has been a disastrous miscalculation that has emboldened the regime’s tyranny and destabilized the region.

The Roots of Appeasement: Economic Interests and Fear of Retaliation

Iran’s vast oil and gas reserves – among the world’s largest – make it a tempting prize for Western companies. A bitter joke circulates among Iranians: “We’re too rich, so the West won’t leave us alone.” Trade deals, from European oil contracts to US sanctions relief under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), have prioritized profit over principle. Iran’s strategic location, bridging the Middle East and Central Asia, adds to its geopolitical clout, leading the US and EU to tolerate its atrocities rather than risk losing influence.

In 2023, EU trade with Iran reached €5 billion, even as the regime stepped up its killing spree. Human rights abuses – executions, repression of women and crackdowns on protests – are met with tepid ‘condemnations’ rather than decisive action, highlighting the disconnect between Western rhetoric on human rights and its policies towards Iran.

Meanwhile, Western inclinations toward appeasement are encouraged by multiple Iranian threats:

  • Terrorism against opponents: Many Iranian dissidents have been targets of the Iranian regime’s terrorism abroad. The regime’s brazenness was demonstrated on November 9, 2023 when Dr. Alejo Vidal-Quadras, a former Vice-President of the European Parliament and a free Iran activist, was shot in the face in Madrid. He survived and pointed the finger at Iran – a claim backed by its history of assassinations.
  • Proxy groups: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) foments chaos through proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Iraq and Syria. The Houthis’ 2024 attacks on Red Sea shipping, disrupting global trade, are an example of this reach.
  • Hostage diplomacy: Iran’s hostage-taking has proven to be a powerful tool. In 2022, it secured the release of diplomat-turned-terrorist Assadollah Assadi – convicted in Belgium of plotting to bomb an opposition rally in 2018 – by swapping him for a Belgian aid worker. In 2024, Sweden released Hamid Nouri, a war criminal linked to the 1988 massacre of 30,000 political prisoners, to get a diplomat back. France also pressured the Iranian opposition in Paris to appease Tehran over a French hostage. These capitulations signal weakness and encourage further blackmail.

The Consequences of Ignoring the Resistance

The West’s refusal to engage with the Iranian democratic opposition and its pursuit of regime change is a critical mistake. Despite thousands of parliamentarians across Europe and the US endorsing Maryam Rajavi’s 10-point plan – calling for universal suffrage, gender equality, religious freedom, abolition of the death penalty and a non-nuclear Iran – governments have bowed to the regime’s lobbying. The EU has repeatedly rejected calls to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization, despite resolutions by the European Parliament and national bodies such as Belgium and Spain. The IRGC, which controls vast swathes of Iran’s economy and spearheads both domestic repression and regional destabilization, remains untouchable, its front companies operating freely in Europe.

Appeasement has failed spectacularly. The 2015 nuclear deal did not moderate Iran’s behavior – its military budget soared to $27 billion by 2024, dwarfing public health spending, while proxy wars escalated. Apologists peddle myths to justify this policy: that the regime is too strong to fall, that the opposition is fragmented, or that toppling the mullahs risks chaos. These are fabrications. The regime’s fragility is evident in its economic collapse and its reliance on brute force to suppress dissent.

Worse, the West has actively undermined the opposition at Tehran’s behest. In the 2000s, the PMOI was blacklisted by the US and EU – a concession to the mullahs despite scant evidence – only to be delisted in 2012 and 2009, respectively, after legal battles. France’s recent pressure on the Iranian opposition during the hostage negotiations is a new betrayal. These actions have demoralized Iranians who once looked to the West for support, reinforcing the perception that their struggle is theirs alone.

A New Way Forward – Standing with the People

The collapse of the regime in Iran is inevitable. Its crises are too profound, its legitimacy too eroded. The Iranian people have made their voices heard through countless protests, sacrifices, and unwavering hope for change. Women, youth, and workers are risking their lives for a future free from repression, corruption, and fear. The key question now is whether the West will stand with them or continue to back the oppressive regime that has held the country in its grip for decades.

A new Western policy is urgently needed—one that moves beyond appeasement, prioritizes human rights and democracy, and actively supports the Iranian people and their resistance. First and foremost, it is crucial for Western nations to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization, as the US did in 2019. This would not only cripple the IRGC’s financial networks but also restrict its ability to fund domestic repression and proxy wars in the region. It would send a powerful signal that the West will no longer tolerate Tehran’s crimes, either at home or abroad.

The West should also recognize the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) as a legitimate, democratic alternative to the current regime. The NCRI, led by figures such as Maryam Rajavi, represents a broad coalition of Iranians who are committed to a free and secular Iran. Rajavi’s 10-point plan outlines a vision for a democratic Iran, one that upholds universal suffrage, gender equality, religious freedom, and the abolition of the death penalty. This plan has been endorsed by lawmakers across the globe and is grounded in Iran’s century-long quest for freedom.

Furthermore, comprehensive sanctions must be imposed against the Iranian regime, targeting Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the IRGC, and their vast economic empires. These sanctions should go beyond symbolic measures, aiming to sever the financial lifeline of the regime. By doing so, they would accelerate the regime’s economic collapse and provide much-needed support to the resistance, which remains a beacon of hope for the Iranian people.

Equally important is the rejection of the West’s policy of hostage diplomacy. Countries in the West must adopt a zero-tolerance stance towards Tehran’s practice of taking hostages and using them as leverage in negotiations. A united front against such tactics would prevent further kidnappings and restore the credibility of Western powers in the eyes of both the Iranian people and the international community.

Finally, there must be accountability for the regime’s human rights abuses. The West should push for international investigations into atrocities such as the 1988 massacre of political prisoners, ensuring that those responsible are brought to justice. Impunity has allowed the regime to continue its reign of terror, and it is time for this to end.

The West should also focus on amplifying the voices of Iran’s youth, women, and workers, who have been at the forefront of the struggle against the regime. Rather than silencing dissent, the West should provide platforms for these brave individuals, allowing their aspirations—not the regime’s threats—to guide policy. The future of Iran should not be shaped by the mullahs, but by the people who are fighting for their freedom.

Debunking the Myth of a Divided Opposition

Iran is at a historic turning point. The Islamic Republic under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is on the verge of collapse, beset by economic ruin, social unrest and a deepening crisis of legitimacy. Decades of repression, corruption and regional adventurism have eroded the foundations of the theocracy, while its reliance on brute force to maintain power looks increasingly desperate. Yet in the midst of this turmoil, a persistent narrative – promoted by the regime’s apologists and echoed in some Western circles – holds that the Iranian opposition is too fragmented to offer a credible alternative. Far from reflecting reality, this claim serves as a strategic distortion designed to undermine the prospects for democratic change.

This paper challenges the myth of a divided opposition, arguing that Iran’s path to democracy lies not in recycled authoritarianism or futile reformism, but in the organized resistance embodied by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and its backbone, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK). Far from being fragmented, the core of the opposition is united by a clear vision: a secular, democratic republic that ends Tehran’s tyranny, curbs its destabilizing tactics – such as proxy wars and hostage diplomacy – and promotes regional stability. By dissecting the regime’s vulnerabilities, the opposition landscape and the deliberate efforts to obscure the NCRI’s role, this analysis seeks to illuminate the viable path forward for Iran’s democratic future.

The Islamic Republic faces a confluence of crises that signal a regime in its twilight years. Economically, Iran is in free fall. The rial has lost more than 70% of its value since 2018, driven by US sanctions, mismanagement and endemic corruption. Inflation, which has hovered above 40% in recent years, has eroded purchasing power, while unemployment and poverty fuel public despair.

Environmental mismanagement – particularly water scarcity – has sparked protests in provinces such as Khuzestan, where resource depletion is exacerbating economic hardship. These structural failures have eroded the regime’s social contract, leaving millions disillusioned with its promises of prosperity and justice.

Politically, the legitimacy of the theocracy has crumbled. The uprisings of 2009, 2017-18, 2019, 2021 and 2022 – each broader and bolder than the last – reflect a population no longer cowed by propaganda or fear. The 2022 protests saw citizens from all walks of life unite under slogans such as ‘Death to the dictator’ and ‘No to the Shah, no to the mullahs’. These chants, echoing through cities and villages, signaled a rejection of both theocratic and monarchical authoritarianism and underlined a public demand for systemic change.

Externally, Iran’s isolation is deepening. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the regime’s praetorian guard, pours billions into proxy militias such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, while ordinary Iranians starve. Tehran’s nuclear ambitions and defiance of international norms have alienated even potential allies, while its hostage diplomacy – holding foreign nationals as leverage – has cemented its pariah status. Meanwhile, Khamenei, now in his late eighties and reportedly in failing health, presides over a system riven by factionalism. The question of succession looms large, and there is no clear way to maintain the regime’s cohesion.

This critical phase is not a temporary setback but a structural unravelling. The regime’s reliance on violence – evidenced by the IRGC’s brutal crackdowns – exposes its fragility. Yet it is precisely at this moment of vulnerability that the narrative of a divided opposition gains traction, serving to distract attention from the organized forces ready to capitalize on the regime’s weaknesses.

Sources of the Myth

Critics of Iran’s opposition often cite its apparent diversity as evidence of irreconcilable divisions. A closer look reveals a more nuanced reality: while various groups claim the mantle of opposition, most lack the organizational capacity or domestic legitimacy to lead a revolution. These largely exile-based factions can be broadly categorized as communist, reformist, nationalist and monarchist. Each deserves to be examined to assess its relevance to the democratic struggle in Iran.

  • Communists: Once influential during the 1979 revolution, groups such as the Tudeh Party have faded into obscurity. Repressed by both the Shah and the Islamic Republic, they now exist as intellectual circles in Europe, with no organizational presence or popular support inside Iran. Their ideological rigidity and historical irrelevance make them peripheral.
  • Reformists: Advocates of change from within, often linked to past administrations such as those of Presidents Khatami or Rouhani, present themselves as a humane alternative to hardline rule. But their track record exposes this as a mirage. Decades of attempted reform have produced only cosmetic changes, each of which has been stifled by the absolute authority of the Supreme Leader under the Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist). Many reformists are enmeshed in the regime’s economic and political networks, benefiting from IRGC-controlled businesses. Their criticism of the PMOI as ‘radical’ or ‘terrorist’ is suspiciously in line with Tehran’s propaganda, suggesting a vested interest in preserving the status quo rather than dismantling it.
  • Nationalists: Advocating a vague return to ‘Persian greatness’, nationalist groups lack a unified platform or operational structure. Sidelined since the 1980s, they operate mainly in exile, with minimal influence beyond diaspora conferences or media appearances. Their inability to mobilize inside Iran limits their impact.
  • Monarchists: Led by Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed Shah, monarchists are vocal in the diaspora, particularly in California, where they benefit from significant financial resources and platforms such as Manoto TV. Their rallies are often marked by nostalgic reverence for the Pahlavi era, with some supporters portraying the Shah as a quasi-divine figure – an attitude at odds with democratic norms. The 1979 revolution’s decisive rejection of royal rule remains a powerful memory for Iranians, and there is no credible evidence of a popular appetite for the restoration of the monarchy. Historical precedents for restored monarchies, such as Spain in 1975, required negotiated transitions and elite consensus – conditions absent in Iran’s polarized landscape.

These exile-based groups share a critical weakness: they lack operational networks inside Iran. While monarchists and reformists amplify their voices through funding and media access, their campaigns rarely translate into tangible influence on the domestic struggle. The Iranian public, particularly its youth – who make up over 60% of the population and are driving the current uprisings – show little enthusiasm for nostalgic or reformist agendas. The regime’s narrative of a fragmented opposition, echoed by its apologists, capitalizes on this disconnect, portraying the opposition as a cacophony of irrelevant voices to discredit the prospect of coordinated resistance.

The Neo-Fascist Monarchist Mirage

The monarchist movement led by Reza Pahlavi deserves particular scrutiny for its role in perpetuating the myth of partition. Its rallies, often marked by ultranationalist rhetoric and symbols, have a disturbing neo-fascist undertone, glorifying the Shah as an almost mythical savior. This revisionist narrative ignores the Pahlavi regime’s record of corruption, repression and reliance on the SAVAK secret police – factors that fueled the 1979 revolution. Associating the broader democratic opposition with such a faction risks damaging its credibility and alienating Iranians who reject both theocracy and monarchy.

Moreover, the resurgence of the monarchists after the 2021-2022 protests arguably diluted the momentum of a unified resistance. Pahlavi’s re-emergence, portrayed by some as a unifying moment, instead sowed confusion among diaspora activists and distracted from grassroots efforts inside Iran. The regime capitalized on this rift, intensifying its crackdown and regaining control. Far from being a viable alternative, the monarchist push serves as a performative distraction, inadvertently helping the mullahs by diverting attention from more credible forces.

The Fallacy of Reform and the Regime’s Allies

Equally misleading is the notion that reform is plausible within the Islamic Republic. The theocracy’s founding doctrine, Velayat-e Faqih, vests absolute power in the Supreme Leader, rendering elections and reforms cosmetic. The Guardian Council’s disqualification of candidates ensures that only loyalists ascend, as seen in the 2021 election that installed Ebrahim Raisi. Prominent ‘reformists’ often come from the regime’s elite, with economic ties to IRGC businesses or personal interests in the status quo. Their criticism of the PMOI echoes Tehran’s propaganda, suggesting a symbiotic relationship rather than genuine opposition. The disillusionment of the Iranian public, crystallized in the 2017 and 2022 uprisings, underlines that reform is a spent force, leaving regime change as the only credible path.

The NCRI and the PMOI: a United Force for Change

Contrary to the myth of division, the NCRI and the PMOI/MEK are a disciplined, organized movement with deep roots in Iranian society. The PMOI’s Resistance Units, operating in dozens of cities, engage in civil disobedience, sabotage and information warfare at great personal risk. These activities – almost unprecedented in scale and consistency – demonstrate a national presence that no other group can match. The regime itself recognizes this threat, with state media and officials frequently identifying the PMOI as its most dangerous adversary. This obsession reflects a strategic calculation: the PMOI’s ideological clarity, internal discipline and operational network pose an existential challenge.

Internationally, the NCRI, led by Maryam Rajavi, advocates a secular, democratic Iran committed to gender equality, ethnic autonomy and peaceful regional relations. Its platform offers a comprehensive framework for transition – something conspicuously absent from other factions. The NCRI’s engagement with lawmakers, human rights organizations and policymakers worldwide increases its influence and positions it as a credible partner for those seeking a stable, democratic Iran.

Disinformation and Media Bias

The PMOI and NCRI face a double assault: a disinformation campaign by the regime and parallel attacks by monarchist and reformist rivals. Tehran’s efforts include fabricated documentaries, online smears and pseudo-academic reports, often laundered through Western-based agents, that portray the PMOI as a cult or terrorist group – a label removed by the US in 2012 and the EU in 2009 after legal reviews. The monarchists, meanwhile, accuse the PMOI of radicalism, a charge that conveniently ignores their own extremist tendencies. This convergence of narratives underscores a shared interest in sidelining the PMOI, the only group that threatens both theocratic and monarchical visions.

Media bias exacerbates this challenge. Persian-language outlets such as BBC Persian, Voice of America and Iran International – which are funded by foreign governments – rarely cover PMOI activities, reflecting editorial policies aligned with geopolitical interests. BBC Persian, dubbed the ‘Ayatollah BBC’ by critics, has been accused of soft-pedalling regime abuses while amplifying anti-PMOI narratives. Iran International, allegedly backed by Saudi interests, favors monarchist voices. This selective coverage distorts perceptions and amplifies minor players while obscuring the PMOI’s domestic influence.

A Way Forward: Unity Around Democratic Principles

The claim of a hopelessly divided opposition falls apart under scrutiny. The multiplicity of exile groups does not equate to a fragmentation of purpose among those actively opposing the regime. Monarchists and reformists, while vocal, lack the infrastructure or legitimacy to lead a revolution. Their prominence owes more to external funding and media access than to organic support within Iran. Historical precedent supports this argument: the 2021-2022 uprising faltered not because of internal discord but because of external interference, as monarchist opportunism diluted momentum at a critical juncture.

Iran’s democratic future depends on empowering those who have demonstrated commitment, capacity and consistency. The NCRI and PMOI, despite decades of marginalization and vilification, are at the forefront of this struggle. Their vision – a secular, inclusive republic – resonates with the aspirations of Iran’s youth and the lived experience of repression and resistance. Western governments must reassess their policies and recognize that appeasement and reformism have failed. Supporting the Iranian people’s right to self-determination means supporting the forces that are already reshaping Iran’s destiny.

The narrative of a divided opposition is a deliberate distortion designed to maintain a status quo that benefits the regime and its enablers. Amid the noise of exile factions and social media activism, there is a disciplined, coherent movement with a clear vision for Iran’s future. The NCRI and PMOI are not one among many – they are the vanguard of a revolution rooted in decades of sacrifice and resilience.

Democracy, peace and an end to Tehran’s tyranny are not distant dreams but attainable goals, achievable through a commitment to the forces driving change from within. The international community, the Iranian diaspora and all those who stand for freedom must choose: to see reality as it is, or to remain complicit in its distortion.

[1] Dan Charles, “Lifting Sanctions Will Release $100 Billion to Iran. Then What?” NPR, 16 July 2015. Available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/07/16/423562391/lifting-sanctions-will-release-100-billion-to-iran-then-what

[2]  “Fluctuations in the Dollar Exchange Rate in 2015.” Donya-e-eqtesad- daily, 20 March 2016. Available at: https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/بخش-سایت-خوان-62/3032000-فراز-نشیب-های-نرخ-دلار-در-سال-نمودار

[3] “Changes in the Dollar Price in 2018 + Chart.” Mizan news agency (affiliated with the Judiciary), 27 March 2019. Available at: https://www.mizanonline.ir/fa/news/505751/تغییرات-قیمت-دلار-در-سال-۹۷-نمودار.

[4] “Dollar and foreign exchange prices on Thursday, 10 September 2020.” Javan Online (affiliated with the IRGC), Available at: https://www.javanonline.ir/fa/news/1018761.

[5] “A turbulent year for the greenback.” 7Sobh, 8 April 2024. Available at: https://7sobh.com/بخش-اقتصادی-31/555739-سال-پرتلاطم-اسکناس-سبز

[6] “Pezeshkian settles in Pastor with this dollar rate / Key economic figures.” Khabar Online, 28 July 2024. Available at: https://www.khabaronline.ir/live/1937766.

[7] “Iran: Inflation rate from 1980 to 2024.” Statista, 2024. Available at:  https://www.statista.com/statistics/1396114/iran-consumer-price-inflation/.

[8] “Prices of various breads at free-market and subsidized rates.” Diyar Mirza, 22 November 2018. Available at: https://diyarmirza.ir/1397/09/قیمت-انواع-نان-به-نرخ-آزاد-و-یارانه‌ای/   

[9] “Bread prices soar amid widespread violations in bakeries / Silence from Agriculture Ministry and Regulatory Organization.” Rokna News Agency, 16 April 2025. Available at: https://www.rokna.net/1111686. https://www.rokna.net/بخش-اخبار-اقتصادی-65/1111686-قیمت-نان-رها-شد-تخلفات-گسترده-در-نانوایی-ها-سکوت-وزارت-جهاد-کشاورزی-سازمان-تعزیرات-حکومتی

[10] “Potato prices reach 5,500 tomans.” Tasnim News Agency (affiliated with the IRGC), 28 September 2018. Available at: https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1397/07/06/1839106

[11] “New potato prices announced (Farvardin 1403).” Gostaresh News, 9 April 2025. Available at: https://www.gostaresh.news/بخش-اقتصاد-7/350310-قیمت-جدید-سیب-زمینی-اعلام-شد-فروردین?rssRedirect=c2hhaHJla2hhYmFyLmNvbQ%3D%3D

[12] “Egg prices hit record levels.” Tasnim News Agency (affiliated with the IRGC), 6 November 2018. Available at: https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1397/08/15/1870138

[13] “Significant drop in egg prices in the market / The cost of a tray of eggs.” Fararu, 8 April 2025. Available at: https://fararu.com/fa/news/851462

[14] “Meat prices fall.” Delgarm, 14 October 2018. Available at: https://www.delgarm.com/news/economic/167855.

[15] Iran’s Statistical Center. Available at: https://amar.org.ir/

[16] ‌ “Iran’s unemployment rate: One in four without a job.” BBC Persian, 25 October 2013. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2013/10/131025_l51_unemployment_rate_iran.

[17] “The Real Unemployment Rate in Iran is 35 to 40 Percent.” Mashregh News, 11 March 2017. Available at: https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/700339/

[18] “Actual number of unemployed in Iran is 22 million.” Voice of America (VOA), 8 October 2024. Available at: https://ir.voanews.com/a/actual-number-of-unemployed-is-22-million/7814316.html

[19] “Hemmati: Smuggling Can’t Be Controlled by Customs When 20 Million Liters of Diesel are Smuggled Daily.” Student News Network (SNN), 2 March 2025. Available at: https://snn.ir/fa/news/1234492/

[20] “Is It Possible Not to Know What Seven Years of Inflation Above 40 Percent Has Done to People’s Livelihoods?” Mashregh News, 2 March 2025. Available at: https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/1694493/

[21] “The Story of Debsh Tea Corruption.” Tabnak, 20 December 2023. Available at: https://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/1211272/

[22] Ibid.

[23] “Embezzlement and Theft of $140 Million; The Curtain is Drawn.” Iran Freedom, 6 April 2025. https://iranfreedom.net/اختلاس-و-دزدی-۱۴۰میلیون-دلاری؛-پرده-دی/

[24] “The Wonders of the 92 Trillion Rial Corruption of the White-Collars in Mobarakeh Steel.” Farhikhtegan Daily, 21 August 2022. https://farhikhtegandaily.com/news/73754/

[25] World Bank’s report on a decade of poverty and prosperity in Iran, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance News Center. Available at: https://www.mefa.ir/en-US/shada/5588/news/view/22871/256575/

[26] “Digital 2025: Iran.” DataReportal – Global Digital Insights, January 2025. Available at: https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2025-iran ​

[27] “Hosseini Ragfar: We are Facing the Risk of Repeating Events Like November and Autumn.” Hammihan Online, 13 November 2024. Available at: https://hammihanonline.ir/بخش-اقتصاد-5/25628-حسین-راغفر-با-خطر-تکرار-رویدادهایی-مانند-آبان-پاییز-روبرو-هستیم

[28] “Warning from Ahmad Tavakkoli to Corrupt Officials and those Silent with Anger: Be Afraid of Every Window that Brings Out Corruption.” Asriran, 3 March 2025. Available at: https://www.asriran.com/fa/news/1041929/هشدار-احمد-توکلی-به-مسئولان-فاسد-و-ساکت-از-خشم-تهدیدستان-بترسید-از-هر-دری-که-فساد-را-بیرون-می-کنیم-از-پنجره-ای-وارد-می-شود

[29] “Beigadli: Society Cannot Bear this Heavy Burden Anymore.” Payam Gilan News, 3 April 2025. Available at: https://www.pgnews.ir/بیگدلی-جامعه-دیگر-تحمل-این-بار-سنگین-را

[30] “Miraculous: The Percentage of Unhappy People in Iran—If the Unhappy Go to the Streets, No One Can Stand Against Them.” Khabarfoori, 20 March 2023. Available at: https://www.khabarfoori.com/بخش-سیاسی-59/2995284-مرعشی-درصد-مردم-ایران-ناراضی-هستند-اگر-ناراضیان-به-خیابان-بریزند-هیچ-کس-حریف-آنها-نخواهد-شد

[31] Statement by Secretariat of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), 26 May 2025. Available at: https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/ncri-statements/statement-human-rights/irans-regime-executes-11-prisoners-in-late-may-including-one-woman/

[32] “Iran Analysis: Old Grievances Spark New Protests.” The National News, 4 January 2018. Available at: https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/iran-analysis-old-grievances-spark-new-protests-1.692003

[33] “Special Report: Iran’s Leader Ordered Crackdown on Unrest: ‘Do Whatever It Takes.’” Reuters, 20 November 2019. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/world/special-report-irans-leader-ordered-crackdown-on-unrest-do-whatever-it-take-idUSKBN1YR0QO/

[34] “Iran’s Crackdown After Mahsa Amini’s Death Prompts Protests.” The Washington Post, 20 September 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/20/iran-mahsa-amini-death-hijab-protest/

[35] “Iran Security Forces Clash with Protesters Over Amini’s Death.” Reuters, 27 September 2022. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-security-forces-clash-with-protesters-over-aminis-death-2022-09-27/

[36] Geoffrey Robertson QC, “Massacre of Political Prisoners in Iran, 1988: Report of an Inquiry,” Robertson Report, 2017. Available at: https://www.iranrights.org/attachments/library/doc_118.pdf

[37] Javaid Rehman, “Atrocity Crimes and grave violations of human rights committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran (1981–1982 and 1988),” United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 17 July 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/iran/20240717-SR-Iran-Findings.pdf

[38] “Maryam Rajavi’s Ten‑Point Plan for the Future of Iran,” National Council of Resistance of Iran, accessed April 2025. Available at: https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/maryam-rajavis-ten-point-plan-for-future-iran/

[39] McKay, Hollie. “Guest Essay: One Woman’s Harrowing Tale of Torture under the Shah Sheds Light on Iran’s Dark History.” HotAir, 12 April 2025. Available at: https://hotair.com/ed-morrissey/2025/04/12/guest-essay-one-womans-harrowing-tale-of-torture-under-the-shah-sheds-light-on-irans-dark-history-n3801697

[40] “Remarks in a Meeting with the People of Qom” (بیانات در دیدار مردم قم). Farsi.Khamenei.ir, 7 January 2020. https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=44628.

[41] Iran: Brutal Treatment and Torture of Political Prisoners Supporting the PMOI, NCRI website, 14 March 2025. Available at: https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/ncri-statements/statement-human-rights/iran-brutal-treatment-and-torture-of-political-prisoners-supporting-the-pmoi/ 

[42] “Gharibabadi: We See Nouri’s Case as Political / Asadi Was Subjected to Humiliating Searches.” Entekhab.ir, 25 June 2022. Available at: https://www.entekhab.ir/fa/news/682735

[43] “Iran’s Resistance Units Escalate Challenge Against the Regime Amid Growing Public Discontent.” National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), 3 April 2024. Available at: https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-resistance/irans-resistance-units-escalate-challenge-against-the-regime-amid-growing-public-discontent/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[44] “Iranian Regime’s Stance on the MEK’s Role in November 2019 Protests.” National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), 26 November 2019.Available at: https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/iran-protests-2019/iranian-regime-s-stance-on-the-mek-s-role-in-november-2019-protests/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[45] “As MEK Resistance Units Expand Activities Inside Iran, Regime Fears Explosive Society.” Mojahedin.org, February 1, 2021. Available at: https://english.mojahedin.org/news/resistance/as-mek-resistance-units-expand-activities-inside-iran-regime-fears-explosive-society/

[46] “Qassem Soleimani’s Infamous Legacy.” Mojahedin.org, 7 January 2022. Available at: https://english.mojahedin.org/article/qassem-soleimanis-infamous-legacy/.

[47] Christina Lamb, “Khomeini fatwa ‘led to killing of 30,000 in Iran,” The Sunday Telegraph, 28 September 2016. Available at: https://iran1988.org/sunday-telegraph-khomeini-fatwa-led-killing-30000-iran/

[48] Roshanak Darabi, “A Freedom of Choice Revolution Is Roiling Iran,” the Village Voice, 15 September 2022. Available at: https://www.villagevoice.com/a-freedom-of-choice-revolution-is-roiling-iran/

[49] https://x.com/ResistanceUnits/status/1904934212261622036

[50] Ibid.

[51] Iran begins trial of 104 MKO members in absentia, Xinhua, 13 December 2023. Available at: https://english.news.cn/20231213/5348700888e04c21959958d86b0216bd/c.html

[52] Iranian Regime Transfers Five PMOI Supporters on Death Row to Ghezel Hesar for Execution, NCRI website, 16 April 2025. Available at: https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/ncri-statements/statement-human-rights/iranian-regime-transfers-five-pmoi-supporters-on-death-row-to-ghezel-hesar-for-execution/

[53] Global Leaders Rally Behind Free Iran March in Paris, NCRI website 4 February 2025. Available at: https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-resistance/global-leaders-rally-behind-free-iran-march-in-paris/

[54] Voices of Defiance: 20,000 Messages Signal Iran’s Hidden Resistance Surge, Iran Freedom website, 29 June 2024, https://iranfreedom.org/en/news/2024/06/voices-of-defiance-20000-messages-signal-irans-hidden-resistance-surge/61286/